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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this thesis is to explore the applicability of transaction cost theory to an 
emerging market context, and to complement it with institutional theory to achieve a 
closer fit. The research questions are:  
(1) Which causes of high transaction costs are perceived by firms in the research 
site?  
(2) How do they respond to these costs? The responses could range from 
internalisation, through cooperation, to the new concept of trading isolation, 
which is the first of two observed gaps in the literature.  
(3) Could an institutional perspective help to explain firms’ responses, if they differ 
from what is expected by theory? The consideration of informal institutions with 
regard to transaction costs in China addresses the second observed gap in the 
literature, which focuses mostly on formal institutions. 
Despite the strengths of transaction cost theory in identifying sources of friction in 
exchange and proposing resolutions, it has been criticised for making assumptions 
concerning behaviour and the strength of formal institutions that reduce the degree to 
which it applies in non-Western, emerging market research contexts. This thesis 
explores these limitations in the context of the inbound tourism sector in the Tiger 
Leaping Gorge, in rural Yunnan Province, Southwest China. The author’s 
exploratory study had suggested that some of these firms attempted to reduce 
transaction costs by decreasing the number of transactions conducted, resulting in 
their relative isolation from – rather than integration into – a trading network. This 
hinders the firms’ ability to develop and specialise, limiting their contribution to 
local economic growth in this relatively undeveloped region of China.  
In the principal field study, qualitative data were collected through interviews 
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The interviews sought to understand the transaction costs the proprietors perceived, 
their views of institutional strength or weakness (in areas including local 
government, legal system, financing, development of trust, kinship, guanxi and 
networks), and the ways they organised their firms. The data were explored first with 
a thematic analysis, then by coding into fuzzy sets for analysis with the Qualitative 
Comparative Approach to help identify causal associations between transaction 
costs, institutions, and responses of isolation from or integration into the market. 
The main causes of transaction costs were found to be opportunism, uncertainty and 
bounded rationality. High transaction costs were generally associated with a response 
of isolation, but they were not the sole causal factor: every isolated firm reported 
weak informal institutions combined with a variety of transaction cost and formal 
institutional conditions. The difficulty of establishing new trust relationships 
increased the isolation of the worst-affected firms, in an environment where weak 
formal protection from transaction risks confined many firms to personal exchange.  
A recommendation for local practice is made for firms to attempt to broaden the 
networks within which they develop trust, to reduce the constraint of personal 
exchange and consequent isolation. Two policy recommendations are made that 
could apply here and in emerging markets more generally: a mainstream 
recommendation to strengthen the enforcement of formal institutions, aiming to 
facilitate rule-based, impersonal exchange based on generalised trust, and an 
alternative approach deriving recommendations from the local context and including 
the consideration of informal institutions. 
This thesis contributes to theory by highlighting the critical influence of informal 
social structures on the cost and extent of exchange, and adapting transaction cost 
theory to better apply to this institutional context. It also constitutes a novel 
application of the Qualitative Comparative Approach to interview data.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION  
The aim of this study is to explore the applicability of transaction cost theory to an 
emerging market context, adapting it by means of integration with institutional 
theory to achieve a closer fit. This exploration is achieved through an investigation 
into firm-level behaviour, centred on the causes of transaction costs that firms 
perceive, the ways in which they respond to these costs, and the impact of the 
institutional context on their response. 
Despite the strengths of transaction cost theory in identifying sources of friction in 
exchange and proposing resolutions, it has been criticised for making assumptions 
concerning behaviour and the strength of formal institutions that reduce the degree to 
which it applies in emerging market research contexts. The term “emerging markets” 
was coined by Antoine van Agtmael in 1981 (Peng, 2006), and it refers to economies 
characterised by high gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates, low GDP per 
capita, and economic liberalisation in progress (Arnold and Quelch, 1998). The 
further features of emerging markets that are recognised as impacting on business 
decision-making include the characteristics of undeveloped market institutions, weak 
legal enforcement, limited infrastructure, and political and economic uncertainty 
(Hoskisson et al., 2000). Conducting research in emerging markets offers an 
opportunity to “assess the generalisability and relevance of concepts and frameworks 
that have been accepted as universal… [in sites] overlooked or under-researched by 
management scholars” (Thomas, 1996: 493). This study explores these limitations in 
the context of the small firms engaged in the inbound tourism sector in the Tiger 
Leaping Gorge, in rural Yunnan Province, Southwest China. The rationale for the 
selection of this site during an exploratory study conducted by the author is presented 
in section 1.4. 
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The exploratory study suggested that some of these firms attempted to reduce 
transaction costs by decreasing the number of transactions conducted, rather than 
responding through the internalisation or cooperation anticipated by transaction cost 
theory. This appeared to result in their relative isolation from the market rather than 
their integration into a trading network. The exploratory study further suggested that 
some elements of the institutional context were limiting the options open to firms in 
their response to high transaction costs. The importance of this is that it hinders these 
firms’ ability to develop and specialise, limiting their contribution to local economic 
growth in this relatively undeveloped region of China. 
This chapter outlines the theoretical issue to be addressed, explaining why it would 
usefully be explored in the context of small firms in China’s interior, and presents the 
theoretical and practical significance of this. It explains how a research site was 
selected, then sets out the structure of this thesis, and outlines the contributions it is 
expected to make.  
1.1 The theoretical issue 
The costs of conducting transactions have been compared to friction that increases 
the expense and delay of exchange (Williamson, 1985), and can occur during the 
specification and the enforcement of exchange (North, 1994a). Transaction cost 
theory was formalised by Oliver Williamson in 1975, and it considers the factors that 
contribute to high transaction costs to be bounded rationality, opportunism, asset 
specificity, transaction frequency and uncertainty. It further anticipates that firms 
will respond to high transaction costs by modifying the governance of individual 
transactions, and by moving towards integrated organisation structures; since the 
mid-1980s, the further alternative of adopting cooperative structures has attracted 
increasing research interest (Thorelli, 1986). Despite the strengths of transaction cost 
theory in explaining transaction governance and organisation structures in response 
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to transaction costs, it has been criticised from various angles – and it is these 
criticisms that this study seeks to address. 
The criticisms that are central to this study concern the applicability of transaction 
cost theory to other research contexts, as management theories developed in the West 
cannot simply be assumed to be appropriate to emerging economies (Luo, 1997). 
Williamson’s expectation that the transaction costs of bounded rationality and 
opportunism will uniformly lead to the internalisation of market transactions is 
strongly criticised as being inappropriate in Confucian countries that prioritise long-
term relationships more highly than profit maximisation (Dore, 1983). The 
assumption of opportunism is further considered to overstate the rationale for 
internalisation in contexts where the market operates to remove opportunists (Hill, 
1990). Both of these criticisms focus on the influence that different institutional 
contexts may have on both the level of transaction costs, and the ways in which firms 
respond to them. The enforcement of agreements at low cost is dependent upon 
sound institutions (North, 1990), which may not be available in emerging market 
contexts (Rao, 2003), and are recognised as being less reliable in China (Zhou and 
Poppo, 2008). This study therefore aims to respond to these criticisms by examining 
the applicability of transaction cost theory to an emerging market context, 
specifically China. 
Within China the reliability of legal institutions, and consequently their effect on the 
level of transaction costs, varies by region and becomes weaker in the less developed 
provinces (Luo, 2007). Prior studies of transaction costs and institutions in China 
have focused on the industrialised coastal cities and provinces, for example 
Guangdong (Child and Moellering, 2003), Beijing and Shanghai (Zhou and Poppo, 
2008), multiple coastal cities (Zhou et al., 2008), and Guangdong, Shanghai, 
Shandong, Zhejiang, and Zhejiang’s immediate hinterland of Anhui (Peng and Luo, 
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2000). This study therefore seeks to make a fresh exploration of the costs and 
institutions in a less developed region of China’s interior. 
Transaction cost theory has further been criticised for offering an under-socialised 
explanation of economic action (Granovetter, 1985), by focusing on economic 
motives to the exclusion of social relations and trust. This study attempts to address 
this criticism by its consideration of informal institutions – including the structures 
within which trust can be formed, such as kinship ties and networks – as social 
influences on economic behaviour, and by its selection of a research site in which 
social relations might be expected be very important to the conduct of business. 
Studies applying transaction cost theory to the Chinese research context find more 
evidence of cooperation than the other expected responses. Their authors explain this 
with reference to a range of both cultural factors and formal institutions, inviting 
further research into Chinese firms’ responses to high transaction costs with 
particular regard to informal institutions. 
The literature offers contradictory views as to the impact of the causes of transaction 
costs on small firms. Whereas Nooteboom (1993) observes that small firms incur 
higher transaction costs related to bounded rationality, uncertainty and opportunism 
than large firms, Granovetter (1985) expects small firms’ networks of social relations 
to protect them from the risk of opportunism. This study seeks to understand more 
clearly the transaction costs perceived by small firms. 
Transaction cost and agency theories are content theories, emphasising the outcomes 
of firms’ decisions, as opposed to the processes by which they reach these decisions 
that are the concern of behavioural and organisational theories (Douma and 
Schreuder, 1991). Transaction cost theory employs comparative institutional analysis 
to evaluate the relative levels of transaction costs under alternative governance 
structures. The level of analysis for transaction cost theory is the organisation or the 
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dyadic relationship between firms engaged in an exchange, whereas agency theory 
analyses the behaviour of individuals, and behavioural theory operates within a 
single organisation. Whereas agency theory is concerned with the analysis of 
individual motivation, transaction cost theory places the individual into an 
institutional context, making firms rather than individuals the unit of analysis 
(Dietrich, 1994). 
1.2 The exploratory study and the research problem 
The author undertook an exploratory study at an early stage in the research 
programme. This was considered to be important in order to assess the feasibility of 
the proposed main study, as a certain degree of fit between theory and site would be 
required in order to produce interesting findings, but too close a fit would risk failing 
to make a new contribution. As indicated in the review of critiques of transaction 
cost theory presented above, a site was sought that represented an emerging market 
with a Confucian history, an uncertain formal institutional environment, an emphasis 
on social relations in business, that contained small firms and ideally was located in 
China’s interior. The exploratory study took the form of an ethnographic 
reconnaissance (Wolcott, 1999), to facilitate an inductive exploration of firms’ 
perceptions of the causes of transaction costs in the research site and their responses 
to them. The study first considered the practical feasibility of research in three sites, 
as will be described in section 1.4, and it then focused on one site in particular for 
this exploration of perceptions, which is the subject of Chapter 3. 
This exploratory study found that transaction costs caused by uncertainty, 
opportunism and bounded rationality were perceived to be present, and it uncovered 
a form of response to transaction costs whereby firms’ avoidance of (the high costs 
of) transactions led to their isolation from other firms. “Isolation” is used here to 
describe a tendency of some firms to rely on in-house production or limited volumes 
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of personal exchange for inputs, as opposed to trading widely and being integrated 
into a supply network, and as distinct from the theory’s expected responses of 
internalisation and cooperation. The exploratory study suggested that high 
transaction costs were causing firms to become isolated from the market, in the 
absence of institutional mechanisms to reduce the transaction costs. This response 
has received little attention in the literature. Isolation delays the firms’ integration 
into the market and the transition towards impersonal exchange that could enable 
further specialisation (North, 1990) and so increase the potential contribution of 
these firms to local economic development. 
The study also suggested that institutions, both formal and informal, were important 
in shaping firms’ choice of response. Internalisation was made difficult for foreign 
tour operators who were constrained by foreign-ownership regulations and the 
perceived risk to property, and domestic firms were hindered by limited access to 
financing. An example of cooperation between a local and a foreign firm was found, 
which benefited both firms (in the form of improved market access for the former, 
and reliable supply for the latter), but which appeared to lead to dependency on the 
foreign firm rather than a reciprocal relationship. In other cases, informal social 
structures such as kinship and networks appeared to be important to the conduct of 
business. 
The exploratory study thus identified a research problem of the need to understand 
why firms that perceived high transaction costs responded with isolation, and how 
this response could be avoided. This in turn contributed to the shaping of research 
questions that would guide the more detailed investigation to be pursued in the 
principal stage of research. The questions are: 
1. Which causes of transaction costs are perceived by decision-makers in the firms 
studied? 




Sacha Rawlence  7 
 
2. How do the firms respond to these transaction costs? 
3. Could an understanding of local institutions help us to explain firms’ responses to 
transaction costs? 
1.3 The significance of the research problem 
The significance of the research problem is now assessed with reference to criteria 
that were originally proposed by Level and Waters (1976), and which have 
subsequently been grouped into the two dimensions of theoretical and practical 
significance by Kittler (2009). 
1.3.1 Theoretical significance 
The theoretical rationale for pursuing a research problem is comprised of its 
contribution to a current research gap, its ability to sharpen the definition of a 
concept or the relationships between concepts, the scope for generalisation, and new 
contributions to data collection and analysis techniques. 
The starting point for the theoretical basis of this study was the view that transaction 
cost theory may not apply equally well in all research contexts, suggesting an initial 
gap to be addressed by exploring the theory in a testing new context. This 
expectation of limited applicability was borne out in exploratory study by the firms 
that appeared not to respond to high transaction costs in the ways anticipated by the 
literature, which focuses on the internalisation of intermediate markets, and 
cooperation. There was little evidence of these anticipated responses in the 
exploratory study, as instead, the firms tended towards self-reliance and isolation 
from the market, which is touched on only very briefly in the literature. The 
influence of institutions on the level of transaction costs and firms’ responses to them 
is considered in the literature concerning emerging markets including China, but is 
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very limited in its treatment of informal institutions in the Chinese context. The 
specific gaps addressed are thus the novel concept of isolation as a response to the 
high transaction costs, and the need for detailed attention to the impact of informal 
institutions in this context. 
The literature gives slight consideration to the possibility that firms might avoid 
transactions whose costs are excessively high, and that where this is habitual it could 
result in the reduction of firms’ participation in the market. The isolation that was 
observed during the exploratory study has been adopted as a sensitising concept for 
the principal study (Blumer, 1954), which is intended to expand upon this idea with 
reference to the firms’ experience in order to result in a sharper definition that can 
more readily be deployed in future research. This study will also deepen our 
understanding of the relationship between transaction cost and institutional theories, 
which has not previously been achieved in such a way as to explain the influences of 
the institutional environment that result in the isolation that has been observed in this 
context. 
Once isolation has been recognised as a current phenomenon in this research context, 
it seems likely that more instances of isolation will become apparent in future 
research seeking to explore it. We therefore consider this study’s examination of the 
causes of isolation to offer scope for generalisation to other emerging market 
contexts with weak institutions, and from International Business to other disciplines 
such as Development Studies that share our concern with the potential contribution 
of private enterprise to economic development. 
Although this study offers a theoretical contribution in its refinement of the concept 
of isolation, the author considers isolation to be not so much a new phenomenon as a 
relatively new subject of research. This suggests that the interview-based data 
collection method has contributed to more effective observation than researchers 
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may have employed in the past, and so the manner in which the study was conducted 
also adds to its significance. Furthermore, the use of the Qualitative Comparative 
Approach (QCA) for the analysis of interview data, and in the discipline of 
International Business, will later be discussed as a methodological contribution. 
1.3.2 Practical significance 
A research problem may be considered to be of practical significance if it addresses 
an issue that is of current and practical concern to a critical population, and can also 
relate to a wider population. 
Isolation has the practical consequence of hindering the development of the small 
firms studied, as their reluctance to trade beyond the range of their trusted personal 
contacts prevents them from extending into impersonal exchange, which then 
constrains their ability to specialise and so benefit from increased productivity. This 
in turn carries significant implications for broader economic growth, which relies to 
some extent on the development of small firms, as will be discussed below. The 
exploratory study found this isolation to be a current phenomenon in the research 
site, affecting firms at the very time the study was conducted. The anticipated 
constraint on economic growth is also particularly timely in the period following 
worldwide recession. However, the currency of the problem does not equate with it 
being transient or of only temporary significance, as the need for development in the 
less-developed regions of China (see section 1.4.2) is a long-term issue which has no 
immediately foreseeable solution. 
The population of decision-makers in the firms participating in this study is 
considered to be of critical importance to the research problem, because the decisions 
they make contribute directly to their firms’ isolation. They perceive high transaction 
costs, do not enjoy institutional safeguards of impersonal exchange, and respond by 
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reducing the number of transactions they undertake, confining them to personal 
relationships – so their decisions work as obstacles to their firms’ development. Any 
results of this study that help to explain the combinations of causal factors associated 
with isolation, and how they can be avoided, could be of direct benefit to these firms. 
However, a solution to the research problem would not be of exclusive relevance to 
the firms studied in the research context. The wider population to which the findings 
could apply includes firms suffering high transaction costs in the context of an 
emerging market with developing institutions, and even extends to all other 
participants of the focal economy to whose development the isolated firms contribute 
less than they might otherwise do.  
Private enterprise is of recognised importance to economic growth and employment 
in general terms (Wennekers and Thurik, 1999, Morrison et al., 2003, Bennett, 
2006), in rural economies (North and Smallbone, 1996) and in emerging markets 
where the growth of small firms in particular can be vital (Danis et al., 2010). This is 
of especial relevance to China, where the privatisation of a substantial proportion of 
the formerly state-owned sector makes future growth more dependent on private 
sector growth. An environment conducive to the growth of these large firms should 
also benefit small private firms, as a climate amenable to endogenous regional 
development would foster the growth of all firms rather than just those in receipt of 
special incentives (Pyke and Sengenberger, 1992). Adverse conditions such as high 
risk not only impose difficulty on small firms, but also reduce the extent to which 
they can participate in local development (Galbraith and Stiles, 2006); the Chinese 
Ministry of Commerce has announced expenditure intended to support the 
development of employment by small domestic firms (MOFCOM, 2008). 
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1.4 The selection of a research context 
The preceding outline of critiques of transaction cost theory suggested that a 
challenging context for our attempt to apply and extend the theory would be an 
emerging market environment characterised by high transaction costs, weak formal 
institutions and an emphasis on social relations (suggesting a location in China’s 
interior), in which small firms are engaged in international business. We therefore 
sought to meet these criteria by identifying a Chinese region within which the 
research problem could usefully be explored, before focusing on a province within 
that region where the criteria were present, and specifying an active sector of the 
province’s economy within which to seek participating firms. 
1.4.1 How Western China meets the selection criteria, and how the 
research could address its practical problem of surplus labour 
It has been explained above that China’s interior offers weak institutional 
enforcement. The Western provinces in particular are identified as posing a 
challenging environment for business (Luo, 1997), resulting in their attraction of 
only a fraction of China’s inbound foreign direct investment (Loughman, 2007).  
The West was the temporary focus of industrial development during the period of the 
first five-year plan (1953-57), when security concerns outweighed locational 
advantage. However, it was then eclipsed by the exclusive prioritisation of the 
development of the East, which was the focus of Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms 
in the 1980s.  
The resulting developmental imbalance was recognised by the Chinese government, 
and the ninth five-year plan (1996-2000) included the aims of reducing the East-
West disparity (Yan, 2003) and improving the West’s infrastructure (Lin and Liu, 
2008). This was continued into the tenth five-year plan (2001-05) with the launch of 
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the Western Development Plan, which was intended to upgrade the industrial 
structure and foster growth poles in the West (OECD, 2010). This plan has, however, 
has been criticised for delivering greater economic benefit to the East, through its 
perpetuation of the West’s role as low-cost producer of natural resources to the rest 
of the country (Goodman, 2004). This view is supported by researchers at the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, who have found a negative correlation 
between the development of the energy sector and economic development in the 
Western provinces since the launch of the plan (Shao and Qi, 2008). 
To promote economic growth in the West and reduce the developmental imbalance, a 
shift has been recommended from this region-wide natural resource production to 
each province targeting its own comparative advantages (Lin and Liu, 2008). For 
Western China this would suggest labour- rather than capital-intensive sectors, due to 
the labour surplus that we will discuss below. Change is needed, as the current 
regionally unbalanced growth is not thought to be sustainable either in economic 
terms (Ding, 2007), or in terms of social stability (Shirk, 2007). 
Another dimension of imbalance is between urban and rural areas, that further 
accentuates the development gap between East and West (Wan, 2008). Institutional 
weakness is a key differentiator:  
Low accountability is linked with weak rule of law in the countryside. Courts are a key 
institution in turning the laws into reality, but they remain weak and have a low status in the 
political system (OECD, 2009: 32).  
The problem is not insignificant, as 56% of China’s population lives in rural areas, 
and China has the second-largest rural population in the world after India (OECD, 
2009). Rural under-employment has been increasing ever since the decollectivisation 
of agriculture in the early 1980s, with its consequent vast increases in productivity 
(Riskin, 1991). Furthermore, in the 1990s the availability of funding for rural 
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entrepreneurship declined sharply, when 1980s policies to support rural capitalism 
were reversed (Huang, 2008). Kwan (2008) recommends improved rural education, 
to enhance agricultural labourers’ prospects of alternative employment in the service 
sector, in rural areas. He describes rural-urban migration as “not entirely impossible, 
[but] institutionally difficult” (p27), because of the hukou or household registration 
system, which the government uses to “ensure that rural Chinese stay in rural China” 
and to control migration (Khanna, 2007: 193).  
Whilst increased rural-urban migration could help to reduce the rural labour surplus 
in the future, it has already contributed to rural depopulation which in turn has raised 
the rural dependency ratio from 40.4% in 1982 to 43.2% in 2006 (OECD, 2009)1. 
Rural income diversification is the recommended alternative, and private enterprise 
in export-oriented industry has already contributed to a “structural transformation of 
China’s rural economy” (OECD, 2009: 21). This diversification needs to target non-
farm employment in industry or services, because natural resource constraints 
diminish the possibility of agriculture continuing to employ its current 50% share of 
the Chinese workforce (Zhang and Wan, 2006). The New Socialist Countryside rural 
development policy of the eleventh five-year plan (2006 to 2010) aims to raise rural 
incomes (OECD, 2009), and our study’s exploration of small, private enterprises in 
the rural service sector will contribute a possible means of reducing this practical 
problem. 
A further criterion for selection of the research context was the importance of 
informal or social institutional arrangements to business. In the presence of weak 
                                               
1 For comparison, the UK’s overall dependency ratio has remained close to 30% for the last 30 years 
(ONS, 2008). 




Sacha Rawlence  14 
 
formal institutions, firms in China use interpersonal networks or guanxi 
(connections, to be explained in Chapter 4) as an informal substitute (Peng et al., 
2008). It then seems likely that in Western China, where formal institutions have 
been reported to be weak, firms will turn instead to informal institutions – supporting 
the expectation that Western China would make an interesting research site. The 
successful growth of small firms in the absence of strong formal institutions has been 
attributed to their reliance on informal institutions, in China in general (Yang and 
Temple, 2002) and in rural China in particular (Hu, 2007). Figure 1 below shows a 
map of China, and a dashed outline highlights Yunnan Province, which is discussed 
in the following section and for which a more detailed map is presented in Figure 3. 
The map also shows Kunming, the provincial capital of Yunnan, and Sichuan 
Province with its capital Chengdu, which will be referred to in later chapters. 
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Figure 1  Map of China, including provinces and provincial capitals 
Source: Nations Online Project, reproduction permitted for educational uses. 
http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/china_administrative_map.htm 
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1.4.2 How Yunnan Province meets the selection criteria, and how the 
research could address its practical problem of low income 
Yunnan Province has a surface area over one and a half times that of the UK, with a 
population two-thirds the size of the UK’s. It is China’s most ethnically-mixed 
province, with only 66% of its population belonging to the Han Chinese majority  
(compared to 92% in China as a whole), and representing nearly half of China’s 56 
minzu or recognised minority nationalities (McCarthy, 2009). Yunnan is one of 
China’s least-developed provinces: in 2007 it ranked 29th out of China’s 31 provinces 
in GDP per capita (RMB 10540, or 48% of the Chinese average of RMB 21,973), 
and in the period 2005-07 its GDP increase ranked 24th (China Statistical Yearbook, 
2008c). In 2001 only six provinces had less foreign trade as share of GDP (8% 
against China’s average of 44%); 80.3% of Yunnan’s industrial production was from 
state-owned enterprises (Western China’s overall share is 70.6%, against 44.4% for 
China overall); and only two provinces had a smaller private sector (Goodman, 
2004)2.  
Yunnan’s rural areas are poorer still, whether disposable income is compared to the 
averages for urban Yunnan or for rural China, as illustrated in Figure 2 below. 
Yunnan’s mountainous terrain constrains its options for development, with limited 
amounts of land suitable for mechanised agriculture (McCarthy, 2009). There is thus 
little prospect of raising incomes through technical improvements to farming 
productivity, even at the cost of the lower employment this would require, so there 
really is a need for diversification away from farming. 
                                               
2 These comparative figures should be taken as an approximation only, as difficulties with official 
Chinese data include the use of different bases of calculation of apparently similar data. 























Figure 2 Disposable income per capita, China and Yunnan for 1980 and 2005  
(Based on data from McCarthy, 2009) 
Despite its low total income, Yunnan has been China’s highest-earning inland or 
border province for inbound tourism every year since 2001 (when annual data 
became available), earning USD 860 million in 2007, representing an increase of 
420% since 1995 (China Statistical Yearbook, 2008a). Overseas visitor arrivals in 
Yunnan increased from half a million in 1995 to 2.2 million in 2007 (China 
Statistical Yearbook, 2008b). This would suggest inbound tourism as a promising 
focus for the required non-farm employment, which could:  
…promote economic diversification and a more services-oriented economy, … opening up 
remote rural areas…. The fact that the consumer comes to the producer, rather than the 
other way around, enables even the smallest transaction to be part of the global economy: 
every sale to a tourist, be it a fruit or a haircut, represents an export. This constitutes an 
important opportunity, particularly for small enterprises (Barrowclough et al., 2007: xi, 
emphasis added) 
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Small enterprises have already made an important contribution to the development of 
China’s private sector (Poutziouris et al., 2002). They could further be well suited to 
small-scale engagement with international tourism, whose invisible exports entail 
low start-up costs, and so can contribute to the development of a rural, service-
oriented economy. China’s tourism sector has been reported to be divided between 
domestic and inbound markets (Xu, 1999); the author found this still to be the case 
during her exploratory study in 2007, with firms focusing largely on either one of 
these two markets. Basing this study solely on the inbound sector was therefore 
considered to be practicable as well as theoretically desirable. 
The potential for tourism to contribute to economic development is recognised by 
academic writers (Mowforth and Munt, 1998, Scheyvens, 2002), by the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2006), and by the World 
Tourism Organisation (UNWTO, 2005). Its particular relevance to rural development 
in China is also noted by academics (Xu, 1999, Zhang et al., 2006), by the Chinese 
Central and Provincial governments (UNWTO, 2006), and by the government of 
neighbouring Guizhou Province (Donaldson, 2007). However, in Yunnan tourism 
does not form part of rural development policy (confirmed in an interview with the 
Division Chief of the Yunnan Foreign Capital Poverty Alleviation Project 
Management Centre, a department of the Yunnan Provincial Government, in 
Kunming on 23/8/2007), but rather is considered to be like any other sector seeking 
to attract commercial investment (Yunnan Provincial Tourism Administration and 
UNWTO, 2001). There is thus scope for our study to enhance the contribution of 
local tourism firms to Yunnan’s rural development, in the absence of guidance from 
other bodies. 
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1.4.3 Selection of a specific site within Yunnan 
Investigation at the sub-provincial level is recommended for understanding economic 
and social interactions in China (Goodman, 2004). We therefore began to seek a site 
on a smaller scale, which had small firms engaged in inbound tourism, located in 
rural Yunnan. The initial screening for potential sites was conducted with reference 
to the itineraries offered by international tour operators, as sites included on these 
itineraries were clearly destinations for inbound tourists. Tour operators were chosen 
who claimed to support responsible tourism with an emphasis on local service 
provision, to further increase the chance that local firms were actively engaged in the 
business of inbound tourism. This resulted in a short-list of three possible sites in 
Northwest Yunnan: Lugu Lake, the Yubeng Valley near Deqin, and the Tiger 
Leaping Gorge. The author made an exploratory visit to all three sites in 2007 to 
evaluate their suitability as research sites for the main study, and to explore the 
compatibility between the proposed research questions and the chosen site (as will be 
described in Chapter 3). These sites are marked on the map of Yunnan Province in 
Figure 3 below. The provincial boundary is marked with a dotted line, and the area of 
particular interest has been highlighted with a dashed outline. This includes the three 
exploratory field sites, the Yangzi River and also the town of Zhongdian. Further 
locations marked on the map that will be referred to in later chapters include Lijiang 
and Kunming. 
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Figure 3  Map of Yunnan Province 
Source: http://www.chinaodysseytours.com/maps/Yunnan-maps.html 
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1.4.3.1 Lugu Lake 
The villages around Lugu Lake, which straddles the provincial border between 
Yunnan and Sichuan, have long catered to domestic tourists who are attracted both 
by the scenery and by curiosity about the matriarchal society of the indigenous 
Mosuo minzu (see Namu and Mathieu (2003) for a detailed description of family 
relationships and village life). Within the last few years, some entrepreneurs have 
begun to target the international market. Inbound tourist provision has grown, but is 
still limited to two or three enterprises per village. The addition of the tourism 
income to ongoing farming and fishing, in communities remote from institutional 
contact but presumably bound by close relationships, had seemed ideal during the 
planning stage. 
However, the very friendly locals who had converted sections of their log-built, 
courtyard farmhouses for tourists were generally limited to simple communication in 
Mandarin Chinese. This was taught to schoolchildren as a second language, but 
severely constrained discussion with the author of the proprietors’ approach to 
business. The recently established, purpose-built guesthouses in the lakeside villages 
of Lige and Luoshui were mostly owned and operated by non-local Chinese. 
Language was generally less of a problem in these cases, but a widespread reluctance 
to engage in conversation with a paying guest – far less a researcher wishing to 
conduct interviews – also hindered meaningful discussion. The author established 
that both types of tourist enterprise were family-owned, and that there was very little 
interfirm trading or cooperation. In fact, transactions of any kind seemed rare, with 
proprietors seeming almost surprised by the sudden appearance of customers. All of 
the cafés, guesthouses and souvenir shops bought the same packaged goods, in bulk, 
from the same visiting wholesaler from the market town of Yongning, so the author’s 
planned discussion topic of supplier relationships reached data saturation alarmingly 
quickly. Beyond these businesses aimed at the perceived needs of tourists, there 
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appeared to be no commercial activity at all: a desire to buy locally-grown fruit or 
ordinary household items required a journey to Yongning, again curtailing the range 
of trading relationships that the author had hoped to discuss. The author found only 
one individual in possession of both local knowledge and a confident command of 
Mandarin, but in Yongning rather than the tourist area. His enthusiastic use of his 
social network to arrange accommodation and a trekking guide made him a 
promising candidate for the field study, but the absence of any others caused the 
author to dismiss this site. 
It had also become apparent that travel between villages would become problematic 
if all were to be included in the principal field study. There was no scheduled public 
transport and independent travel by bicycle was made very slow by the incomplete 
circumference of the cobbled lakeside road. This joined up only those villages with 
designated tourist accommodation and excluded the villages that were home to the 
tourism employees. 
1.4.3.2 Yubeng Valley 
Beneath the peak of Kawakarpo in Yunnan’s far northwest, the valley is reached on 
horseback or on foot by numerous Han Chinese and very few foreign tourists. The 
Tibetan villages had been overrun by the influx of hungry tourists and horses, the 
farmland had been turned over to grazing, and the locals spoke very little Mandarin 
at all. A helpful hotelier in the nearby town of Deqin had arranged for the author to 
meet the proprietor of one of the guesthouses in the valley, but in the event this 
proprietor was too busy to speak with the author for the duration of her visit. The site 
also turned out to have very little contact with inbound tourism, and seemed to be 
almost entirely dependent on immigrant labour: it was a poor fit with the selection 
criteria and was also dismissed. 
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Although both of the above sites are regularly visited by international tour groups, 
the local firms proved to be far from accessible to an unconnected outsider. 
However, the author had previously visited the third site on the short-list, so was 
confident of a more productive phase in the exploratory study. It was because of her 
earlier, fruitful trip to the Tiger Leaping Gorge that the author had thought it likely 
that the other sites could be feasible research sites, but the longer-term involvement 
of the former in tourism turned out to be of critical importance. 
1.4.3.3 The Tiger Leaping Gorge 
The Tiger Leaping Gorge is formed by the Yangzi River (known in these upper 
reaches as the Jinsha Jiang, or Golden Sands River) cutting a cleft 3,900m deep 
between Haba Mountain on its west side and the Yulong Xueshan (Jade Dragon 
Mountain) range to the East. Local farmers first began to take in foreign trekkers in 
the early 1990s, before the region had been officially opened to foreign visitors, and 
in the meantime have established a web of footpaths leading to their many 
guesthouses from which they generate a second income alongside farming. The 
gorge is popular with foreign trekkers who travel independently or with tour groups, 
walking the high-level footpaths that connect these guesthouses. Increasingly, it is 
also visited by Chinese tourists, most of whom travel the lower-level road by tour 
bus.  
During the exploratory visit the author was welcomed by previous acquaintances, 
and succeeded in conducting interviews with these and more local businesses. 
Chapter 3 presents a detailed account of this visit, which resulted in the selection of 
this site, and specifically the west side of the Yangzi River (attached to Zhongdian 
County), from the town of Qiaotou to the village of Haba. The site met the criteria 
set for a site suitable for a detailed exploration of the applicability of transaction cost 
theory, which would then serve as the basis for future theoretical adaptation. It had 
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small firms actively participating in international business, in the sector of inbound 
tourism. This small-scale tourist provision appears to be compatible with the local 
resources and inhabitants, and “a significant portion of every yuan spent” in tourist 
expenditure directly reaches the local proprietors – unlike the mass-provision 
targeted at domestic tourists in Qiaotou and at lookout points on the lower-level road 
(Donaldson, 2007: 333). This reflects the investment-oriented approach to tourism in 
Yunnan: the construction of the low road was a government project entailing 
substantial capital expenditure, but requires frequent repair from landslides caused by 
timber harvesting and mining (Hayes, 2007), and the majority of the revenues 
generated accrue to the mining firm that controls access to it.  
Whilst there are no data available for visitor numbers to the gorge itself because the 
sale of admission tickets is not recorded, the steady increase in the number of tourism 
firms in the gorge demonstrates growth. The relative success of tourism in the gorge, 
and more broadly Yunnan’s thriving tourism sector, suggest that this is an 
appropriate test-case (Yin, 2003): of all the sectors in Yunnan, tourism is most likely 
to be growing and yield interesting findings; if any site in Yunnan can foster thriving 
inbound tourism provision, the Tiger Leaping Gorge should be one of them; if firm 
development is hindered in this favourable context, we consider it likely that they 
would also be hindered elsewhere. 
This site also had the additional benefit of the author’s compatibility. The author was 
able to communicate easily, established a rapport with several potential research 
participants, observed examples of high transaction costs, and deepened her 
knowledge of the site sufficiently to identify issues of real local concern to the local 
firms – including some institutional constraints that would perhaps help to answer 
the research questions. Two interviewees in particular confided to the author their 
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fears of a very uncertain future, as it was rumoured that the government intended to 
flood the gorge with a hydropower dam, but neither dared to protest. 
1.5 Thesis structure 
The structure and content of the thesis chapters are outlined below, beginning from 
Chapter 2.  
2. Review of transaction cost theory 
This chapter reviews transaction cost theory, beginning with the factors that are 
considered to cause high transaction costs, namely bounded rationality, opportunism, 
asset specificity, transaction frequency and uncertainty. It further considers the ways 
in which the literature expects firms to respond to high transaction costs, by 
modifying the governance of individual transactions and by moving towards 
integrated or cooperative organisation structures. These causes and responses are 
considered in relation to the research context, before critiques of the theory are 
presented which invite an examination of how well the theory applies in the chosen 
context. This focus on context offers an early indication of the importance that 
institutions will take on in the progression of this study. This chapter presents an 
illustration (Flowchart 1) of the literature’s expected associations between the causes 
of transaction costs and responses to them, whose applicability to the research 
context is explored in the exploratory study. 
3. Exploratory study and research questions 
This chapter describes the aim, method and findings of the exploratory study 
undertaken by the author. The study took the form of an ethnographic 
reconnaissance, to explore behaviour related to perceived causes of and responses to 
transaction costs in the research site. The findings then contributed to the shaping of 
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research questions that were very much grounded in the context, and would both 
guide the more detailed investigation to be pursued in the principal stage of research 
and suggest a methodology appropriate to this.  
This approach identified isolation from the market as a form of response to 
transaction costs that has received little attention in the literature, and suggested that 
institutions were important in shaping firms’ choice of response. The resulting 
research questions are: 
1. Which causes of transaction costs are perceived by decision-makers in the firms 
studied? 
2. How do the firms respond to these transaction costs? 
3. Could an understanding of local institutions help us to explain firms’ responses to 
transaction costs? 
4. Integrating institutional theory into transaction cost theory 
This chapter outlines the development of institutional theory and introduces the 
distinction that is commonly made between formal and informal institutions. It 
discusses the benefits that the author hopes to achieve through combining transaction 
cost and institutional theories, in understanding the impact of institutions on the level 
of transaction costs, in shedding some light on the responses by firms to high 
transaction costs, and in adapting transaction cost theory to increase its applicability 
to the Chinese context. The particular features of formal institutions considered are 
local government, access to funding and the reliability of the legal system; the impact 
of informal institutions is considered in the areas of trust, kinship, wider networks 
and social sanctions. It identifies a second apparent gap in the literature, concerning 
the empirical study of informal institutions in China. This chapter presents a second 
illustration (Flowchart 2) that modifies the literature’s expected associations between 
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causes of transaction costs and firms’ responses, by adding the response of isolation 
that emerged during the exploratory study, and showing institutions as a possible 
moderating factor on the relationship between transaction costs and responses. 
5. Methodology 
This chapter presents the critical realist epistemology underlying this study, and it 
explains the qualitative approach taken to understanding perceptions of the causes of 
transaction costs, rather than quantification of absolute levels of costs. It introduces 
the fieldwork participants, who were decision-makers in 13 tourism firms in the 
selected field site. The participants’ perceptions were explored during unstructured 
interviews conducted in Chinese, with questions relating directly to the transaction 
cost and institutional literatures (see Appendix 1). These were supported by context 
interviews with informed professionals and officials who were not directly associated 
with the field site. A thematic analysis of the interview data was conducted to seek 
answers to the first two research questions, whilst the causal complexity involved in 
answering the third research question was addressed by using the Qualitative 
Comparative Approach (QCA), a computer-assisted analytical technique that is 
based on the coding of interview data as fuzzy sets.  
6. Thematic analysis and discussion 
This chapter presents a cross-firm thematic analysis of the interview data, discussing 
participants’ responses in relation to the literature of transaction costs and 
institutions, and to the context interviews. It answers the first two research questions, 
with the most commonly perceived cause of transaction costs being opportunism, 
and firms’ responses including non-contractual transaction governance, organisation 
structures that were neither internalised nor substantially cooperative, and a general 
disinclination to specialise. The concept of isolation is explored in detail to address 
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the first observed gap in the literature, examining trading relationships up, down and 
along the supply chain, and isolation is found to be the most common response to 
high transaction costs. 
This chapter also offers a preliminary answer to the third research question, prior to 
the QCA analysis and fuller discussion. Formal institutions are notable for their 
ineffectiveness, making internalisation an unlikely response in the presence of weak 
property rights and absence of funding, and cooperation is hindered by a lack of legal 
protection. The structures within which trust can develop are found to be vital in 
enabling and safeguarding transactions, but the process of developing trust is slow 
and selective, reinforcing patterns of personal exchange and further hindering 
cooperation. This begins to explain why firms try to reduce transaction costs by 
cutting down on the number of transactions, suggesting that high transaction costs 
and weak institutions contribute to the outcome of isolation. 
7. QCA analysis and findings 
The analysis presented in this chapter finds weak informal institutions to be a 
necessary cause of isolation, being present in all of the isolated cases. In contrast, 
formal institutions are not found to be causally important. The causes of transaction 
costs are combined with weak informal institutions to comprise sufficient causes of 
isolation. 
8. Discussion 
This chapter answers the third research question by finding the strength or weakness 
of informal institutions to be a contingent factor between the alternative outcomes of 
isolation from the market and integration into the market. Further exploration 
addressing the second observed gap in the literature suggests an underlying factor, 
that firms whose proprietors easily develop new trust relationships are more able to 
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overcome high transaction costs and avoid isolation, even in the presence of weak 
formal institutions. The implication is drawn that informal institutions are vital to the 
participating firms’ avoidance of isolation, and that firms reporting weak informal 
institutions are more constrained in their response to high transaction costs. This 
chapter presents a third illustration (Flowchart 3), further modifying the author’s 
expectation of associations between causes of transaction costs, institutions and 
responses, reflecting the QCA findings by reducing the emphasis placed on formal 
institutions and illustrating the moderating effect of informal institutions on the 
relationship between transaction costs and the outcome. 
9. Conclusion 
This study’s contribution to theory is assessed in terms of its evaluation of the fit of 
transaction cost theory to the research context, and the increased applicability it 
offers by integrating transaction cost and institutional theories to better explain the 
response of isolation. It highlights the impact of informal social structures on the 
cost, extent, or even absence of exchange, and in particular, the constraint on trading 
imposed by the scarcity of trust. A recommendation for local practice is made for 
firms to attempt to broaden their networks, to reduce the constraint of personal trade 
and consequent isolation. Two policy recommendations are made: a mainstream 
recommendation to strengthen the enforcement of formal institutions, in order to 
facilitate rule-based, impersonal exchange based on generalised trust, and an 
alternative approach deriving recommendations from the local context and including 
the consideration of informal institutions. 
This chapter presents a fourth illustration (Flowchart 4) indicating how the 
recommendations would be intended to increase trust, reduce transaction costs and 
enable more specialisation, and so increase the firms’ potential contribution to 
economic growth. It is proposed that these recommendations could also be applied to 
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firms in other emerging markets that share the observed institutional weaknesses. 
The chapter concludes with an evaluation of the study, and ideas for future research. 
1.6 Anticipated contribution 
This study is expected to make theoretical contributions by addressing the two gaps 
in the literature, concerning isolation as a response to high transaction costs and the 
empirical study of informal institutions in a Chinese context. It will further integrate 
institutional theory into transaction cost theory, in an attempt to explain the response 
of isolation. It contributes to method in its approaches both to the observation of the 
phenomenon of isolation, and to the analysis of interview data in QCA. 
The practical contribution of this study will lie in its deepening of our understanding 
of the factors that may hinder the development of firms in the research context, and 
in emerging markets more generally. The importance of non-agricultural growth to 
Western China and Yunnan has been explained, and the potential of the inbound 
tourism sector of the Tiger Leaping Gorge to provide it has been identified. Firms (in 
the gorge or elsewhere) that continued to respond to high transaction cost by 
isolation would need to meet their own supply needs through in-house production. 
This would hinder specialisation and increases to productivity, reducing 
competitiveness and in turn diminishing the firms’ contribution to economic growth. 
This isolation also hinders any transition from personal to impersonal exchange, 
which could help to broaden the potential economic impact of trade, but would also 
be dependent upon impersonal trust based on dependable legal enforcement. The 
findings of this study could therefore contribute significantly to new approaches in 
policy and practice regarding the development of the research site and contexts 
similar to it. 
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1.7 Note on the use and romanisation of Chinese words 
This study uses the contemporary Pinyin system for the romanisation of Chinese 
words, for the names of people and places referred to in the text. An exception is 
made for the names of Chinese authors, whose publications use the older Wade-Giles 
romanisation system. Thus, for example, the author cites Tseng and Kuo (2008) with 
the authors’ names as they appear in the original publication, rather than converting 
them to the Pinyin form of Ceng and Guo. 
This thesis follows the convention of the literature and the recommendation of 
Blenkinsopp and Pajouh (2010), of using the Chinese for terms that have no direct 
equivalent in English, and Pinyin is used for this purpose. For example, the term 
guanxi is usually translated as “social connections”, in the sense of using social, 
political or military connections to achieve personal or business advantage. Hukou is 
the system of household registration that makes it difficult for Chinese people to 
migrate away from the place of their birth. Minzu are the ethnic minorities officially 
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CHAPTER 2 REVIEW OF TRANSACTION COST THEORY 
This chapter gives a brief overview of transaction cost theory, considering the causes 
of high transaction costs and the ways in which firms are typically expected to 
respond to them. This relates directly to the first two research questions that ask 
which types of transaction costs are perceived by the participating firms, and how the 
firms respond to them. It presents critiques of transaction cost theory that focus on its 
applicability to different contexts, and then considers studies that have applied the 
theory in research contexts similar to our own. This attention to context offers an 
early indication of the importance that institutions will take on in the progression of 
this study.  
The emphasis of this study lies in the ongoing operations of firms as going concerns, 
rather than the influence of transaction costs on firms’ market-entry decisions which 
forms a substantial part of the broader transaction cost literature. The chapter closes 
with an illustration of the literature’s expected associations between the causes of 
transaction costs and responses to them, whose applicability to the research context is 
explored in the exploratory study described in the next chapter. 
2.1 The costs 
In 1937, Ronald Coase recognised the existence of and variation in the costs of 
conducting transactions, in a departure from the neoclassical economists’ 
conceptualisation of efficient markets in which transaction costs were assumed be 
zero (North, 1994a, North, 2003). It was to be over three decades before Williamson 
(1975) would begin to formulate this into what is now known as Transaction Cost 
Economics (Jones, 1997, Klaes, 2008), at about the same time as New Institutional 
Theory also evolved (see Chapter 4). 
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Friction in transactions serves as a metaphor for transaction costs, causing delays and 
increasing the costs of exchange (Williamson, 1985). Transaction costs may be 
incurred both before (ex ante) and after (ex post) the transaction takes place: 
“Transaction costs are the costs of specifying what is being exchanged and of 
enforcing the consequent agreements” (North, 1994a: 361). Ex ante costs would 
include information search, the drafting of agreements or contracts, and negotiating 
prices, and ex post costs concern executing and monitoring the exchange, and 
enforcing the agreed terms. As such they may be borne by all parties to the 
transaction, and may vary between transactions and between contexts (Kreps, 1990). 
Rao (2003) considers a major part of transaction cost theory to be the economics of 
contracts under different forms of governance, focusing largely on the transaction 
costs of contract formulation and implementation.  
Transaction cost theory describes the principal causes of transaction costs as a range 
of particular risks, and firms’ attempts to reduce them. The risks are bounded 
rationality, opportunism, uncertainty, transaction frequency and asset specificity. The 
theory proposes modified governance structures that firms may adopt with the aim of 
reducing transaction costs, in terms of both the risks and the associated contracting 
costs. 
2.2 The causes of transaction costs 
The aim of this section is briefly to describe the risk factors that are recognised as 
causing transaction costs, relating them to key references in the literature and to the 
first research question. 
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2.2.1 Bounded rationality 
This is another departure from classical economic theory, specifically its assumption 
of the rational “economic man”. The concept of bounded rationality concedes that 
although economic actors such as business proprietors intend to behave rationally, 
this may be hampered by their limited (or “bounded”) information or ability to 
process it – the limited “access to information and the computational capacities” that 
humans have (Simon, 1955: 99). Bounded rationality affects the ability of these 
actors to make rational decisions, or increases the perceived transaction costs of 
making the decision, in specific ways including information asymmetry, planning, 
incomplete contracts, monitoring, and language.  
Bounded rationality increases transaction costs if it results in “information 
impactedness”, a circumstance where one party has complete information that cannot 
be costlessly found out by the counterparty (Williamson, 1975). This has more 
recently been described as “information asymmetry”, and may increase risk to the 
buyer in his attempt to establish the “costs of measuring the valuable attributes of 
what is being exchanged” (North, 1990: 21), because he has less information than the 
seller concerning the good or service to be sold.  
The limitations of human foresight serve as an example of people’s limited capacity 
for information processing, with the result that unforeseeable contingencies would 
entail prohibitive costs of “contemplation”, or planning and forecasting (Williamson, 
1975). This idea is extended to the transaction costs of contract, in that ex ante costs 
are raised by contemplation of possible future events and their inclusion into the 
drafting of a contract, and ex post costs arise in interpretation or renegotiation when 
contingencies arise that had not been provided for in the original contract. The 
implication is that the transaction costs of contracting rise, as the parties to a contract 
attempt to make provision for contingencies that cannot be accurately foreseen due to 
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bounded rationality. The alternative is to economise on the transaction costs of 
contracting by accepting incomplete contracts, under which the parties expect to 
resolve contingencies as they arise (Williamson, 1985), thus reducing “the 
opportunity costs of the parties’ time spent writing the [complete] contract rather 
than doing productive work” (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992: 130).  
Another impact of bounded rationality on contracts arises from the difficulty or cost 
of monitoring the counterparty’s performance. This is interpreted as a constraint on 
the effective enforcement of contracts when the costs of monitoring exceed its 
benefits (North, 1990), and as a hindrance to the drafting of contracts between parties 
who cannot easily monitor one another (Zhou and Poppo, 2008). 
A further factor contributing to bounded rationality is language: if the nature of the 
transaction cannot be clearly communicated, the parties to it will have an incomplete 
understanding of it and the risks of bounded rationality will increase (Buckley and 
Chapman, 1998d). Buckley and Chapman expect that difficulties in communication 
will exacerbate the computational element of bounded rationality, and the author 
anticipates that this may be the case in the research context. 
2.2.2 Opportunism 
Opportunistic behaviour is described as “self-interest seeking with guile” 
(Williamson, 1975: 26), meaning an attempt to maximise one’s own welfare at the 
expense of others. Transaction costs increase when parties attempt to protect 
themselves from this risk of behavioural uncertainty. 
Types of opportunistic behaviour anticipated in the literature include blatant lying, 
stealing, and cheating; breaking relational norms by making insincere promises 
regarding future conduct; and the deliberate withholding or distorted disclosure of 
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information that would be useful to others, thus contributing to information 
asymmetry (Williamson, 1985). Opportunism may occur ex ante or ex post, resulting 
in adverse selection and moral hazard respectively (Buckley and Chapman, 1998a). It 
may be active, meaning an action deliberately intended to take advantage, or passive 
in the sense of omission or failure to act (Wathne and Heide, 2000). 
Actors who might behave opportunistically naturally include customers and 
suppliers, particularly when small-numbers bargaining increases the buyer’s 
dependence on a particular supplier (Williamson, 1985). However, “opportunistic 
behaviour is often embedded in more complex relational settings than just dyads 
between the focal opportunist and the focal damaged party”, including competitors 
and distributors (Schauwecker and Kühlmann, 2007: 11).  
Opportunism raises transaction costs when actors perceive a behavioural risk, and 
attempt to reduce it. Actors might respond to a fear of opportunism by incurring costs 
in attempting to prevent an unknown counterparty from behaving opportunistically 
by detailed drafting of contract terms (Williamson, 1975) or monitoring of 
performance (Zhou and Poppo, 2008), or by increased reliance on their prior 
knowledge of their counterparties (Douma and Schreuder, 2008). This fear might be 
increased if parties feel unable to judge the risk of opportunism or retaliate against it 
(ibid.).  
The fear of opportunism may impact upon the willingness of actors to trade with 
others, if a perceived risk of impersonal exchange prevents trade with strangers and 
constrains the range of their trading relationships (North, 2003). Institutional 
protection can reduce this fear and facilitate a long-term transition to more efficient 
impersonal trading (North, 2003). 
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2.2.3 Specificity 
Specificity describes an asset or investment that is particular to an individual 
relationship or transaction, or a resource that has been committed to a particular 
transaction such that it cannot be redeployed (Williamson, 1991). This can apply to 
sites or physical assets that are dedicated or tailored to a single customer-supplier 
relationship (Williamson, 1985), human assets such as dedicated staff (Poppo and 
Zenger, 2002) or intangibles such as knowledge transfer or client-specific training 
(Langlois and Robertson, 1995). Dedicated asset specificity describes a general-
purpose physical asset acquired in support of a particular relationship, for example a 
hotel that is extended to accommodate the delegates attending a nearby conference 
centre (Lamminmaki, 2005). 
Specificity causes the parties to it to become mutually dependent, reducing the 
appeal of alternative trading partners in comparison, and so may give one party 
power over the other (Rao, 2003). The power and dependency increase the risk of 
opportunistic behaviour, and an asset’s value will be contingent on the continuity of 
the parties’ relationship. Transaction costs are incurred in attempts to reduce the risk 
of dependency, through changes to governance structures including contract or 
internalisation (Williamson, 1985). Although these proposed linkages between 
degrees of specificity to predicted governance structures add predictive power to the 
theory, this precision is considered to narrow the applicability of the theory from the 
broader question of why firms exist, to a narrower question of vertical integration 
(Jones, 1997). 
2.2.4 Transaction frequency 
Transaction costs can effectively be reduced when transactions are repeated with the 
same customer or supplier, as the development and cost-amortisation of dedicated 
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structures (such as contract terms) become worthwhile, whereas one-off transactions 
will entail no particular changes to transaction governance (Williamson, 1985). This 
applies particularly to specific investments, which would benefit from specialised 
governance structures, but whose cost might only be recoverable under repeated 
transactions. Such repeated transactions offer the opportunity for the transacting 
parties to develop trust and so reduce transaction costs of opportunism, if they 
choose to cooperate in a repeated game rather than defect as anticipated by game 
theory (North, 1990). Frequency can be understood as the rate of the anticipated 
recurrence of similar transactions between two parties, and may also incorporate the 
volume of the recurring transactions (Colbert and Spicer, 1995). 
2.2.5 Uncertainty 
Uncertain environments confront organisations with exogenous changes that are 
beyond their own control, which might result from natural events or from the actions 
of other economic actors – respectively described as primary and secondary 
uncertainty (Williamson, 1985). Both of these forms are considered to be “innocent” 
or non-strategic, in contrast to the strategic intent of behavioural uncertainty or 
opportunism (ibid.). An extension of the concept of secondary uncertainty focuses on 
the actions of competitors amongst the economic actors, and suggests that their 
actions might be strategic or non-strategic (Sutcliffe and Zaheer, 1998)  – which 
appears to merge secondary with behavioural uncertainty. The PEU2 measure of 
perceived environmental uncertainty (Werner et al., 1996) incorporates government 
policy, macroeconomic features, availability of inputs and infrastructure, and 
variability of demand in addition to competition. The environmental changes might 
vary in terms of frequency or amplitude (Wholey and Brittain, 1989), and 
unpredictability (Wholey and Brittain, 1989, Dess and Beard, 1984). Government 
policy can raise the level of uncertainty because “the possibility that policymakers 
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might be tempted to change laws, rules or regulations… creates uncertainty for the 
regulated” (Guler and Guillen, 2010: 191). The degree of uncertainty in a firm’s 
environment determines which contingencies can be anticipated, the costs of 
anticipation, and the range of possible responses. 
Firms operating in an uncertain environment may need to adapt their strategies 
rapidly in response to changes (Krishnan et al., 2006), or draft detailed contracts to 
reduce the ex post transaction costs of enforcement (Barthélemy and Quélin, 2006). 
This latter approach expects that the saving on enforcement costs will be greater than 
the higher transaction costs of anticipating contingencies and drafting the detailed 
contract. A firm may also decide to discontinue trading with a particular partner 
depending on their perception of the partner’s stability in the context of uncertainty 
(Keister, 2001).  
2.3 Expected responses to transaction costs 
The transaction cost literature offers predictions as to how firms might respond to the 
causes of transaction costs, both in terms of the governance of individual 
transactions, and of their own resulting organisation structure. Where transaction 
costs are perceived to be very high, a firm is expected to reduce the number of 
market-mediated transactions by moving towards relational contracting, 
internalisation and unified governance structures (Williamson, 1975, Rao, 2003). 
2.3.1 Transaction costs and the governance of individual transactions 
Firms must decide whether to conduct individual transactions in the market (between 
firms), or to bring them within the firm, or some point in between. The choice will 
depend on the comparative efficiency of these options (Williamson, 1975). 
Transaction costs are kept to a minimum in the simple structure of classical 
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contracting, or arm’s length market exchange (Williamson, 1985). This is appropriate 
when assets are non-specific, transactions are infrequent, neither party has market 
power over the other, and most contingencies are known – so straightforward terms 
can be specified ex ante and no adaptation or dispute is anticipated. “The lower the 
level of transaction costs vis-à-vis other costs, the greater the likelihood that resource 
allocation will take place within markets than firms” (Jones, 1997: 10). 
When outcomes are less certain and contingencies harder to predict, a neoclassical or 
relational approach to the governance of repeated transactions may be preferred, in 
which the preservation of the evolving relationship between transacting parties is 
prioritised above the original contract (Williamson, 1985). This becomes appropriate 
when moderate asset specificity increases risk, but where parties do not attempt to 
draft formal contracts providing for contingencies, in order to minimise transaction 
costs. Instead, the parties respond to emergent contingencies with a less formalised 
bilateral approach, depending on mutual cooperation for the relationship to continue. 
In contrast to classical arrangements, the identities of and relationship between the 
transacting parties are of prime importance here. Although relational governance is 
more effective than classical contracts in uncertain environments where ex post 
renegotiation would be required, its dependence on informal sanctions makes it a less 
effective deterrent to opportunism (Carson et al., 2006). 
A further option is for firms to reduce transaction costs by supplying some goods or 
services internally rather than procuring them from other firms, and by using single, 
incomplete contracts of employment rather than many separate contracts. This may 
be advantageous when complete contracts are not feasible, when there are or 
prospectively could be small numbers of potential suppliers, in situations where 
internalisation would remove the cost of information asymmetry by sharing 
knowledge, or where uncertainty could be reduced by convergence of both parties’ 
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expectations (Williamson, 1975).  In the latter two cases, asymmetric access to 
information can lead both to adverse selection when the party with information 
misleads the party without, and to moral hazard in the form of post-contractual 
opportunism (Rao, 2003). Drafting long-term, contingent claims contracts in an 
uncertain environment may cause prohibitively high transaction costs, in which case 
the transaction should be internalised instead, allowing the firm to adapt to emerging 
conditions rather than trying to anticipate them (Williamson, 1975).  
This make-or-buy decision may, however, not be clear-cut due to the incompleteness 
of firms’ information:  
The decision whether to internalise or not is therefore not a nice matter of calculation, but a 
function of judgment and experience, which will include both an element of comparative 
costs and levels of risk involved (Jones, 1997: 18). 
Even the decision to internalise a transaction does not avoid transaction costs 
altogether because the purchase of inputs will entail a share of the supplier’s 
transaction costs, and internalisation cannot resolve a firm’s internal transaction costs 
which include information search, coordination and motivation (Buckley and Carter, 
1998). Finally, the reduction in transaction costs resulting from internalisation must 
be greater than the benefits foregone of trading in the open market – these being the 
customer’s ability to switch suppliers, and the supplier’s focus on core competencies 
and economies of scale (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). 
2.3.2 Transaction costs and organisation structures 
The internalisation of markets for intermediate products or services leads to vertical 
integration (Buckley and Casson, 1976), which extends the boundaries of the firm 
and entails changes to its organisational structure. Transaction cost economics 
requires a comparative assessment of choices to understand firm-level decisions 
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regarding whether to contract out production or bring it in-house, the consideration 
of horizontal or vertical integration, and economies of scale or scope (Rao, 2003). 
Such an assessment asks whether firms have either pursued or considered 
internalising functions along or up the value chain, being internalised, or developing 
their relational arrangements into cooperative governance structures. 
Where high asset specificity and frequency increase risk to the point that the 
transaction costs of comprehensive planning, monitoring and enforcement become 
prohibitive, a unified governance structure (with one party buying out the other) is an 
appropriate alternative (Williamson, 1985). This vertical integration has the effect of 
internalising all future transactions between the erstwhile customer and supplier, and 
incorporating both into an expanded, hierarchical governance structure. The cost of 
establishing the unified structure is offset against the notional reduction in the cost of 
repeated transactions that would otherwise have continued. As firms internalise more 
transactions, the scope of their productive activities expands: 
When transaction costs between firms are high, firms will tend to trade within themselves. 
The boundaries of the firm will expand to internalise key markets for intermediate products, 
such as proprietary knowledge. The higher are arm’s length transaction costs, the greater 
are the economies of internalisation, and the wider are the boundaries of the firm (Buckley 
and Casson, 1998: 18). 
The boundaries may incorporate new areas that are closely related to the firm’s core 
productive and distributive activities, or extend into more loosely related 
diversification (Dietrich, 1994). This eternal question of transaction cost economics 
is illustrated by Seabright (2004): 
In the sea of decentralised market relationships, with no-one in overall charge, there are 
countless such [firms, or] islands of centralisation, planning and hierarchy… [the question 
is] to understand where the shoreline should be: where the islands need to end and the sea 
to begin (p153). 
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An alternative to the internalisation of other firms is the extension of relational 
governance to new organisational structures encompassing such firms. Alternative 
governance structures replace ownership with resource control through informal, 
cooperative mechanisms such as networks, alliances, licensing or franchises. They 
represent a compromise position between markets and internalised firms, which 
Seabright might perhaps have described as an inter-tidal zone between the sea of 
markets and the islands of firms. 
The phenomenon of cooperative structures for the pooling of risks and resources has 
long been discussed, for example in the cases of peer-group associations 
(Williamson, 1975), or the post-war development of industrial districts in central 
Italy (Locke, 1996). They are collective, cooperative ways of organising production, 
sharing resources, risks, incomes and costs, achieving the economies of scale 
required for the acquisition and operation of physical assets, or the achievement of 
associational gains but without subordination. Contemporary equivalents would 
include professional partnerships such as those between lawyers or accountants 
(Douma and Schreuder, 2008), collaborative marketing clusters in tourist 
destinations (Moutinho et al., 1994), or networks. A network may be defined as a 
group of firms linked through transactions, or input and output relationships (Brown, 
2002), and as such networks may be considered to be a type of organisation distinct 
from markets and hierarchies (Thorelli, 1986). They may be classified according to 
whether the relationships are vertical or horizontal, whether membership is open to 
all or restricted by invitation, whether there is transparency in identifying current 
members, and whether the network is intended to coordinate labour, capital or 
intermediate products (Buckley, 2004).  
Cooperation can reduce the uncertainties of economic exchange, and so achieve 
lower transaction costs within a network (Rao, 2003). It is beneficial in reducing the 
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transaction costs of risk whilst also avoiding the resource requirements of 
internalisation (Thorelli, 1986, Buckley, 2004, Peters and Young, 2006). This is 
recommended particularly for start-up firms suffering a “poverty of resources and 
power”, where network structures present a “powerful resource-conserving 
alternative to internalisation” (Oviatt and McDougall, 2005: 33). Where interfirm 
relationships are cooperative rather than formal, relational norms moderate the costs 
both of initial contracting and of ex-post renegotiation when there is joint planning 
and information sharing (Artz and Brush, 2000). Poppo and Zenger (2002) agree that 
governance based on shared values and repeated transactions can lower transaction 
costs as compared to formal governance, in both economic (calculation of benefits of 
future exchanges within the relationship) and social (trust that has been developed 
during previous exchanges) terms. The norms and values referred to above indicate 
the relationship between transaction costs and institutions, which will be explored 
more fully in Chapter 4.  
The transaction cost-inducing risks to which small firms are particularly vulnerable, 
and for which cooperation is an alternative to internalisation, are opportunism, 
uncertainty and bounded rationality (Nooteboom, 1993). In addition to the small or 
young firms described above, resource constraints will also be experienced by firms 
that are in decline or are uncertain of their survival (Martinez and Dacin, 1999). For 
such firms, these alternative organisational forms are also seen as a means of gaining 
market access and as a route to growth (Larson, 1992). Cooperation may emerge as 
the default response, in an environment where firms neither have the requisite 
resources to increase efficiency by internalising other firms, nor experience pressure 
to do so (Granovetter, 1985).  
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2.3.3 Responses to combined causes of transaction costs 
In this section we move on from considering the individual causes of transaction 
costs, to the interactions between causes that increase the risk and thus the cost of a 
transaction. The behavioural, transactional and environmental characteristics of a 
transaction are collectively described by the term “atmosphere”, indicating that their 
“technically separable” effects are not necessarily “attitudinally separable” 
(Williamson, 1975: 37). Because of this difficulty of separation, Williamson 
recommends that the influence of these factors on transactions should be considered 
as a whole as well as individually, and so different responses might be expected 
when factors interact.  
An individual’s bounded rationality limits his knowledge relative to other actors’, 
and constrains his ability to predict outcomes, often leading to incomplete contracts. 
If this information asymmetry is combined with an uncertain environment, under 
which a flexible strategy or detailed contracting might normally be expected, then the 
relative risks of market and firm transactions must be reassessed, and a move to 
internalisation considered (Williamson, 1985). The increased risk is also noted by 
Rao (2003), due to greater incompleteness of information.  
When opportunism, which would cause parties to prefer a comprehensive contract, is 
combined with bounded rationality that would usually lead to an incomplete contract, 
“serious contractual difficulties” arise (Williamson, 1985: 66). Since the drafting of a 
complete contract is impossible, the parties become exposed to greater risks of 
opportunist behaviour (Luo, 2007). Milgrom and Roberts (1992) see a wish to 
protect one’s reputation as the key to removing incentives for opportunist behaviour 
under these conditions, echoing North’s (1990: 61) emphasis on “informal 
constraints”. In a similar vein, if opportunism is added to a relational contract arising 
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from uncertainty, effective monitoring will need to be supported by social sanctions 
(Carson et al., 2006). 
Small-numbers tendering emerges where an initially broad pool of bidding firms 
contracts over time, due to first-mover advantages or increasing asset specificity – 
“what was a large numbers bidding condition at the outset is effectively transformed 
into one of bilateral supply thereafter” (Williamson, 1985: 61). This is described as a 
fundamental transformation, locking the buyer in to an emerging monopoly. The risk 
here is that the supplier’s long-term interest in maintaining the relationship might be 
subsumed by a shorter-term opportunity to maximise his present profits (Williamson, 
1985). In this case, damage to an opportunist supplier’s reputation is not an effective 
deterrent, as the buyer has no alternative suppliers to choose from (Douma and 
Schreuder, 2008). Since opportunism and uncertainty in a small-numbers situation 
will require regular adaptation by both parties, this is expected to lead to relational 
governance to promote a longer-term perspective (Artz and Brush, 2000), or to 
internalisation in the case of frequent transactions (Williamson, 1985). 
2.4 Contextual limitations and critiques of transaction cost 
theory 
Despite the strengths of transaction cost theory in identifying sources of friction in 
exchange and proposing resolutions, criticisms of it include making assumptions 
concerning behaviour and the strength of formal institutions that might reduce the 
degree to which it can apply in non-Western or emerging market research contexts. 
Some consideration of these limitations is necessary before the case can be made for 
an exploratory study in China, whose main aim will be to try out the theory in a 
context that is heavily influenced by institutions. A fuller theoretical consideration of 
the role of formal and informal institutions will be presented in Chapter 4. 
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2.4.1 The applicability of transaction cost theory in other contexts 
The view that transaction costs of information asymmetry and opportunism will 
uniformly lead to the transfer of transactions from the market into the hierarchy has 
been strongly challenged. For example, it is contradicted by the reverse flow to the 
market from formerly integrated firms in the Japanese textile industry (Dore, 1983), 
which is attributed to Japan’s Confucian tradition that emphasises stable, long-term 
trading relationships in contrast to the Western emphasis on self-interest or profit 
maximisation, which Dore dates back to Adam Smith (1776), and considers 
Williamson to take for granted. A similar reversal from vertically integrated 
production to a network of smaller, more specialised firms has been documented in 
the Biellese region of northern Italy, as a response to intensifying competition from 
emerging markets (Locke, 1996). This study takes these exceptions as an 
encouragement to apply transaction cost theory in China, a context that shares 
Japan’s Confucian tradition and so might also share its low incidence of 
opportunism. On the other hand, the increasingly aggressive competition following 
the economic reforms of the 1980s (Li, 2008) might make stable, long-term 
relationships and the formation of networks more of an aspiration, and opportunists 
and transaction costs the current reality. 
The assumption of opportunism has further been criticised for overstating the risks of 
exchange, and hence the rationale for internalisation (Hill, 1990). In this view, the 
market is expected to remove habitual opportunists through two mechanisms. The 
first mechanism is based on a repeated-game prisoner’s dilemma and results in the 
evolutionary selection of cooperative actors, as their avoidance of opportunist 
behaviour reduces transaction costs and so maximises the potential returns of a long-
term relationship. Hill acknowledges that this assumes effective communication of 
changes in reputation, the absence of which would entail the transaction costs of 
information search, but his assumed pre-existence of a few cooperative actors goes 
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unchallenged. He also takes for granted some effective legal protection of 
cooperative actors from opportunists, an omission addressed in the observation that 
the market creates a need for protection from opportunism but does not actually 
provide that protection (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996). The second mechanism removes 
opportunists from the market through bankruptcy or takeover. Hill’s own implicit 
assumption that sound formal institutions will be present to conduct bankruptcy 
proceedings and finance takeovers, may confine the applicability of his work to 
contexts where these are available. The more generic expectation of detailed 
contracting as a response to transaction costs (Williamson, 1975, Barthélemy and 
Quélin, 2006) also holds an implicit assumption, that an appropriate legal framework 
will be present; North (1990) challenges this with his observation that successful 
contract enforcement is dependent upon institutions to constrain self-interested 
behaviour. This research will therefore seek out a Chinese research context that is 
similarly subject to transaction costs but does not offer strong legal protection or 
financial institutions (Zhou and Poppo, 2008), to find out whether opportunists are 
still excluded from the market as Hill expects and contracting is possible, or whether 
actors develop an alternative response to transaction costs. 
2.4.2 Studies applying transaction cost theory in the research context 
Earlier studies making empirical applications of transaction cost theory have been 
criticised for a tendency to “understate the significance of contextual factors” (Tseng 
and Kuo, 2008: 1), which this study aims to avoid in both its attention to the context-
specific literature and in its method. Here we consider briefly the causes of and 
responses to transaction costs that have previously been found in the context of this 
study – being China, specifically the tourism sector and small firms operating in it. 
The aim is to explore the extent to which we may expect the theory to be appropriate 
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to the setting, and the setting to offer an interesting context within which to study the 
theory. 
2.4.2.1 Causes of transaction costs in the research context  
The transaction costs caused by behavioural and environmental factors have been 
found to increase in the presence of weak legal institutions. Emerging markets may 
experience increased risks of opportunism, as weak legal institutions and 
enforcement invite rent-seeking behaviour (Rao, 2003), which in turn may have a 
negative impact on national economic performance (Colombatto and Macey, 1999, 
Rao, 2003). Early work on transaction costs in China focused on legal institutions for 
agriculture, specifically contracts (Cheung, 1969) and land tenancy (Cheung, 1974). 
In present-day China, the availability and cost of information varies by geographic 
region and by industrial sector, which is attributed to the different stages of economic 
development and the “different levels of governmental interference [that] cause 
industrial differences in information accountability” (Luo, 2007: 43). Institutional 
uncertainty causes high transaction costs (Luo, 1997), and “both transaction cost and 
information processing complexity increase with industry structural instability, 
information unverifiability, and law unenforceability” (Luo, 2007: 40). This latter 
point encompasses the factors of uncertainty, bounded rationality and rule of law, 
and the risks of these factors for firms operating in China have been found to 
increase with distance from the coastal economic centres (He, 2002). 
The development of information asymmetries between Chinese firms has been traced 
back to the period of economic transition and the accompanying high risk of 
opportunism, which made potential trading partners reluctant to share information 
and also hindered the development of trust between them (Keister, 2001). 
Opportunism has been found to be a greater risk in transactions taking place between 
groups than within groups, as a result of collectivist cultural conditioning (Chen et 
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al., 2002). Internalising knowledge, especially unpatentable knowledge, has long 
been expected to substantially reduce the risks of both opportunism and information 
asymmetry (Buckley and Casson, 1976). Calls for more explanation as to when this 
would be most efficient (Buckley, 1983) were answered with reference to the high 
transaction costs of repeated international transfer of tacit knowledge requiring two-
way communication, especially where the knowledge needed to be protected from 
disclosure to competitors and where institutions for legal redress were weak (Teece, 
1983). We therefore expect transaction costs to be particularly high where the 
Chinese context combines asymmetry, opportunism, and weak protection of 
intellectual property rights (Massey, 2006). 
In the tourism sector, transaction cost theory is recommended for the analysis of 
organisational development in the supply chain, and the internalisation pressures that 
firms face at each stage in the chain (Buckley, 1987). However, Tremblay (1998) 
considers the approaches of Williamson (1985) in general, and of Buckley (1987) in 
the context of tourism, to relate simply to short-term efficiency gains made through 
information asymmetry. He counters that the theory “fails to provide a valid 
justification for long-run strategic decisions concerning the integration, 
diversification, and other substantive changes in the boundaries of the firm in the 
tourism market”, such as changes driven by the “rapidly changing technological 
environment” confronting the tourism sector (p844). The term “dynamic transaction 
costs” is used to describe the specific training and coordination of local suppliers that 
is needed to keep their capabilities up to date with technical change (Langlois and 
Robertson, 1995: 54). The question of technological change may, however, be of 
secondary importance in a body of theory that has otherwise been criticised as static 
(see section 2.4.3), and in the research context of a developing region where firms 
might give higher priority to short-term savings than to technology or long-term 
strategy (Martinez and Dacin, 1999), and where the transfer between tour operators 
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and local accommodation providers may be more likely to concern training in service 
standards than advanced technology. 
Nooteboom (1993) observes that small firms incur higher transaction costs than large 
firms, when the costs are related to bounded rationality, uncertainty and 
opportunism. Their limited resources and low trading volumes impact their ability to 
conduct information search and monitoring, and their narrower range of suppliers 
hinders the spreading of risk against opportunism. In contrast, Granovetter (1985) 
expects small firms’ networks of social relations to protect them from the 
opportunism that would otherwise push them towards integration. This common 
emphasis on behavioural and environmental causes, rather than transaction 
characteristics, is reiterated by McGee and Sawyerr (2003). Under conditions of 
uncertainty, they expect small firms to suffer higher costs of information search, as 
their limited internal resources cause them to depend on networks and external 
sources of information. 
In conclusion, the small, Chinese tourism firms researched in this study are expected 
to experience transaction costs, with an emphasis on those caused by bounded 
rationality, uncertainty and opportunism. The level of these costs may also be 
increased by weak legal institutions. The next section will consider whether they are 
likely to respond to the transaction costs in the same way as is anticipated by the 
literature. 
2.4.2.2 Responses to transaction costs in the research context 
Studies applying transaction cost theory to the Chinese research context find more 
evidence of cooperation than the other expected responses, and their authors explain 
this with reference to cultural factors and formal institutions. 
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A survey of Chinese manufacturers finds that informal, relational ties are a more 
common response than formal contracts to the transaction costs of uncertainty, 
opportunism and specificity (Zhou et al., 2008). China’s weak legal system is often 
cited as a reason why firms do not pursue detailed contracts in response to 
transaction costs. Firms are unlikely to use contracts to safeguard specific 
investments against opportunism, as they cannot be confident of an equitable 
division of assets by the courts in the event of contract termination (Zhou and Poppo, 
2008). In addition to this weakness, the soundness of legal systems and law 
enforcement varies across China’s regions – generally being weaker in less 
developed areas – and can be unpredictable due to political influence (Luo, 2007). 
Mutual hostage-taking can help to reduce the risks of opportunism in cases where 
neither contracts nor trust can be depended upon to govern exchange (Choi et al., 
1999). 
The preference for relational ties over contracts is attributed to the strength of shared 
norms between customer and supplier, although in future the balance may tip 
towards contracting as China’s institutional reforms proceed (Zhou and Poppo, 2008) 
– which Peng (2003) anticipates during economic and institutional transition. Zhang 
and Keh (2010) associate private firms’ dependence on relational ties both with an 
early stage of market transition, and with an early stage in the firms’ development – 
proposing that as the institutions and the firms develop, their emphasis will move 
from relational ties to contracting. An earlier survey also found that levels of 
management networking increase with levels of uncertainty, and also with increased 
regulation and competition (Luo, 2003). A study of overseas Chinese firms found 
that networks could be effective in shielding their members from the high transaction 
costs caused by corruption (Buckley, 2004). 
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Opposing views are put forward to explain why some Chinese firms do not carry out 
their intention to internalise. On the one hand, they may wish to internalise, but be 
prevented from doing so by economic regulations (Peng and Heath, 1996); on the 
other hand, they may fear the loss of face that would result if the proposed 
acquisition were to fail (Luo, 1997). In both cases, exchange and growth proceed via 
informal networks rather than internalisation. 
As regards responses by small firms, Nooteboom (1993) considers cooperation, 
networks or “quasi-integration” in industrial districts to be practical alternatives to 
market-based transactions. Given their constraint of scale he does not consider 
internalisation as an option, in contrast to Buckley and Casson (2009), who contend 
that the principle of internalisation can explain the changing boundaries of 
organisations of all sizes, down to “ ‘do it yourself’ production” by individual 
households (p1566).  
The literature concerning the responses of tourism firms to transaction costs focuses 
mainly on vertical integration by large firms (see, for example, Buckley, 1987), 
although the Eclectic Paradigm has been adapted to reflect the changing patterns of 
ownership and internalisation by multinational enterprises in the international hotel 
sector (Dunning and McQueen, 1981). Ownership of intangible assets such as brands 
supersedes the potentially risky ownership of overseas hotel buildings, and 
internalisation is interpreted as the degree of control exercised through franchises or 
service agreements. The linkages that might constitute cooperative structures 
between firms in the tourism sector may run backwards through the value-chain, 
including direct employment in tourist services, indirect services to tourism 
providers, and spillovers into sectors such as food production and light 
manufacturing, or forwards to agents selling services direct to tourists. The types of 
cooperation in the tourist sector range from informal links within the trade, to 
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professional or public bodies either in the same sub-sector or at a common 
destination (Holloway, 2001). 
In conclusion, although the causes of transaction costs are expected to affect the 
firms in this study’s research context, this literature suggests that these firms’ 
responses might tend more towards forming cooperative relationships than to either 
contracts or internalisation.  
2.4.3 Further critiques of transaction cost theory 
A common criticism of transaction cost theory is that, although it can offer an 
economic accounting for actions (Martinez and Dacin, 1999), its assumption that 
actors’ aims are to minimise transaction costs (Dietrich, 1994) causes it to fail to 
consider the importance of social relations and trust (Douma and Schreuder, 2008). 
This has been succinctly described as an under-socialised explanation of economic 
action (Granovetter, 1985), which this study attempts to address by its consideration 
of informal institutions (in Chapter 4) as social influences on economic behaviour, 
and the selection of a research site in which social relations appear to be very 
important to business. 
Another criticism is that transaction cost theory takes a static viewpoint from which 
to explain the behaviour of firms, which is in fact dynamic (Dietrich, 1994). This has 
been interpreted to mean that the very survival of firms demonstrates that they have 
succeeded in reducing their transaction costs, and so any sample for transaction cost 
research is self-selecting (Buckley and Chapman, 1998d). This idea of self-selection 
would also imply that firms have reached a stable status quo, without ongoing 
competition between firms (Douma and Schreuder, 2008). If the theory is in fact 
static, then this implies a close correspondence with the cross-sectional nature of the 
data collection in this study. However, the collected data also indicate that high 
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transaction costs might not have the effect of introducing a survivorship bias, so 
much as hindering the performance and development of the affected firms. The data 
also suggest that the inception, maturation and decline of firms, and the competition 
between them, is ongoing and the situation is dynamic rather than stable. 
Concerning the applicability of transaction cost theory to tourism, Tremblay (1998) 
pursues Dietrich’s (1994) point on dynamism. In Tremblay’s view, Williamson 
(1985) assumes a stable level of technology that does not affect decisions, but he 
contends that the pace of technological change is very pertinent to decisions 
regarding internalisation and firms’ boundaries in tourism. Tremblay in turn has 
assumed the tourism sector to be uniformly operated by well-resourced 
multinationals able to invest in changing information and communications 
technologies.  
A final criticism concerns the danger of transaction costs being used to explain 
almost any outcome (Williamson, 1985). The author’s response to this will to present 
a clear research design in Chapter 5, to allow the reader to judge whether the theory 
has been applied appropriately to fulfil its potential: 
Transaction cost economics, despite its faults, remains the best means of coping with the 
complexities of international business (Buckley, 1998: xvii). 
During the course of this thesis a series of four flowcharts will be presented. This is 
intended to illustrate the progression in the author’s conceptualisation of firms’ 
responses to transaction costs. It begins with the initial review of transaction cost 
theory in the current chapter, via modifications made following the exploratory study 
described in Chapter 3, through the patterns observed in the empirical findings in 
Chapter 8, to the recommendations made in Chapter 9.  
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The literature that has been reviewed up to this point identifies causes of transaction 
costs including bounded rationality, opportunism, asset specificity, transaction 
frequency and uncertainty. In response to high transaction costs, and subject to 
institutional restrictions, firms are expected to move from arm’s length market 
exchange to relational exchange, to internalise intermediate markets or to establish 
cooperative governance structures. This anticipated pattern is illustrated in Figure 4 
below, and was explored in the research context during the exploratory study, which 
is the subject of the next chapter. 
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Causal factors   Responses  Outcome 
Causes of high transaction costs  Modified governance of transactions and 
organisational structures 
 Reduced transaction costs promote 
business development 
     
     
Behavioural causes:     
Bounded rationality  Reduced numbers of market transactions   
Opportunism     
  Relational transactions   
Transaction characteristics:     
Specificity  Internalised supply of intermediate    
Frequency  products   
     
Uncertain environment      
  Internalisation of all future transactions 
(not expected in research context) 
  
Formal institutions:     
Funding     
Legal     
Regulatory     
  Cooperative structure (more likely in the 
research context) 
  
     
     
    Relational trading and cooperative 
organisational structures are expected 
     
Figure 4 Flowchart 1 – Causes of and anticipated responses to high transaction costs  
(Source: author)
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CHAPTER 3 EXPLORATORY STUDY 
This chapter describes the aim, method and findings of the exploratory study 
undertaken by the author in the Tiger Leaping Gorge in 2007. It demonstrates the 
pivotal role of the exploratory study in the subsequent formation of the research 
questions, and in the identification of the first of two observed gaps in the literature. 
3.1 Rationale 
The exploratory study was considered to be important in order to assess the 
feasibility of the proposed study, as a certain degree of fit between theory and site 
would be required in order to yield interesting findings, but too close a fit would risk 
failing to make a new contribution. Chapter 1 justified the selection of the Tiger 
Leaping Gorge as the research site and explained why, based on her prior knowledge 
of the site, the author expected that it would offer an appropriate context in which to 
explore the causes of transaction costs and firms’ responses to them. In particular, the 
transaction cost literature reviewed in Chapter 2 had suggested that behavioural and 
environmental causes, and cooperative organisation structures, might well be in 
evidence. However, the author still considered it prudent to conduct a small-scale 
exploration in advance of the principal data collection exercise, rather than assuming 
that the theory would prove to be substantially applicable.  
3.2 Method 
A largely inductive approach was taken to the exploration of behaviour related to 
causes of and responses to transaction costs in the research site. The modifications to 
pure induction recommended by Lindsay (2004) allow for both a Straussian 
preparatory review of previous research prior to the author’s own theory generation 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2002), and familiarisation with the research setting to increase 
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the relevance of the data and the economy with which they are collected (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994). The data collection was conducted in the form of an ethnographic 
reconnaissance (Wolcott, 1999: 207), which is intended as an orientation period 
before the development of a complete research strategy and so does not call for 
formal interview schedules or sampling of participants. The openness of this 
approach allows for the emergence of further issues that are of current concern to the 
study’s participants (Kirk and Miller, 1986, Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). Such 
emergent issues can in turn feed into the formation or modification of research 
questions at an early stage, as is characteristic of an ethnographic approach (Robson, 
2002). 
An investigation into the participating firms’ responses to transaction costs would 
naturally address their trading relationships with customers and suppliers. Since 
relationships should ideally be researched from both sides (Coviello and Jones, 2004, 
Hansen, 2008, Yang et al., 2006), the author first concentrated on international tour 
operators, as clients of the firms who were the focal participants in the exploratory 
study, who could offer an informed yet detached view of the commercial 
environment in which the participant firms operate. Tour operators were selected in 
preference to individual guests who would be unlikely to maintain relationships with 
the participants, and in preference to local suppliers with whom the researcher would 
have no ready opportunities for securing access. This approach would also help to 
avoid the pitfall of locally-focused business research that fails to engage with an 
international perspective (Malmberg, 2003). This preliminary contact with tour 
operators was of further benefit in offering the author an initial steer towards 
potential participants who the tour operators identified as their partners, prior to 
encountering other participants during the course of the exploratory study. 
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3.3 Discussion of findings 
This section describes the findings of the two stages of the exploratory study, the first 
with international tour operators and the second in the field in China, and discusses 
the issues that emerged during the course of the exploratory study. 
3.3.1 International tour operators 
International tour operators offering itineraries in the Tiger Leaping Gorge were 
identified from guidebooks, websites and brochures, and those with responsible 
tourism policies that highlighted local service provision were selected, as the author 
interpreted this as an indication of an emphasis on long-term relationships with local 
service providers. See, for example, the websites of Exodus (2007), Imaginative 
Traveller (2009), Intrepid (2008) and World Expeditions (2009). The author 
conducted preliminary interviews with management representatives of two of these 
tour operators (hereafter referred to as TO1 and TO2) in London, which is the global 
headquarters of TO1 and the European headquarters of TO2. 
These interviews revealed a marked distinction between the degree of contact 
between the tour operators and local firms, and the considerations that drive it. As a 
response to the perceived difficulty of the regulatory environment, TO1 has 
subcontracted its entire China operation to a Chinese agent based in Beijing. This 
agent employs its own tour guides, who are Beijing residents but accompany groups 
throughout China, and handles domestic travel and accommodation bookings. The 
agent further subcontracts local accommodation bookings to its own provincial 
agents; it occupies the top of a hierarchical structure in China, and reports upward to 
TO1 in London. There is informal contact between the tour guides and local families 
who host “farm visits”, but these appear to be ad hoc and unannounced rather than 
drawing on a reciprocal relationship. 
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None of these agency relationships is exclusive, and the agents in Beijing and the 
provinces have no specific investment in their upward relationships apart from staff 
briefing in company principles such as responsible tourism. TO1 has a formal, 
contractual, arm’s length relationship with the agent, and as it values the agent’s 
position as a buffer between TO1 and the difficult environment, there is no 
inclination to internalise. The agent described this as a good working relationship of 
ten years’ standing, in which both parties respect the efforts made by the other. TO1 
has no contact with tourist service providers in the local destinations, and owns no 
fixed assets in China.  
In contrast, TO2 has its own staff in China, having experienced difficulty in finding 
reliable local operators. It has an in-country ground manager and employs dedicated 
Chinese or foreign guides, who are described as having detailed local knowledge and 
good relationships with the accommodation providers, and who report site-specific 
conditions back to the ground manager. They report the deliberate cultivation of 
long-term relationships with these accommodation providers, who they then expect 
to meet emergent needs rather than having to rely on formalised booking procedures. 
The London manager explained that the prioritisation of TO2’s bookings by local 
providers confirms that they value their good relationship with TO2, and this 
suggested to the author that there is transaction frequency and a degree of specificity 
in the informal relationship. The manager felt that internalisation of accommodation 
would be an option in cities where multiple tours start and finish, but not locally as 
TO2 aims to offer cultural immersion and its clients demand a local flavour in their 
trips. 
One of TO2’s tour leaders described his long-standing friendships with three family-
run guesthouses in the research site, to whom he takes groups on a weekly basis. 
Their relationships are informal and social rather than business-like, bookings are 
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made by telephone and they always find room for his groups. TO2 has not required 
any specific investment or provision by the guesthouses, but can fill the smallest one 
to capacity. TO2’s ground manager confirmed that his firm values its relationship 
with guesthouse proprietors highly, and indicated a long-term orientation in referring 
to an annual exercise of agreeing prices with the guesthouses. He expects his tour 
leaders to maintain these relationships, which would only be terminated if the 
guesthouses were to fail repeatedly to meet TO2’s needs or standards. A two-way 
relationship was implied by the ground manager’s statement that the guesthouses 
expect fair treatment and sufficient notice from TO2, and that “we can provide 
support and help to them if they need it”. 
The further exploration in the field site of specificity, frequency and cooperation 
therefore had some grounding in TO2’s reports as well as the theory referred to in 
Chapter 2. However, this was not strongly corroborated by the guesthouse 
proprietors, who were the counterparties to these reportedly close relationships, and 
other causes of transaction costs appeared to be more significant. 
3.3.2 Field study 
An aim of the exploratory field study was to explore the relevance of transaction cost 
theory and the local firms’ view of their relationships with the international tour 
operators. It incorporated interviews with five firms in the research site – including 
the firms mentioned by TO2 – and less detailed conversations with a further two. 
There were also interviews with TO2’s contacts in the provincial capital, Kunming, 
and relevant tourist authorities in Kunming. 
The author’s discussions with TO2 had led her to anticipate the firms’ descriptions of 
their relationships with the international tour operators and guesthouses to include 
knowledge of the tour operators and their needs, a commitment to meeting these 
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needs, and a long-term orientation, which would correspond to specificity, frequency 
and cooperation or a valued relationship. Three of the guesthouses received tour 
groups with sufficient frequency that they were accustomed to taking bookings by 
telephone, but there was no specificity in the provision of services or 
accommodation. All appeared to react to the tour operators’ booking requests, rather 
than to actively attempt to manage a relationship, or to handle the client firm 
differently to other customers. Only two of these guesthouses could name the firms 
that regularly sent them groups of clients. It therefore appeared as though the 
author’s expectations had been raised by TO2’s description of deep and mutual 
relationships, but that the local firms considered them to be more arm’s length and 
unexceptional. 
Discussions about how the participants interacted with other local firms were used to 
explore whether any of the behavioural causes of transaction costs were present. 
Cross-marketing by firms that were not in direct competition with each other was 
observed only in towns and cities outside the actual research site. The author 
interpreted this as a possible indicator of greater bounded rationality or fear of 
opportunism in the rural areas, or a lack of trust in remote partners who could not 
easily be monitored (Zhou and Poppo, 2008). Staff at most guesthouses within the 
research site were willing to refer guests on, if always to a guesthouse far enough 
away not to be a direct competitor. One proprietor explained that her guesthouse was 
too newly-established to have acquired this local knowledge – one and a half years 
after opening – suggesting that overcoming bounded rationality would be a long-term 
exercise, that would hinder her ability to cooperate or to inform herself about her 
competitors. Reports of behaviour between competing guesthouses, that struck the 
author as connoting opportunism, included a “willingness to lie, if only by 
omission”. Local taxi drivers were also said to have misinformed tourists during a 
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period of great danger from landslides in the month before the exploratory study, 
when a premium was charged for a risk of which the passengers were unaware. 
A very high degree of uncertainty in the operating environment was evident, with 
most participants being very concerned at rumours that the national government 
intended to dam the gorge for a hydropower scheme. This would require all the firms 
to relocate and so lose their businesses, at an unspecified time in the future. Two 
participants described the uncertainty of the government’s plans, and the 
impossibility of expressing opposition. One mimed handcuffing the author, and the 
other aimed an imaginary rifle whilst repeating the word “soldier” in both Chinese 
and English to be sure that the author had understood his fear. They both said that 
local life had been severely disrupted, and they could not plan for the future. One 
participant, however, had lodged a formal protest with the national government’s 
Development and Reform Committee. Another participant claimed his business was 
being damaged by environmental destruction resulting from tungsten mining, 
diminishing the attraction of the gorge to tourists and reducing the scope of services 
he could offer. His formerly vibrant mountain-guiding service was virtually defunct 
by the time of the exploratory study in 2007. 
The ways in which the participant firms might respond to high transaction costs, 
including internalisation, relational trading and cooperation, were explored 
throughout the tourism value chain (Holloway, 2001), in both the vertical 
relationships between guesthouses and tour operators or suppliers, and in the 
horizontal relationships among the guesthouses. The firms reported that they had 
limited access to funds to take over any other supplier or competitor firms. The 
international tour operators are in turn constrained by the bar on wholly-foreign 
ownership in the Chinese hotel sector (World Bank, 2004), and are deterred from 
acquiring stakes in guesthouses by the perceived property risk. Internalisation of 
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guesthouses would also jar with the tour operators’ stated commitment to the support 
of local businesses through their responsible tourism policies. 
The interviews with TO2 had suggested that it would be reasonable for the author to 
expect to find cooperation between tour operators and guesthouses in the field. The 
closest relationship observed in the field was between TO2 and the smallest 
guesthouse. This proprietor explained that her key problem was market access: 
potential guests had no prior knowledge of the guesthouse as it was not mentioned in 
the guidebooks, and the language barrier hindered her attempts to catch passing 
trade. Working with TO2 offered a solution to both problems, but this suggested to 
the author a degree of dependency on the tour operator as has been observed in small 
European tourist accommodation enterprises (Bastakis et al., 2004), rather than 
reciprocal cooperation. In general, the local firms’ immediate concerns were focused 
more on growth than on long-term strategies or ethics policies (Churchill and Lewis, 
1983), and this was reflected in a pragmatic approach to relationships with tour 
operators. 
Supplier relations appeared to be confined to a small number of personal 
relationships. Transactions were regular in cases where each party could trust the 
other, and the seller understood the buyer’s requirements. There was, however, little 
suggestion that this embodied the cooperative alternatives to internalisation, more 
than the simple direction of business towards a few favoured individuals. One 
participant described these informal relations as “favours to be repaid”, rather than 
either cooperation or arm’s length transactions. 
The exploratory study sought evidence in the research site of commitment to 
relationships and associated specificity or frequency, but it found more limited 
support for these ideas than for the remaining transaction cost drivers of bounded 
rationality, opportunism and uncertainty. Although frequent visits by international 




Sacha Rawlence  67 
 
tour operators (including TO2) alleviated the resource constraints of one of these 
firms, and three more firms regularly hosted tour groups, the operating procedures of 
all the firms interviewed reflected less the expected approaches of cooperation or 
internalisation, than an attitude of self-reliance in which the firms only traded outside 
for goods or services that were not available internally (this is discussed further in 
section 3.3.3).  
This self-reliance was further in evidence in the author’s interviews with business 
contacts of TO2, which extended beyond the intended research site. In Kunming the 
author spoke with three large, Chinese tourist service providers. The observed 
inclination to be a self-reliant generalist, rather than a specialist within a network of 
providers, was evident even in a 200-room hotel. Owned by the Yunnan Provincial 
Government Tourist Board, this hotel kept all activities in-house including the 
laundry service and even the ownership of the bicycles rented out to guests. A state-
owned travel agency, also under the authority of the provincial tourist board, was the 
only enterprise to describe a partnership with an overseas tour operator – suggesting 
that this is only possible for large firms with state backing. It also had formal 
contracts with suppliers and agents in local destinations, indicating a very different 
scope of activity to the other interviewees. 
Exploratory interviews were also conducted in Dali, an ancient walled city that is 
visited on TO2’s Yunnan itineraries, with three local service providers who cater to 
inbound tourists. Here the businesses were independent and competitive, they did not 
cooperate with other local firms, nor did they report significant trade volumes or 
relationships with foreign tour operators. One interviewee was a guesthouse 
proprietor who offered homestay visits with farming families; this seemed neither to 
be a commercial relationship nor reciprocal cooperation, as the visitors appeared to 
be imposed on the families unannounced. This interviewee saw himself as the sole 
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source of cash income for the host villagers, which indicated that the risk of 
dependency was present in domestic as well as international relationships. 
3.3.3 Emergent issues 
Although the interviews described above suggested that the theory of transaction 
costs could explain the behaviour of the firms to a limited extent – as cautioned by 
Luo (1997), the local Chinese context cannot always be fully accounted for by 
Western theory – they did, however, uncover matters of urgent concern to the 
interviewees that the author had not anticipated. These concerns offered alternative 
perspectives that served both to steer the further study in a direction that was more 
meaningful to the participants (Kirk and Miller, 1986), and also clearly demonstrated 
that the research site was a high transaction cost environment.  
The procurement behaviour of rural guesthouses with comparable road access was 
very variable. Whilst most offered home-grown food, one described the 
inconvenience of buying it in from the nearest town. This suggested to the author that 
the latter firm might not be strongly integrated into local kinship networks (Peng, 
2004) that could otherwise have provided farming labour, and so alternative informal 
structures took on increased emphasis in the ongoing research. Kinship or social 
networks were also important to a participant in the research site and two in Dali, and 
one Dali interviewee distinguished between social networks and political guanxi, 
with each serving distinct purposes to his business. 
Formal institutions limited the options open to the firms. Regulatory constraints on 
strategy are experienced both by hotels where the provincial tourist board has a 
degree of ownership and managerial control (this was reported independently by the 
state-owned travel agent, and by a Chinese academic researching the impact on Dali 
and Lijiang of increased transport infrastructure), and by tour operators who are 
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required to hire local guides at every site visited (confirmed by both local and foreign 
operators). Formal sources of finance were reported to be unavailable to the firms in 
the research site, so any investment was funded from such profits as were retained 
and the need for self-reliance was reinforced. Property rights were widely considered 
to be uncertain. The risk of expropriation could not be avoided by the Chinese 
interviewees, but the foreign-owned firms refrained from investing in fixed assets 
altogether. The national and local governments were not thought to be accountable to 
the locals, whose livelihoods were directly impacted by government sale of land for 
mining operations.  
The firms demonstrated little specialisation, engaging instead in a wide range of 
productive activities. In the light of subsequent events, namely the earthquakes and 
political unrest of Spring 2008, the author considered that the high risk-level of the 
environment might demand diversification rather than specialisation in business. The 
responses to risk varied, though, and so merited further investigation. For example, 
most guesthouses were run alongside continuing farming activity, but one guesthouse 
proprietor no longer farmed. Most proprietors felt that their businesses were 
threatened by the mining operations, but one was actively involved. This raised 
questions as to whether he was responding to a decline in tourism or contributing to 
it, and whether there was a mechanism for environmental protection or compensation 
for externalities. 
3.4 Conclusions drawn from the exploratory study 
In summary, the exploratory study has suggested that transactions were impeded 
between the participating firms and other firms. If their resulting insularity persists, 
they are unlikely to develop further and bring economic benefit to a wider group than 
the family members and others currently employed. The difficulties that the 
participants described correspond to some of the causes of transaction costs, and also 
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to problems of weak institutions, both formal and informal. Yet the exploratory study 
did not find the expected structures of internalisation or cooperation, despite the 
presence of transaction costs. In fact, the firms’ response appeared to be an attempt 
to reduce transaction costs by reducing the number of transactions they conducted, 
resulting in self-reliance and their isolation from trading relationships.  
Such a disparity between a researcher’s “schema-guided expectations” and their 
findings is referred to as a “breakdown”, which serves to highlight problems meriting 
further attention (Agar, 1986: 21). This is then addressed by modifying the schema of 
understanding and returning to the field or comparing it to the findings again, in an 
iterative cycle until the breakdown is resolved. As the breakdown occurred when 
self-reliant isolation emerged as a more common response than cooperation or 
internalisation, this is explored in the next section as a possible gap in the literature. 
The emergent weakness of institutions is considered to be a possible reason why 
firms might respond through isolation. The second section of the literature review, 
presented in Chapter 4, therefore considers the importance of institutions in relation 
to transaction costs, and makes the proposition that institutions might play a 
mediating role between transaction costs and firms’ responses to them. Isolation and 
institutional theory are then used to modify the schema of understanding. If the aim 
of transaction cost economics is simply to minimise transaction costs (Dietrich, 
1994), then the firms’ cost minimisation by reduced trading or isolation should be 
explored, theoretically and empirically, as another possible response to these costs. 
3.5 Isolation as a response to high transaction costs 
We now revisit the literature in search of alternative responses by firms to perceived 
transaction costs, which could better explain the tendency towards self-reliance and 
consequent isolation of firms observed in the exploratory study. We seek 
circumstances under which firms might reduce the number of transactions they carry 
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out or the number of relationships they maintain other than through internalisation, 
causing them to become isolated from – rather than integrated into – a network of 
trading relationships. The discussion is centred on weak market institutions and 
informal constraints, and the hindrances that these pose to specialisation, before 
isolation is identified as a sensitising concept to be adopted in the continuation of this 
study. 
3.5.1 Market institutions and specialisation 
Under circumstances where uncertainty combines with long timescales to make 
transaction costs prohibitively high, such that classical contracts become impossible 
to draft completely: “One [alternative] would be to forgo such transactions 
altogether” (Williamson, 1985: 70). The other alternatives that Williamson proposes 
are internalisation or neoclassical contracting with third-party arbitration, all of 
which would aim to preserve the continuity of the trading relationship beyond the 
lifetime of the transaction in question. 
The avoidance of individual transactions is drawn into a consideration of its impact 
on the scope of the firm’s ongoing activities by North (1990) who, like Adam Smith 
(1776), considers exchange to be the foundation of specialisation. The causal chain is 
further extended by the view that trust is a prerequisite for exchange, that enables 
specialisation, which is the basis of wealth (de Soto, 2006). If transaction costs are 
high and exchange transactions are limited, firms will be unable to specialise, so 
isolation and non-specialisation are both consequences of high transaction costs. This 
view is supported by Arora et al. (1996), who expect specialisation to result from low 
transaction costs that enable firms to trade in intermediate goods. Non-specialisation 
is explained as “a form of insurance when the costs and uncertainties of transacting 
are high” (North, 1990: 34), which offers multiple income sources to sustain 
uncertain livelihoods (Ellis and Biggs, 2001). This is because when transaction costs 
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and uncertainty are high, firms may reduce the costs of such transactions by avoiding 
them; in consequence, firms which are isolated rather than actively trading cannot 
specialise. North concludes that such firms experience a trade-off between the lower 
transaction costs of limited personal exchange, and the higher production costs 
entailed by limited specialisation and division of labour. The opportunity is missed to 
specialise, and so to capitalise on a competitive advantage, and the firm becomes 
isolated in its self-reliance. The institutional support that would be necessary for a 
transition from personal to impersonal exchange is discussed in Chapter 4. 
The question of division of labour is pursued in the context of economic 
development, where market institutions exist but are not trusted by the firms who 
would otherwise use them: “They prefer to remain self-sufficient rather than 
participate in a division of labour because they do not trust the market process” 
(Buckley and Casson, 1998: 17). In this case, firms fear that there is no institutional 
protection from the risk of opportunists in market transactions and so they avoid 
them, relying instead on their own subsistence production. Firms may also continue 
in-house production to avoid a perceived risk of opportunist suppliers withholding 
inputs, in addition to changes in the costs of purchasing or of production (Lyons, 
1995). This presents isolation as the chosen strategy of the decision-maker, to protect 
his firm from risk and to reduce its transaction costs. In developing countries, 
isolation may also be an outcome that is imposed on the firm rather than chosen by it, 
as a result of insuperable barriers to participation in markets or the formal economy. 
These might include the costs of company registration, weak property rights that 
make investment unacceptably risky, or lack of title to property that prevents firms 
from borrowing to invest through their inability to post collateral (Cleaver, 2007). 
Ineffective or absent institutional support is also seen as the cause of low market 
participation by the poor (Mair and Marti, 2007), and the resulting lack of formal 
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registration status has been shown to be a key determinant of variations in growth 
rates between enterprises (Capelleras et al., 2007). 
3.5.2 Trust and informal constraints 
A combination of uncertainty and weakness of the formal institutions responsible for 
contract enforcement is expected to result in trust-based coordination or cooperation 
between firms (Zhou and Poppo, 2008). Trust thus enables informal cooperation 
(Artz and Brush, 2000), that can act as an alternative to formal institutions and 
internalisation. The patterns of personal relationships within which these transactions 
are conducted are considered to be key to understanding organisational structures 
(Granovetter, 1985). However, if opportunism is added to the uncertainty and 
institutional weakness, then both trust- and contract-based coordination may be 
ineffective and firms may “simply select [sic] not to do business in such conditions” 
(Zhou and Poppo, 2008: 24).  
Although informal constraints on behaviour can, on occasion, substitute for formal 
institutions, isolation can also result from the absence of informal restraints: “The 
higher these [transaction] costs [of formal enforcement], the more will the 
exchanging parties invoke informal constraints to shape the exchange, although in 
the extreme, of course, no exchange will take place at all” (North, 1990: 68).  In the 
absence of both informal and formal constraints on opportunist behaviour, 
individuals trust neither the market nor their potential trading partners (Buckley, 
1998).  
In a study of China’s economic transition, an actor’s decision whether or not to trade 
with another was found to depend more on levels of environmental uncertainty (and 
the associated transaction costs), than on the cost of the goods or services traded 
(Keister, 2001). Levels of trade might be further reduced in the absence of informal 
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constraints on behaviour: “Parties choose to not work with others if broader social 
sanctions for misbehaving do not exist” (Zhou and Poppo, 2008: 24). 
In summary, the degree of withdrawal from trade may range from a firm avoiding 
complex transactions, to reducing the number of transactions conducted or 
relationships maintained, or even remaining outside the formal economy. At the 
extreme, habitual withdrawal results in isolation of the firm, and an organisational 
structure compatible with self-reliance and non-specialisation. 
3.5.3 Isolation as a gap in the literature and as a sensitising concept 
The literature examined above offered ideas as to how the concept of isolation could 
be explored further, but without providing a precise definition. The author considered 
this to be a gap in the literature, and a suitable starting-point for the further 
exploration of an apparently under-researched phenomenon. 
A definitive concept refers precisely to what is common to a class of objects, by the aid of a 
clear definition in terms of attributes or fixed bench marks…. A sensitizing concept lacks 
such specification of attributes or bench marks and consequently it does not enable the user 
to move directly to the instance and its relevant content. Instead, it gives the user a general 
sense of reference and guidance in approaching empirical instances. Whereas definitive 
concepts provide prescriptions of what to see, sensitizing concepts merely suggest 
directions along which to look (Blumer, 1954: 7, emphasis added).  
In the subsequent empirical research for this study, the author therefore used 
isolation as a sensitising concept to guide the exploration of firms’ responses to 
transaction costs, without prescribing in advance a mechanism for measuring degrees 
of isolation. This corresponds with the strategy of enquiry based on the principles of 
critical realist ethnography, and the abductive inferences to be made (Blaikie, 2000), 
that will be described in Chapter 5. The observation, description, analysis and 
reporting of the empirical findings will contribute to the development of this concept, 
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as recommended by Blumer, culminating in its refinement as a “grounded concept” 
(Bryman, 2008: 541). 
3.6 Research questions 
The findings of the exploratory study proved critical to the shaping of research 
questions that are very much grounded in the context (Robson, 2002), particularly in 
the identification of isolation from other firms as a form of response to transaction 
costs that has received little attention in the literature, and in suggesting that 
institutions were important in shaping firms’ choice of response. The resulting 
research questions are: 
1. Which causes of transaction costs are perceived by decision-makers in the firms 
studied? 
2. How do the firms respond to these transaction costs? 
3. Could an understanding of local institutions help us to explain firms’ responses to 
transaction costs? 
 The first research question draws on the literature to ask which of the causes of 
transaction costs are perceived by participating firms. The second question asks 
which responses to transaction costs are evident in the field, including the somewhat 
neglected area of isolation as a possible response to transaction costs. This may shed 
light on the reasons why the literature appears to lack a detailed examination of 
isolation, and it answers calls for research into business isolation in the absence of 
effective social constraints (Zhou and Poppo, 2008). The third question draws on the 
suggestion of the exploratory study, that institutions might be an important influence 
on firms’ responses and so help to explain the unexpected response of isolation. The 
relationship between transaction costs and institutions will be discussed in the next 
chapter.  
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CHAPTER 4 INTEGRATING INSTITUTIONAL THEORY INTO 
TRANSACTION COST THEORY  
An alternative perspective on the findings of the exploratory study is presented by 
institutional theory, which opens up the possibility that institutional strength or 
weakness could affect the level of transaction costs and the range of responses that 
are available to firms. This is particularly important in an emerging market context, 
where institutions may be less developed than in the economies in which business 
research has typically taken place before (Peng et al., 2008). We now examine the 
scope of institutional theory to address this in the current study, describe the second 
of two observed gaps in the literature, and explain why the outcome of isolation is 
considered to be important. 
4.1 Overview of new institutional theory 
Institutional theory offers a way of understanding the reasons for the emergence or 
adoption of organisational forms, and so is pertinent to our study of the forms 
adopted by firms in response to transaction costs. Scott (1987) warns that “the 
beginning of wisdom in approaching institutional theory is to recognise at the outset 
that there is not one but several variants” (p493), but Bjorkman et al. (2007) offer an 
initial orientation for international business research: “a common point of departure 
for most scholars is that organisations are under pressure to adapt to and be 
consistent with their institutional environment” (p432). This is variously expressed as 
the influence of the institutional framework on organisations’ evolution (North, 
1990), the role of the local context in which firms are embedded in the shaping of 
their economic behaviour and ability to respond to challenges (Locke, 1996), the 
institutional constraints on firms’ selection of an efficient structure (Roberts and 
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Greenwood, 1997), and a pressure on the subsidiary to conform to the expectations 
of the multinational enterprise’s home context (Morgan and Kristensen, 2006).  
The evolution of institutional theory has broadened the scope of institutions to which 
firms are thought to adapt. Prior to the 1970s, the literature of both institutional 
economics and institutional sociology focused on the process of organisations’ 
conformance to their regulatory environments (Scott, 1995). This study focuses on 
the New Institutionalism of the mid-1970s onwards, because of three key changes: 
the inclusion of cultural institutions, the differentiation between institutions and 
organisations, and a focus on transactions. Scott (1987) credits Meyer and Rowan 
(1977) as being the first writers to go beyond regulatory institutions by incorporating 
cultural elements of institutions as influences on organisational structure, including 
cognitive systems and normative beliefs. This marked the emergence, alongside the 
existing Rational Choice Institutionalism, of Sociological Institutionalism (Hall and 
Taylor, 1996). Whilst the former had expected organisations to maximise their 
material well-being, the latter now added cultural explanations to changes enacted by 
organisations. Secondly, a clear distinction emerged at this time between the 
previous conflation of the concepts of institutions and organisations (Scott, 1995). 
This differentiation is critical to any analysis of the influence of institutions on firms, 
and is clearly illustrated by North’s (1990) metaphor of institutions as the “rules of 
the game”, and organisations (including firms) as the players (p3). Thirdly the new 
institutionalism in economics, which considered the influence of institutions on the 
structures and performance of individual organisations, included the influence of 
transaction costs on the placement of transactions in the market or the firm, and 
consequent changes to the boundary of the firm (Williamson, 1975). The new 
institutional theory, in both the economic and sociological schools, is therefore 
pertinent to this study’s concern with “the interaction among institutions, 
organisations and strategic choices” (Peng et al., 2008: 922). The schools vary in the 
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emphasis they place on each of the institutional “pillars” (Scott, 1995), which are 
described in the next paragraph. 
This broadened scope of institutions endures. It is encompassed in changes to the 
organisational structure that may be externally imposed (through government 
regulations or parent-firm authority) or deliberately acquired (to emulate examples 
considered to be successful or appropriate) (Scott, 1987), and in the coercive, 
mimetic and normative isomorphic processes whereby organisations become 
increasingly similar (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). These can in turn be mapped onto 
Scott’s (1995) three pillars of institutional processes: the regulatory, cultural-
cognitive and normative pillars respectively (Bjorkman et al., 2007), that both enable 
and constrain behaviour (Hodgson, 2006). Roberts and Greenwood (1997) consider 
firms’ efforts to maximise efficiency to be constrained by both regulatory and 
cognitive limits, which their constrained efficiency framework seeks to illustrate. For 
example, it attempts to offer a fuller explanation of the satisficing (rather than 
optimising) decisions that firms make due to the cognitive constraint of bounded 
rationality. This twofold typology is frequently employed in the study of constraints, 
with the terminology being abbreviated to formal rules (the regulatory pillar) and 
informal constraints (the remaining two pillars):  
Institutions are the rules of the game of a society [,] or more formally are the humanly-
devised constraints that structure human interaction. They are composed of formal rules 
(statute law, common law, regulations), informal constraints (conventions, norms of 
behavior, and self imposed codes of conduct), and the enforcement characteristics of both 
(North, 1994b: 1). 
This distinction between informal and formal institutions is characteristic of new 
institutional economics (Alston, 2008, Rao, 2003). It is employed in conceptual 
(Dunning and Lundan, 2008, Pinkham, 2009) and empirical international business 
research (Dikova et al., 2010), and in emerging markets applications (Peng et al., 
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2008). These emphasise that resources, capabilities and markets are necessary but not 
sufficient for economic growth, which also depends on the incentives and 
enforcement of institutions to guide their use (Dunning, 2006). The distinction will 
further be employed in this study’s examination of the institutional environment to 
which firms adapt and by which they are constrained.  
It should be noted that the scope of the author’s attempt to integrate transaction cost 
and institutional theories is limited to investigating the institutional influences on 
transaction costs, and any intervening role they may play between the causes and 
outcomes of transaction costs. It does not extend to the discussion of institutional 
theory beyond its application to organisational structures and transaction costs, nor to 
a comparison of the predictive value of the two theories of institutions and 
transaction costs. For such comparisons, see the conceptual model of Martinez and 
Dacin (1999), or empirical studies such as Puck et al. (2009). Whilst much of the 
work that has previously been done on integrating transaction costs and institutions 
has been in the field of market entry-mode decisions, the business decisions we seek 
to understand concern the placement of transactions by firms as going concerns. This 
emphasis in international business research on institutional effects on the costs of 
conducting business is supported by Henisz and Swaminathan (2008), and is 
consistent with Mudambi and Navarra’s (2002) concern for the effect of institutions 
on the “relative transaction and coordination costs of production and innovation” 
(p636). This study responds to a call by Powell (1991) for “research [that] would 
focus on why less than optimal arrangements persist over time” (p183) – which the 
author interprets as an invitation to explore the reasons for isolation in the study site. 
4.2 The benefits of theoretical integration 
By integrating the transaction cost and institutional theories, the author draws upon 
the relative strengths of both to explore the effects of institutions on transaction 
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costs, and the possibility of a moderating effect by institutions on the relationship 
between transaction costs and firms’ responses to them. The combination will also 
help to address the critiques of transaction cost theory outlined in Chapter 2, some of 
the issues raised in the exploratory field study in Chapter 3, and to answer the call for 
more empirical research into both transaction costs and institutions (Williamson, 
2000). 
4.2.1 The impact of institutions on the level of transaction costs 
The view that institutions affect the level of transaction costs makes it necessary to 
consider transaction costs and institutions in combination (North, 1990, Williamson, 
1991). North (1994a) credits Coase (1960) with being the first to link strong formal 
institutions to transaction costs, by means of enforcing contracts, protecting property 
rights, imposing the rule of law, and avoiding corruption. Property rights and liability 
rules are identified as society’s most important institutions, whose efficiency helps to 
reduce transaction costs (Rao, 2003). The key to this is the role of institutions in 
reducing the transaction costs caused by uncertainty of the environment and of 
behaviour (North, 2003), both of which were observed in the exploratory study. The 
means by which they might do this will be explored in section 4.3. 
Transaction costs vary with the level of institutional protection afforded by different 
countries (Coeurderoy and Murray, 2008), and different countries provide different 
“institutional infrastructure, which determines to a large extent the context within 
which firms operate” (Chong and Gradstein, 2006). Emerging markets are 
characterised as having undeveloped institutional structures for the functioning of 
labour, product and capital markets (Palepu and Khanna, 1998). These “institutional 
voids increase transaction costs significantly” (p71), because of information 
asymmetry and weak contract enforcement. This geographic variation has prompted 
the author to seek an original research site with potentially weak formal institutions. 
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4.2.2 Intervention by institutions on firms’ responses to transaction 
costs 
Institutional theory offers an alternative perspective on the consequences of 
transaction costs, proposing that the strength or weakness of institutions might 
restrict the range of responses that are available to firms (Roberts and Greenwood, 
1997). The potentially weak institutions in emerging markets (Luo, 2007) might 
make some of the responses predicted by developed countries’ theory undesirable or 
impossible (see section 2.4.1).  
North (1990) believes that institutional theory can help to explain behaviour, and in 
particular the decision whether or not to cooperate in response to transaction costs, 
where other theoretical approaches have failed.  In his view, neoclassical economists’ 
behavioural assumptions of rational choice and expected utility do not help us to 
understand the motivations of economic actors because in a complex environment, 
each actor will have incomplete information and will interpret it differently than 
others would; institutions can reduce this uncertainty. Although game theory predicts 
“the gains from cooperating and defecting in various contexts, it does not provide us 
with a theory of the underlying costs of transacting and how these costs are altered 
by different institutional structures” (North, 1990: 15).  
In their review of organisational decisions based on comparative efficiency, Roberts 
and Greenwood (1997) draw all three institutional pillars into their constrained-
efficiency framework, showing that firms aim to maximise the efficiency of their 
structures but are constrained in the choices open to them. Martinez and Dacin 
(1999) emphasise the informal or social element of these constraints on an otherwise 
economic response to transaction costs, and Oliver (1991) identifies social 
conventions that cause firms to make decisions that are not in their own best interests 
– just as the self-reliant behaviour in the research site may not serve the firms’ future 
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growth needs. The means by which these informal constraints affect firms’ decisions 
are explored by Yiu and Makino (2002) who interpret the normative pillar as limiting 
firms’ actions to conformity with that which is commonly understood to be 
appropriate, and the cognitive pillar as the cognitive structures, schemas and 
stereotypes that decision-makers use to interpret the environment, resulting in greater 
use of strategies that have been used before, by their own firm or by other firms. 
4.2.3 Reconciliation of the under- and over-socialised explanations 
As discussed in Chapter 2, transaction cost theory has been criticised for 
concentrating on firms’ aim of maximising efficiency whilst disregarding the role of 
social relations, whereas sociological institutionalism has been faulted for privileging 
constructed normative and cognitive processes at the expense of realist regulations, 
and rejecting the idea that structures might result from rational choice (Scott, 1995). 
This leads the author to consider transactions neither to be determined by purely 
economic motives, nor by conformance to norms alone (Granovetter, 1985). Neither 
school of thought’s predicted response to transaction costs is sure to come about: the 
economic view assumes the presence and strength of formal institutions, and the 
sociological view is predicated on norms of trust being stronger than might be the 
case in China; nor can either school fully explain organisational behaviour (Martinez 
and Dacin, 1999). Granovetter’s (1985) argument is that economic behaviour is 
embedded in interpersonal relations, which avoids the extremes of the under- and 
over-socialised views of the economists and sociologists respectively. He considers 
internalisation to be less effective at reducing opportunism than social relations 
between firms, and that internalisation occurs only where there is pressure for it in 
the absence of these social relations, and where the necessary resources are available. 
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4.2.4 Adaptation of transaction cost theory to the Chinese context 
Where transaction cost theory has been criticised for making behavioural 
assumptions that might not apply in all cultural contexts, this study will use an 
institutional framework to examine its suitability to the research context. 
Management theory developed in the West often cannot simply be applied without 
adaptation in emerging economies (Wright et al., 2005) or in China (Leung et al., 
2009). The increasing research interest in emerging markets over the past ten years 
has been accompanied by the recognition that understanding strategic choice here 
would require the addition of institutional theory to the more routine transaction cost, 
agency and resource-based approaches. These formed the guiding structures for 
special issues on strategy in emerging markets of the Academy of Management 
Journal (Hoskisson et al., 2000) and the Journal of Management Studies (Wright et 
al., 2005).  
Researchers have noted that transaction costs can be particularly high in emerging 
economies, and some explain this as the result of the weakness or uncertainty of 
institutions (Meyer and Peng, 2005, McDonald and Vertova, 2002), which are 
needed to enable people to measure, share, reduce and hedge against risk (Cleaver, 
2007). Weak formal institutions raise costs when individuals divert their own 
resources to make up for society’s failure to promote law and property rights, and to 
protect them from exploitation (Williamson, 1975). Cleaver (2007) illustrates the 
costs of insecure contract and property rights: raising the risk – and so the transaction 
costs – of investment, and preventing a stronger contribution to growth from the 
informal sector, where lack of title and thus collateral prevents individuals from 
raising credit. High transaction costs can arise from the bureaucratisation of planned 
economies, including rent-seeking by officials that is made possible by weak law 
enforcement (Rao, 2003). The need to take into account the quality of institutions in 
evaluating transaction costs, is illustrated using the example of the weakness of law 
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enforcement in emerging markets and the regional variation in enforceability in 
China in particular (Luo, 2007). Luo (2007) explains Chinese regional variation in 
terms of degrees of economic development, where less-developed regions generally 
have weaker legal protection and enforcement, and more corrupt courts. Another 
type of transaction cost results from the absence of the rule of law, in the context of 
Chinese privately-owned business:  
Worrying about the possibility of government predation, private owners rationally hide 
excessive revenue by choosing short-term or liquid projects. This provides incentives to 
managers but also incurs revenue-hiding costs (Qian, 2003: 312). 
Several studies have used institutions to deepen their understanding of how firms 
cope with transaction costs in China. For example, long-term social connections and 
guanxi are used to reduce transaction costs of uncertainty (Keister, 2001), joint-
venture contracts are adjusted to reflect the institutional context in order to reduce 
transaction costs (Luo, 2005), transaction cost and institutional theories are combined 
to explain firms’ decision to change structure from joint ventures to wholly foreign-
owned enterprises (Puck et al., 2009), kinship networks are used to reduce 
transaction costs and protect property rights in the context of undeveloped market 
institutions (Peng, 2004), and the transaction cost implications of contractual or trust-
based governance are examined in the presence of weak legal institutions (Zhou and 
Poppo, 2008).  
Of the three institutional pillars, Ang and Michailova (2008) found the regulatory 
pillar to be the most influential in deciding the governance structures of cross-border 
alliances where the host country is an emerging market with high regulatory 
uncertainty. Regulatory institutions were the least important in deciding structures in 
developed host countries, where regulations are likely to be stable and the normative 
pillar is key to mimetic isomorphism. China’s weak and ever-changing legal system 
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has been found to have strong effects on governance choices (Zhou and Poppo, 2008, 
Ahlstrom et al., 2003). Small firms are also found to be particularly constrained by 
weak formal institutions including government regulation, access to finance and lack 
of protection from externalities and powerful industry or market players (Morrison et 
al., 2003). When their development is thus constrained, these firms’ contribution to 
employment growth, income generation and economic development remains limited 
(Smallbone and Welter, 2006). 
The inclusion of informal institutions has also been recognised as being vital to the 
research into strategic choice in emerging markets (Trevino et al., 2008), and firms’ 
performance in emerging markets including China (Peng et al., 2008). If such a 
context has weak formal institutions, the social capital embodied in managers’ 
informal ties with external organisations can be all the more important to 
performance (Peng and Luo, 2000). Informal institutions of trust and reciprocity in 
exchange contribute to the reduction of transaction costs and so to the development 
of rural enterprise in China (Hu, 2007). Informal ties serve to attenuate transaction 
costs relating to uncertainty and opportunism, and result in relational rather than 
contract-based governance (Zhou et al., 2008). 
Despite these examples, Meyer and Peng (2005) see room for further development of 
the theoretical integration between transaction costs and institutions, citing “the 
potential value in exploiting institutional variation to better understand the nuances 
and limitations of TCT [transaction cost theory]” (p603). This is a challenge that this 
study attempts to take on. 
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4.3 How institutions affect transaction costs and firms’ 
responses 
This study considers various elements of formal and informal institutions, in their 
impact on levels of transaction costs and as potential constraints on firms’ responses 
to these costs. Whereas North’s formal institutions or Scott’s regulatory pillar are 
generally explored in terms of political, financial and legal institutions (Guler and 
Guillen, 2010, Djankov et al., 2006), here the author specifically explores the 
hindrance to firms by inefficiency or arbitrariness of local governments, the 
availability of funding to finance internalisation, and the perceived reliability of the 
legal system to enforce contracts and property rights or protect parties to 
transactions.  
The author anticipates, however, that informal institutions might have more influence 
on the small firms researched, to whom the government may appear distant 
(Levitsky, 1989). These draw on North’s conception of informal institutions, and so 
equally on Scott’s cultural-cognitive and normative pillars. The informal institutions 
addressed include trust, kinship, social networks, guanxi and sanctions.  
4.3.1 Formal institutions 
North (1990) describes market institutions as a “mixed bag... some increase 
efficiency and some decrease efficiency” (p69) – reminding us that weak institutions 
can constrain productivity and raise transaction costs just as readily as stronger 
institutions can reduce them. Institutions shape incentive structures for production 
(Olson Jr., 1996), which then direct the type of production, learning and growth that 
is achieved (North, 1994b): if the incentive structure is focused on redistribution 
rather than production, opportunism is expected to result. 
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4.3.1.1 Local government 
The economic and political reforms in 1980s China included decentralisation of 
government powers, resulting in the transfer to local (provincial, county or township) 
governments of policy areas directly affecting local life. This left a “myth of the 
strong central state” (Schortgen, 2009: 28), that is both remote from the firms in this 
research context (Levitsky, 1989) and impacts upon them less directly than local 
government (Smallbone and Welter, 2006). However, the township governments’ 
evolution from Mao-era communes has retained fundamental problems: 
Although the commune has been dismantled as a political economic unit, its institutional 
successor, the township, is now popularly regarded as the most corrupt level of 
government. … The combination of the township’s institutional weakness in its preceding 
communal incarnation and budgetary pressures created by reform-era fiscal decentralisation 
have inspired a variety of local developmental strategies – some of which are predatory 
(Tsai and Cook, 2005: 61). 
Small firms in emerging markets may have little chance of accessing positive 
government support (Elkan, 1995), but this is almost certain for privately-owned 
firms in China as resources are directed to state-owned firms (Luo, 1997). The 
influence of Chinese local government on firms is described as uncertain or 
unpredictable, with implications for the transaction costs of bounded rationality and 
uncertainty, to the point of hindering business operations (Zhou and Poppo, 2008, 
Peng, 2004). This might be caused simply by inefficiency in the bureaucracy (Rao, 
2003), by arbitrary enforcement of unclear regulations (Child and Moellering, 2003) 
that may change more quickly than firms can keep up with them (this transaction 
cost of information search was reported to the author by two foreign-invested 
enterprises (FIEs) in Chengdu, in 2006), or by deliberate discrimination against 
enterprises (Peng, 2004). It may result in a loss of confidence by firms in the honesty 
of local government representatives (Child and Moellering, 2003), and even firms 
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resorting to networks or red-capping (presenting a private firm as a collective 
enterprise) in an attempt to protect themselves from predatory officials (Peng, 2004). 
4.3.1.2 Funding 
In order for firms to finance growth or internalisation, they must have access to 
external funding at reasonable cost (Smallbone and Welter, 2006). This has been 
found to constrain the growth of firms in a similar research setting to our own – 
small, family-owned tourist accommodation businesses, in a developing region of 
Poland (Zapalska and Brozik, 2006). Whilst emerging economy banks may often 
have insufficient funds to lend to small firms due to a low level of deposits (Elkan, 
1995), the Chinese have built up high saving rates even in the presence of negative 
real interest rates (Economist, 2009b). However, Chinese banks tend not to pass on 
these deposits to small or private firms (Peng, 2004), instead being directed to offer 
far cheaper credit to state-owned firms (Economist, 2009a, Li and Xia, 2008). Zhu 
(2007) even describes the purpose of China’s banking sector as being the support of 
state-owned enterprises. Small private firms’ lack of credit records (Poutziouris et 
al., 2002) and property rights prevents them from accessing bank lending in China 
(Bai et al., 2006, World Bank, 2008) just as in other developing countries (Cleaver, 
2007), and larger private firms may pay a high price – in terms of time and financial 
cost – to formally register collateral (World Bank, 2008). The lack of lending to 
small firms is particularly acute in rural areas, despite government attempts since 
2005 to support rural and private sector development through improved access to 
finance, partly because this conflicts with another government demand: that this 
lending should be based on thorough credit-risk assessments (Herd et al., 2010). 
Peng (2004) explains that because Chinese entrepreneurs struggle to obtain formal 
bank loans, they resort to informal borrowing – mirroring the findings of Zapalska 
and Brozik (2006). This is reported to lead to lower transaction costs if accompanied 
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by enforceable trust, but access and available amounts will vary with individual 
circumstances. It usually takes the form of small loans based on personal 
relationships between relatives or friends, with no interest charged (Hu, 2007), and is 
the main source of finance for Chinese SMEs and farmers (Herd et al., 2010). This 
constraint on funding may hinder firms’ investment for growth, or even their 
participation in the formal market (Mair and Marti, 2007). Further financial 
institutional support that may be lacking includes purchasing on credit at reasonable 
terms (Atradius, 2008) and insurance for healthcare costs and buildings (in the 
context of the 2008 Sichuan earthquake). 
4.3.1.3 Legal system 
This section concerns the reported reliability of the legal system to enforce contracts 
and property rights or to protect parties to transactions – so reducing transaction costs 
and enabling firms to use contracts and internalisation to respond to them. However, 
in China contract law has historically had limited effect in constraining opportunism, 
and enforcement costs are high (Hoskisson et al., 2000). Commercial and civil law 
are not yet well developed, property rights and the limits to officials’ authority are 
ambiguous, and commercial disputes are often resolved informally or even forcefully 
(Ahlstrom et al., 2003). Despite the considerable progress made since the 1980s in 
reforming the legal system, inconsistencies between laws and regulations remain, 
and there are regional discrepancies in interpretation and enforcement (Ojiro, 2003). 
Chinese firms often rely on trust-based relationships to safeguard their business 
interests, because of historical habit (Zhou and Poppo, 2008) and because they have 
little confidence in the variable effectiveness of the legal protection or remedies 
available (Luo, 2007). Time will tell whether the second judicial interpretation of 
China’s Unified Contract Law (1999), which came into effect in May 2009, will have 
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the anticipated effect of reducing uncertainty in contractual relations (Thomas, 
2009). 
The first legal hurdle for firms to clear is formal registration, and high costs of 
registration may act as a barrier to entry by new firms (Cleaver, 2007). Once 
registered and conducting trust-based trading, fast-growing firms will need to extend 
into contractual trading and so leave behind the protection of the reputation effect 
(Douma and Schreuder, 2008). This transition is dependent on the perceived 
reliability of legal enforcement (Zhou and Poppo, 2008), and of the accuracy with 
which legal documents describe the trustworthiness of an individual or firm (de Soto, 
2006), which is fundamental to achieving a system of impersonal exchange that 
encourages repeat transactions rather than cheating (North, 2003). This reflects 
North’s (2003) expectation that sound institutions should be able to reduce the 
transaction costs of opportunism in addition to uncertainty. Firms will assess the 
reliability of the legal system in deciding whether their transactions would better 
protected from opportunists by trust-based or contractual governance structures, but 
may prefer to resolve disputes through relational rather than legal means (Zhou and 
Poppo, 2008). Granovetter’s (1985) view of formal institutions that deter 
opportunism is, “They do not produce trust, but instead are a functional substitute for 
it” (p489) – which would make functioning institutions all the more valuable in 
contexts where trust is limited. 
Whilst North (1994b) anticipates lower transaction costs in the presence of 
strengthened broader legal institutions – protected property rights, the rule of law, the 
absence of corruption – Khanna (2007) points out that the enforcement of property 
rights is still uncertain in both urban and rural China. On October 1st 2007 China’s 
new Property Rights Law came into effect, offering equal protection to state, 
collective and private property; however, its ambiguity led to expectations that its 
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implementation would be subject to local interpretation (Marechal et al., 2009). The 
new law allows the renewal of farmers’ land-use rights (rural land still being owned 
by collectives), but does not allow for their sale or mortgage (Economist, 2008) – 
denying rural residents the incentive to invest in land and the means to raise finance 
for such investment. Such residents risk expropriation for urban development or 
infrastructure projects (Bai et al., 2006) and insufficient compensation (Khanna, 
2007). 
North (1994a) rightly observes that contracts need to be enforceable in order to be 
worthwhile, but Poppo and Zenger (2002) find that transaction costs can be further 
lowered by supplementing contracts with relational governance, where parties have 
developed trust and can rely on relational norms. This is illustrated in the Chinese 
context by Zhou and Poppo (2008) who found cases where firms would not enter 
into a contract unless they could trust the counterparty to honour it, as they had no 
expectation of legal enforceability. 
Formal institutions can help to control externalities, which are unintended 
consequences of production that affect third parties but go uncompensated. These 
externalities persist and are not internalised by firms, when prohibitive transaction 
costs are involved which might include contract provisions for liability rights such as 
penalty clauses (Rao, 2003). Milgrom and Roberts (1992) illustrate this using 
pollution as an example of an externality, which the exploratory study had shown to 
be a concern in the research site. If the sufferers of pollution were to attempt to 
charge firms for the pollution they cause the negotiations would entail unreasonably 
high transaction costs, so instead governments specify and enforce environmental 
standards to protect all potential sufferers. These regulations thus avoid the need for 
individuals to incur transaction costs of obtaining protection, and reduce the 
transaction costs of negotiation or compliance by the party causing the externality. 
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In our discussion above, we have examined the effects of formal institutions on 
transaction costs, but it should be noted that they require the support of informal 
institutions in order for them to be optimally effective. Hodgson (2006) expresses 
this in terms of laws that are ineffective until they become incorporated into social 
norms and Dunning and Lundan (2008) propose that it would be pointless to study 
formal institutions in isolation from the underlying informal institutions. This means 
that the pace of institutional change is heavily influenced by informal institutions: 
“While the formal rules can be changed overnight, the informal norms change only 
gradually” (North, 1994b: 3). Yang and Temple (2002) report that this was taken into 
account during China’s reform period. 
4.3.2 Informal institutions 
Scott (1987) defines social institutions as enduring systems of beliefs and practices, 
encompassing cognitive, normative and behavioural systems. These systems include 
the norms that define the legitimate means by which one may pursue the desired 
ends, and the cultural-cognitive rules used to interpret and to constrain behaviour. In 
the context of organisations, these systems can dictate behaviour “through the 
exercise of habit, convention, convenience, or social obligation” even when it runs 
against the organisation’s own interests (Oliver, 1991: 151), which the current author 
interprets as constraining how firms can respond to transaction costs. In the context 
of doing business in China, Tseng and Kuo (2008) consider normative institutions to 
include the practice of settling transactions in cash, the standards of commercial and 
competitive behaviour, labour norms, and the ineffectiveness of legal enforcement. 
Their interpretation of cognitive institutions focuses on the use of guanxi to obtain 
influence, whilst the current author takes a slightly broader view of guanxi and 
kinship relations as culturally-determined structures within which trust may develop.  




Sacha Rawlence  94 
 
The sections that follow examine the effect that various informal institutions might 
have in reducing transaction costs and enabling firms to respond to transaction costs, 
or conversely, in increasing transaction costs or constraining firms’ options. 
Consideration is also given to the scope for informal institutions to act as substitutes 
for weak formal institutions. North (1990) considers that where a developing 
economy lacks the financial, legal and political institutions that would normally be 
drawn on in the course of contract enforcement, some of the gaps can be made up for 
by informal institutions. This view is repeated with reference to the Chinese context 
(Li et al., 2008b, Poutziouris et al., 2002, Peng et al., 2008, Hu, 2007). North (1990) 
considers property rights to be an exception to this proposition, but Peng (2004) 
offers an example of this working in China (see section 4.3.2.3). Poppo and Zenger 
(2002) suggest that contracts themselves, and the alternative governance form of 
vertical integration, can be replaced by the self-enforcing safeguards of trust and 
relational norms of behaviour. 
4.3.2.1 Trust  
This section considers how the development of trust affects its impact on the level of 
transaction costs, whether it enables cooperation as a response to transaction costs, 
its ability to substitute for weak formal institutions, and negative consequences of 
trust-based exchange. 
Trust is evident in economic exchange when actors expose themselves to the risk of 
opportunism by their counterparties, because of their expectation that the 
counterparty will not take advantage of them (Humphrey and Schmitz, 1998, Locke, 
2001). Trust can affect the levels of transaction costs associated with contracting and 
opportunism (Poppo and Zenger, 2002), and can exist at various levels (Rao, 2003). 
Degrees of interpersonal trust can be influenced by culture – some traits increase 
transaction costs (kinship leading to cronyism), while others reduce transaction costs 
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in personal exchange (reputation, credibility, formation of expectations). This is the 
micro-level of trust described by Humphrey and Schmitz (1998), and might be 
extended within the family (Fukuyama, 1995), kinship network (Peng, 2004), social 
network (Child and Moellering, 2003), or beyond. Trust may be confined to others 
considered to be similar, or to those who are different and might bring 
complementary benefits to a transaction (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996). Between the 
micro and macro levels, generalised trust applies to all individuals in a social group 
(Knight, 2001); this entails a shift from trust developed through acquaintance to trust 
through description (de Soto, 2006). To reduce the uncertainty and transaction costs 
of impersonal exchange, macro-level or institutional trust by individuals in formal 
institutions is also needed (Humphrey and Schmitz, 1998), as is trust amongst firms 
(Zaheer et al., 1998), and between economic entities, state and society. 
In distinguishing between types of trust, Barney and Hansen (1994) differentiate 
between the weak trust exhibited by people who do not fear opportunism because 
they do not acknowledge vulnerability, the semi-strong trust of those who have 
confidence in contractual safeguards employed to avoid opportunism, and the strong 
trust of those who are confident that their vulnerabilities will not be exploited even in 
the absence of contractual safeguards. Cooperation based on strong trust avoids the 
contracting costs inherent in forming semi-strong trust (Steensma et al., 2000). 
Granovetter (1973) divides the value placed on strong or long-standing ties, from 
recently-formed or weak ties that might be valued for their potential benefits to 
business. Humphrey and Schmitz (1998) describe a range from “minimal trust” as 
the minimum degree of trust that is required for a market economy to function, which 
can be lacking in emerging markets, to the “extended trust” that is required for the 
integration of global supply chains. 
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Regarding the development of trust in business relationships, Western conceptions 
can assume a progression from arm’s length transactions through knowledge of the 
counterparty to trust (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996), which contrasts with Chinese 
authors’ views that the trust relationship routinely precedes transactions (Zhou and 
Poppo, 2008). Dibben and Harris (2001) consider the alternatives of whether trust 
always precedes trade or trade leads to trust, in an apparent parallel to the 
sociological and economistic views of trust (Locke, 2001). In the former view, the 
pre-existing relationship is expected to survive a termination of trade. Dibben et al. 
(2003) expect dispositional trust – determined by the truster’s personality – to 
develop only in the absence of situational trust which is produced by repeated 
interaction within a given context; Hardin (2001) sees limited benefit arising from 
dispositional trust alone. The current author’s view is that easily-formed trust will 
more readily contribute to lower transaction costs. 
The business benefits of micro-level trust centre on a reduced expectation of 
opportunism, and so a reduction in the transaction costs of contracts intended to 
avoid it (Fukuyama, 1995, Steensma et al., 2000); a strategy of cooperation is also 
made possible by a trusting relationship (Steensma et al., 2000). Macro-level trust in 
firms and market institutions is expected to reduce the uncertainty and the risk of 
opportunism in impersonal exchange, and thus the need for complete (high 
transaction cost) contracts (Rao, 2003). Zhou and Poppo (2008) focus on trust 
between firms to reduce transaction costs, by enabling a firm to rely on its partner’s 
fair and predictable behaviour, and by promoting a common, long-term outlook 
without the need for constant monitoring. Zaheer et al. (1998) explain that inter-firm 
trust reduces the transaction costs of contracting, by reducing the need of each party 
to take precautions against opportunism by the other party. Pre-contractual 
negotiations can thus be briefer – as also demonstrated by Dyer and Chu (2003) – 
and post-contractual contingencies can be resolved “without resorting to legalistic 
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remedies” (p146). Regarding asset specificity, Artz and Brush (2000) expect that 
trust can reduce the extent and therefore cost of contract negotiations by virtue of 
minimising the risk of opportunism. In addition to reducing the transaction costs that 
stem from opportunism, Madhok (1995) finds that trust limits the environmental 
transaction costs that are due to small numbers bargaining and uncertainty.  
McDonald and Vertova (2002) suggest that in developing countries where the 
institutional environment has caused high transaction costs, they can be reduced by 
supplementing the business network with a social network element. Buckley (2004: 
268) applies this to business in China, describing the Chinese family as “an island of 
high trust in a low trust society”, and family firms as “a response to an imperfect 
(corrupt) society. Corruption raises transaction costs, and networks represent islands 
of low transaction costs in a sea of high transaction costs”. Hu (2007) emphasises the 
vital importance of trust acting as a substitute for the legal system that is largely 
absent from rural China. 
However, despite their benefits in personal exchange, the time taken to develop these 
trust relationships (Keister, 2001) and their near-restriction to kinship groups 
(Fukuyama, 1995) constrain their effectiveness in promoting impersonal exchange 
and business growth; this leads us in to the next section on kinship. Trust may have a 
further detrimental effect on the inclusiveness and cost of trading:  
Trust, however, as a foundation for economic relations, is a ‘double-edged sword’: it can 
retard economic development where it is a strictly private form of transactional 
coordination, as in the case of mafias or aristocracies, for these, by definition, restrict the 
entry of new producers; where trust is highly generalised and public, on the other hand, it 
serves to sustain transactions and reduce the costs for established producers, while at the 
same time allowing new entrants into the community (Storper, 1991: 112). 
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4.3.2.2 Kinship 
The social element of the business network referred to in the previous paragraph, 
may be understood in China as concentric circles of relationships, with immediate 
family at the core, surrounded by close and then more distant blood-ties, then social 
ties within a village, and more remote “external bridging ties” radiating outwards 
from the village (Peng, 2004). The outermost ring comprises the more commercially- 
or politically-oriented guanxi connections, which will be discussed in the next 
section. Hu (2007) similarly cites the family, extended family and village as the 
principal bases of trust in China. Peng (2004) distinguishes between the relationship-
based definition of Chinese networks, and Western ideas of groups constituted of 
voluntary members who share common principles and qualifications for 
membership. Peng (2003) particularly warns that Chinese social networks should not 
be confused with the network strategies of developed-country firms: 
Not all networks are the same. Whereas networks in emerging economies tend to be 
embedded in interpersonal ties, networks in developed economies, supported by more 
established formal institutions, tend to be more calculative, with more codification and 
transparency (Peng, 2003: 292). 
The mechanisms by which these social relationships reduce transaction costs are the 
protection of property rights, deterring opportunism, facilitating cooperation and 
sourcing information through external ties. Kinship “remains the locus of collective 
action and normative control in contemporary China”, with the benefit of 
“enforceable trust” (Peng, 2004: 1051), which obliges members to cooperate and 
trade fairly, and can aid the resolution of disputes without the transaction costs of 
formal enforcement. A similar reduction in opportunism is expected between small 
Western firms whose proprietors share social bonds, with a consequent reduction in 
pressure to internalise (Buckley and Casson, 1998). 
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Whyte (1995) disagrees with Weber’s depiction of family bonds as solely 
detrimental to the economy, arguing instead that they have also been a source of 
loyalty, motivation and performance contributing to China’s growth since the 1980s. 
A further benefit to rural entrepreneurs of kinship networks is identified as the 
enforcement of informal property rights as a substitute for ineffective formal 
property rights and weak market institutions with their associated high transaction 
costs (Peng, 2004). 
Although the trust inherent in kinship structures reduces the risk of opportunism, the 
boundary of these structures can in turn constrain the development of the firm. In 
Whyte’s (1996) continued debate as to the relative merits of kinship in China’s 
economic development, he finds some family firms reluctant to employ or even trade 
with outsiders: “There is prejudice against hiring nonrelatives to work in the family 
firm, even if they are quite competent… .The difficulties of cooperating with 
nonrelatives outside the firm are also described as severe” (p4). This difficulty of 
extending trust beyond the kinship group is described as a constraint on the growth 
of firms, resulting in the dominance of small, family-owned firms in China, and 
hindering internalisation and the separation of ownership from control (Fukuyama, 
1995). 
4.3.2.3 Wider networks  
The term “guanxi community” is used to describe a group or network based on social 
rather than family ties that may share attributes such as codes of conduct, ethnicity, 
religion, territory or dialect (Hu, 2007: 32). Hu equates it with the concept, widely 
used by Chinese people, of a “group of friends” (p57). Such ties may serve a 
commercial as well as a social purpose, and may then be characterised as business 
ties (between managers in customer, supplier or competitor firms) or political ties 
(between managers and government officials) (Li et al., 2008b); Peng and Luo 
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(2000) emphasise the importance of making this distinction in Chinese business 
research. The Chinese term guanxi, meaning “social connections”, describes a 
relationship with an overt business or political rather than purely social aim. Tseng 
and Kuo (2008) consider guanxi to be an element of the cognitive pillar that can be a 
critical supplement to the normative pillar, and guanxi are widely recognised as a 
means of maintaining influence, operational efficiency or competitiveness in China 
(see for example Li et al., 2008a, Douma and Schreuder, 2008). A Western 
viewpoint might suggest that where such relationships run vertically they can 
improve quality and cost of supply, as in the internalisation of intermediate product 
markets, but that horizontal relationships often lead to collusion (Buckley, 2004). 
The current importance of guanxi in Chinese business stems from their historical 
importance in the coordination of economic exchange (Zhou and Poppo, 2008), and 
their ongoing potential for lowering the transaction costs related to opportunism 
compared to formal policing and enforcement (Peng, 2004). Luo (1997) proposes 
that information obtained via guanxi can be more reliable and incur smaller search 
costs than other sources. Peng et al. (2008) and Douma and Schreuder (2008) 
highlight China among developing countries, as a place where personal connections 
are an important substitute for less-developed institutions of governance and dispute 
resolution. The need for guanxi as an alternative to the formal bureaucracy, 
especially by private firms, is stated very plainly: 
While the Chinese bureaucracy often inhibits action, guanxi facilitates action… Guanxi 
provides a balance to the cumbersome Chinese bureaucracy by giving individuals a way to 
circumvent rules through the activation of personal relations…. Collectively and privately 
owned firms have more difficulties [than state-owned enterprises] in gaining access to 
scarce raw materials and other resources and achieving governmental assistance and 
support. Good guanxi connections therefore constitute a substitute for institutional support 
in this circumstance (Luo, 1997: 46). 
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This reliance on political ties is supported by Li et al. (2008b) and by Xin and Pearce 
(1996: 1642) who found private firms to need a substitute for “formal institutional 
support” comprising reliable government, a stable regulatory environment and an 
established rule of law, which would otherwise enable them to conduct impersonal 
business transactions. Xin and Pearce (1996) go on to describe a defensive use of 
guanxi, as protection from threats of expropriation or extortion by officials. 
The benefits of networks or guanxi, in reducing risk or transaction costs, should be 
weighed against their cost. Services performed by political contacts are favours that 
must be repaid (Li et al., 2008b). Peng (2003) and Douma and Schreuder (2008) 
illustrate the high marginal cost of each guanxi-facilitated transaction, suggesting 
that high-volume business is very expensive and a transition to arm’s length business 
would be more economical. Peng’s (2003) model predicts that a shift from network-
based to rule-based, impersonal exchange will occur as market institutions mature. 
This reduction in reliance on networks is demonstrated in a longitudinal study of 
entrepreneurial growth during Hungary’s institutional transition (Danis, Chiaburu 
and Lyles, 2010). Zhou and Poppo (2008) fear that the transition to impersonal 
exchange might be hindered by China’s “tradition of using social relations to 
sanction economic exchanges” (p23). A stronger form of this concern describes a 
corrupt form of guanxi that is used as a “back-door” means of gaining advantage 
(Guthrie, 1998). Luo (2008) describes an increasing tendency for guanxi and 
corruption to overlap, causing increased levels of opportunism and bribery as the 
emphasis shifts from an exchange of favours to a power-based exchange. He expects 
the public perception of guanxi to deteriorate from a cultural to a rent-seeking 
practice. 
Another possible cost of networks is that they may entail an opportunity cost greater 
than the saving they offer in terms of protection from opportunists outside the 
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network. Child and Moellering (2003) point out that, although economic relations in 
China are very dependent on trust, it is difficult to build trust beyond the boundaries 
of existing kinship or social networks – confirming the fears of Storper (1991) 
quoted above. Existing social ties can restrict firms’ access to new opportunities that 
reside beyond the network (Poppo and Zenger, 2002), and a close network may be 
closed to inflows of new information from outside and so fail to adapt to changing 
demands (Uzzi, 1997). A further problem is gaining entry to a network of 
relationships, as “managers built new ties on existing relations, creating considerable 
path dependence in interfirm exchange” (Keister, 2001: 340). This is exacerbated by 
the differential development of the Chinese regions, where firms in slower-growth 
areas have more difficulty in accessing markets and competing. This is described as 
an effective barrier to entry for new firms, making them less able to compete against 
more established firms with extensive networks (Whyte, 1996). 
4.3.2.4 Social sanctions 
Trust has been defined as not expecting one’s business partner to behave 
opportunistically, and sanctions as believing that one’s partner might act 
optimistically and so developing rewards and penalties to make this unattractive 
(Humphrey and Schmitz, 1998). Where North (1994b) describes institutions as rules 
and their enforcement, sanctions serve as an informal enforcement mechanism of 
trading norms (Dunning and Lundan, 2008). Humphrey and Schmitz (1998) consider 
trust and sanctions to be complementary rather than mutually exclusive, together 
increasing the predictability of a party’s actions and so facilitating exchange.  
The accepted rules of behaviour are widely agreed upon in the community, and are 
enforced by a network of sanctions, both positive and negative, both economic and non-
economic. The system is well suited to minimizing both transactions costs as well as risk of 
opportunistic behaviour (Mead, 1984: 1101). 
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Sanctions at the meso (within a trade association or informal network) and micro 
(between the parties to an individual exchange) levels could be either social or 
economic. The principal mechanism for meso and micro social sanctions is the 
reputation effect within a trading community. If members know that any short-term 
gains from opportunist behaviour will be offset by damage to their trustworthy 
reputation and a longer-term reduction in transactions, they will be deterred from 
such behaviour (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). Greif (1994) expects this informal 
enforcement to be common in collectivist societies, whereas individualist societies 
would tend more towards formal institutions, and Peng (2004) confirms that 
maintaining one’s reputation is an effective deterrent to dishonest behaviour in 
China. Zhou and Poppo (2008) call for further research to establish whether parties 
would elect not to trade in the absence of such social sanctions.  
Prerequisites for sanctions to operate effectively in enabling trade include an element 
of trust, a shared understanding of the group members’ common interests, sufficient 
autonomy to modify institutional structures, and communication (Ostrom, 1990). 
This latter point is emphasised by Douma and Schreuder (2008) as in order for 
exchange to be supported by trust in reputation, there must be a means of 
communicating information concerning reputations and their change over time. This 
leads Holstrom (2002) to expect the reputation effect to work in local groups.  
Despite the transaction cost benefits and extended trading that can be made possible 
by social sanctions, these costs may in fact be increased and the number of potential 
trading partners reduced if  “firms select exchange partners of known reputation and 
solicit relations that reduce uncertainty, even when there is a cost involved” (Keister, 
2001: 336). 
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4.4 Second gap in the literature: empirical studies of the role 
of informal institutions in Chinese firms’ responses to 
transaction costs 
Transaction cost theory expects firms to adopt the governance structure that will 
most reduce the perceived transaction costs, which implicitly assumes that all the 
theoretical options are open to them in real life. Our review has shown that there are 
cases when the institutional context limits these options. 
A number of the conceptual papers already cited postulate that institutions, in various 
forms, constrain firms in their choice of action. A broad interpretation, encompassing 
both formal and informal institutions, is employed by Hodgson (2006) and Roberts 
and Greenwood (1997) in their analysis of institutional constraints, and by Meyer 
and Peng (2005) in terms of less developed institutions in emerging markets. 
Mudambi and Navarra (2002) consider that formal institutions raise transaction costs 
by limiting firms’ interaction, and Oliver (1991) sees informal institutional pressures 
hindering firms from acting in their own economic interests. In a conceptual paper 
specific to informal institutions in China, Luo (1997) describes the fear of losing 
social status as preventing firms from pursuing internalisation.  
Empirical studies of the institutional constraints on the actions of firms in response to 
transaction costs in the Chinese context appear to be largely limited to firms’ 
confidence in the effectiveness of formal institutions. For example, Child and 
Moellering (2003) focus on the conduct of government officials, and Zhou and 
Poppo (2008) examine the regional variation in the enforceability of contracts in 
firms’ choices between contractual or trust-based governance. The author considers 
the lack of empirical studies of informal institutional constraints on firms’ responses 
to transaction costs in China to constitute a second gap in the literature. Hu (2007) 
confirms that scholarly effort has tended to focus on China’s “formal institutional 
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changes, such as government policy… very little attention has been paid to changes 
in informal institutions”, and describes his work on informal lending through rotating 
credit associations “as one of the very few attempts made in this area” (p28). Peng 
and Luo’s (2000) study is another such attempt, exploring the relationship between 
managerial ties and firm performance. Although these two studies address informal 
institutions, they do not fill the gap or duplicate the current author’s work, with the 
former focussing on informal bodies for lending rather than connections or trust, and 
the latter using quantitative rather than qualitative data. 
The third research question asked whether an understanding of local institutions 
could help to explain firms’ responses to transaction costs, in terms of a possible 
mediating role between the causes of transaction costs and the responses of firms that 
range from internalisation to cooperation or even isolation. The incorporation into 
this question of both formal and informal institutions will contribute to addressing 
the second gap in the literature and it answers a call for research into the impact of 
informal (as well as formal) institutions on international business decision-making 
(Trevino et al., 2008). 
4.5  Conclusion 
This section explains why the author considers the response of isolation to be 
important, before closing with a summary of the research questions, the gaps in the 
literature, and a modified framework illustration. 
4.5.1 Repercussions of isolation 
For the individual firm, isolation will entail in-house production to meet all of the 
firm’s needs. It has long been recognised that this generalist approach will prevent 
the division of labour and the growth in productivity that should result from this 
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(Smith, 1776, Douma and Schreuder, 2008). As the firm fails to develop a specialist 
area of production in which it has a competitive advantage, it will fail to maintain or 
increase its ability to compete with other more efficient firms, and so risks decline 
rather than business development. A failure to specialise will also limit the 
contribution of the firm to economic growth, as: 
Capitalist growth is achieved through increasing the ‘roundaboutness’ of production, that 
is, through increasing interfirm and interindustry specialisation, as well as increasing 
specialisation within the technical division of labour in a specific firm (Storper, 1991: 22).  
Increasing specialisation and competitiveness are not considered to be synonymous 
with extensive firm growth, as they do not extend the boundaries of the firm; as such, 
avoiding isolation need not conflict with the preferences of some proprietors to keep 
their firm small (Nooteboom, 1993) or with the conservation of this rural research 
site. 
Without specialisation, there will be no incentive to extend the patterns of exchange 
between firms, carrying implications for the development of the firm and the local 
economy. A transition from personal towards impersonal exchange is desirable in the 
longer term, to enable the firm to trade beyond the confines of a network that 
becomes increasingly expensive to maintain as it expands (Peng and Heath, 1996), 
and to promote local economic development as more numerous, more complex 
transactions could be conducted more efficiently (North, 1990). Self-sufficient 
producers who avoid participation in the market do not contribute strongly to 
economic development (Buckley and Casson, 1998). 
We have seen that informal institutions can facilitate personal exchange, but 
dependable formal institutions would need to be present to protect the parties making 
a transition to impersonal trading. The powers of enforcement of legal institutions are 
a prerequisite for the transfer from trust-based to contractual trading (Zhou and 
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Poppo, 2008). An accompanying transition would be needed from personal trust in 
the counterparty to an impersonal trust in the formal institutions: once the trading 
group is too big for the reputation effect to work, legal structures must both be in 
place and be trusted (Douma and Schreuder, 2008). North (2003) sees this as key to 
achieving a system of impersonal exchange that encourages repeat transactions rather 
than cheating, which Williamson (1975) earlier described as “the invention of 
institutions that produced order out of conflict” (p3). The enforcement of impersonal 
transactions at low cost “is a necessary condition for capturing the gains from trade 
that were the keys to Adam Smith’s ‘Wealth of Nations’ ” (North, 1994b: 1). 
4.5.2 Summary  
The extant theory of transaction costs and institutions does not explain the business 
isolation observed in the author’s exploratory study. The literature appears to be 
focused on internalisation and cooperation, as examples of successful responses to 
transaction costs by growing firms. Too little attention is paid to the poor relation of 
integration and cooperation, namely isolation, which is mentioned but not discussed 
in detail or researched further. The exploratory study identified firms that neither 
cooperate nor internalise in response to transaction costs; instead they conduct a 
reduced number of transactions. This lower volume of trade prevents them from 
specialising, and so from capturing the benefits of specialised exchange. This study 
will proceed to examine the behaviour of these firms in depth, to explore the 
possibility that isolation might be a response to transaction costs. 
It has further been observed that the theories of informal institutions have not been 
subjected to as much empirical examination in the Chinese context as the formal 
institutions. It seems unlikely that such an examination is unnecessary, given the 
attention paid by the conceptual literature to informal institutions, and so this study 
will contribute to this important gap by investigating how informal as well as formal 
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institutions affect the levels of transaction costs and constrain or shape firms’ 
responses to transaction costs. 
These two gaps are directly associated with the formulation of the research questions, 
which are restated here for the reader’s convenience: 
1. Which causes of transaction costs are perceived by decision-makers in the firms 
studied? 
2. How do the firms respond to these transaction costs? 
3. Could an understanding of local institutions help us to explain firms’ responses to 
transaction costs? 
The research questions and gaps in the literature have been incorporated into the 
modified conceptual framework, presented in Figure 5 below. The progression from 
our initial expectations from the transaction cost literature (illustrated in Figure 4) is 
shown by the insertion of institutions as intervening factors between the causes of 
transaction costs and firms’ responses to them. The exploratory study and subsequent 
review of the institutional literature suggested that weak formal institutions could 
hinder the predicted responses of internalisation and cooperation, resulting instead in 
the unexpected outcome of isolation. Informal institutions are also thought to be able 
to act as substitutes for weak formal institutions, or to constrain firms’ responses, so 
also contributing to an outcome of isolation. 
In Chapter 5, we will show how a qualitative approach to transaction costs will be 
used to apply the theory to answering the research questions. 
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Causal factors  Intervening factors between causes 
and expected responses 
  Responses  Outcome 
Causes of high transaction costs  
(Research question 1) 
 Institutions  
(Research question 3) 
 Governance structures  
(Research question 2) 
 Reduced transaction costs promote 
business development 
       
    (Reduced numbers of market   
Behavioural causes:    Transactions)   
Bounded rationality  Weakness of formal institutions:     
Opportunism  Funding     
  Legal  (Relational transactions)   
Transaction characteristics:  Regulatory     
Specificity    (Internalisation)   
Frequency       
    (Cooperation)   
       
Uncertain environment  Substitution or constraint by 
informal institutions  
(2
nd
 gap in literature): 
 Isolation  
(1
st
 gap in literature): 
  
  Trust  By deliberate choice, or  No: 
  Kinship  Involuntary  Actual outcome of isolation, when  
Formal institutions  Network or guanxi connections    institutions intervene between cause  
Funding  Social sanctions    and expected outcome, hinders 
Legal      Exchange, specialisation and 
Regulatory      development 
       
Figure 5 Flowchart 2 – Modified conceptualisation of causes of and responses to transaction costs, incorporating exploratory 
study and institutional literature  
(Source: author) 
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CHAPTER 5 METHODS 
This chapter presents the critical realist epistemology underlying this study, and it 
explains the qualitative approach taken to understanding perceptions of the causes of 
transaction costs, rather than quantification of absolute levels of costs. It introduces 
the fieldwork participants and the methods used in data collection and analysis; each 
of these sections closes with a description of how the methods were employed in this 
study. The chapter proceeds to describe the collection of qualitative data through 
unstructured interviews, with questions relating directly to the transaction cost and 
institutional literatures, and with supporting context interviews. The Qualitative 
Comparative Approach (QCA) is introduced, and its use explained for the analysis of 
the causal complexity involved in interpreting the interaction between transaction 
costs and institutions. The chapter closes with a review of ethical issues relating to 
data collection, whilst the evaluation of the study as a whole is presented in Chapter 
9. 
5.1 Methodology 
5.1.1 The choice of a qualitative approach 
Strong arguments have been made in support of qualitative approaches to 
international business research. These include a need for more theory generation than 
testing in the relatively immature discipline of international business, the potential of 
achieving greater cross-cultural understanding of the research phenomenon in 
context, a better fit with business practice in cases where research is conducted in 
developing-country contexts, and an ability to explore “why” and “how” in addition 
to quantifiable or observable behaviour (Marschan-Piekkari and Welch, 2004). In 
connection with the last point, “qualitative data [can] offer insight into complex 
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social processes that quantitative data cannot easily reveal” (Eisenhardt and 
Graebner, 2007: 26). In their study extending institutional theory, Greenwood and 
Suddaby (2006: 31) justify a qualitative approach for their “complex social setting in 
which causal dynamics were not immediately apparent”, which equates to this 
study’s critical realist concern for context and underlying causal processes (see 
section 5.1.3). 
A qualitative approach is all the more relevant to the current study, as its research 
questions demand an understanding of participants’ perceptions of transaction costs, 
rather than a quantification of the costs. This approach can address the two key 
questions of perception and decision-making: 
The crucial issue is the way that individual managers perceive, weigh and judge these 
[transaction] costs. Different managerial judgments determine different outcomes, and this 
explains, in part at least, the consistent differences observed between firms (Buckley and 
Chapman, 1998d: 77).  
This perception of costs and risks cannot be ascertained through objective data, but 
rather is best explored through qualitative interviewing (Zhou and Poppo, 2008). 
Even if a transaction cost is not – or cannot be – measured, it has an effect when it 
influences the outcome of managerial decision-making. When the perceived 
transaction costs of alternative courses of action are compared in the process of 
making a decision, it is the perception of the cost, rather than the actual or quantified 
cost, that has driven the decision (Buckley and Chapman, 1998d). The principle of 
transaction cost minimisation does not assume “explicit transaction cost 
calculations”, so much as a comparison of relative transaction costs (Martinez and 
Dacin, 1999: 93). This is a comparison that can be achieved through qualitative 
comparison without the need to quantify costs: “It is the difference between rather 
than the absolute magnitude of transaction costs that matters” (Williamson, 1985: 
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22). Rao (2003) elaborates on the application of transaction cost theory explaining 
that in practice, economic decisions must be and can be made even in the absence of 
complete information regarding all relevant elements of cost – including transaction 
costs. Instead, decisions are based on the qualitative comparison of alternative 
institutions and governance structures. These decisions can be made, “as long as the 
managers know, or think that they know, the relative size of the quantities” (Buckley 
and Chapman, 1998b: 261, italics in original). This subjectivity of perception and 
decision-making leads back to the opening quotation’s mention of different outcomes 
between firms, showing that a qualitative comparison of outcomes needs to be made 
between firms by the researcher, as well as within firms by decision-makers. The 
qualitative approach will make knowledge-claims based on constructivist rather than 
positivist perspectives, using an ethnographic strategy of enquiry (Creswell, 2003) as 
will be discussed below. 
The obvious alternative to a qualitative approach to transaction costs would be to 
quantify transaction costs, but the literature offers few suggestions as to how this 
could be attempted. The difficulty, or near impossibility, of measuring actual 
transaction costs is widely reported: from trying to quantify the potential for 
networks to reduce hard-to-measure transaction costs (McDonald and Vertova, 
2002), to the impossibility of measuring all the valuable attributes of a good or 
service for sale, anticipating future income flows derived from it, and to what extent 
the flows might be affected by other parties (North, 1990). One conclusion is 
resonant with frustration: “Transaction costs… are often outside the domain of 
quantification altogether” (Buckley and Chapman, 1998d: 72). 
As a substitute for quantifying actual transaction costs, quantitative estimates can be 
made. For example, the component parts of a transaction cost could be estimated, 
such as asset specificity broken down into the hypothetical income streams from the 
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assets, the opportunity cost of the use of the assets, and the cost of redeployment of 
the asset to a different customer-supplier relationship (Jones, 1997). Alternatively, 
proxies can be used. For example, the difference in house prices with and without 
telephone connections can be used as a proxy for the cost of the connection. This can 
further be split into the actual cost charged for such connections, and the remaining 
transaction cost element (Rao, 2003).  
However, the literature also contains numerous warnings regarding the limited 
effectiveness or completeness of quantitative approaches to transaction costs. 
Rao (2003) cautions that obtaining actual firm-level data for costs such as 
information search, monitoring and enforcement might come at a cost that exceeds 
the benefit of the study, and that in any event these would need to be supplemented 
with the estimated costs referred to above. Furthermore, the use of proxies may be 
limited by their inapplicability in different contexts – those designed in the West may 
not be comparable in emerging economies, requiring new proxies to be developed for 
each research context (Meyer and Peng, 2005). The present author questions whether 
the judgments regarding estimates and proxies would be more usefully made within 
the firm by managers (in their perception of transaction costs), than by outside 
researchers estimating non-quantifiable costs.  
Even more critical to this study than the difficulty of quantifying transaction costs, is 
the fact that this would not answer the research questions. Our concern with the 
causes of and responses to transaction costs falls within the normative aspect of 
transaction cost economics, which concerns the gap between current or proposed 
practice and an optimal solution, rather than the positive aspect which addresses the 
magnitude of costs (Rao, 2003). Because of this, the approach must be qualitative 
rather than quantitative:  
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What matters, rather than computation of fully recognised transaction costs, are managerial 
perceptions of transaction costs. These perceptions are not expressed in numbers, but in 
language (Buckley and Chapman, 1998d: 57). 
5.1.2 Ontology 
Within the qualitative approach to this study, the theoretical stance incorporates both 
interpretive and realist ontological positions. 
5.1.2.1 Interpretive strand 
This study aims to understand the perceptions of and responses to transaction costs 
by the business proprietors participating in the research, and the knowledge it seeks 
is thus the reality that the participants construct from them. The research question 
cannot be answered simply by empirical observations of transaction costs without 
reference to the meaning they hold for the individual participants and the consequent 
effects on their decisions. The researcher shares the view that: 
It is necessary to explore the subjective meanings motivating people’s actions in order to be 
able to understand these… [the] role of the interpretivist is to seek to understand the 
subjective reality of those that they study in order to be able to make sense of and 
understand their motives, actions and intentions in a way that is meaningful for these 
research participants (Saunders et al., 2003: 84). 
A positivist ontology would not be appropriate to this study. It would necessitate a 
controlled experiment for the objective measurement of observable realities 
(Phillimore and Goodson, 2004), where in fact we seek to understand subjective 
influences on individual behaviour. In the context of economic research, this is 
equivalent to moderating a positivistic assumption of perfect information, with an 
anticipation of the individual’s bounded rationality: whether this rationality is 
understood as being a partial or limited portion of the economists’ higher-level 
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perfect information, or a more anthropological view of knowledge built up from 
scratch, transaction cost economics requires an ontological position that 
accommodates the individual’s interpretation of reality (Buckley and Chapman, 
1998a). 
The emphasis of this study on the subjective influences of individual perceptions and 
motivations is already established in the field of enterprise research, which accepts 
and explores each entrepreneur’s own perception and interpretation of the world 
(McAuley, 2007). This explains our wish to interpret the participating business 
proprietors’ own responses to the transaction costs and institutional constraints they 
perceive in their environment, rather than simply assuming that all participants 
would both perceive and respond to these factors in the same manner. An interpretive 
approach to enterprise research is also more pertinent than positivism, to the aim of 
theory-building in a young field rather than hypothesis-testing in a mature field rich 
in theory (Hine and Carson, 2007). The interpretive approach has further been 
recommended for the study of rural development (Ellis and Biggs, 2001), informal 
institutions (North, 2003), tourism in general (Peterson, 1994), and tourism in China 
(Xiao and Smith, 2006), all of which are important to the context of this study.   
5.1.2.2 Realist strand 
Whilst the focus of this study is on participants’ own perceptions, some of their 
interpretations may be shared if they are be based on stimuli that are experienced in 
common (Saunders et al., 2003). This suggests a reality that exists independently of 
human thoughts, but which contributes to the individual’s interpretation of their 
environment or to their construction of the meaning of their environment (Creswell, 
2003). Knowledge of this reality is therefore interpreted, and is theory-laden rather 
than objective: “Social phenomena such as actions, text and institutions are concept-
dependent” (Sayer, 1992: 5). This study therefore needs to acknowledge the external, 
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objective, macro aspects of society, but to explore them in terms of the individual’s 
interpretations. Where realism explores the influences or constraints on individual 
choices by broader social forces or structures, this will be applied in terms of the 
constraints on participants’ responses to transaction costs imposed by the external 
institutional context. 
Critical realism draws together the two ontological strands of interpretivism and 
realism, claiming that although reality has an objective existence (the realist strand), 
our knowledge of it is mediated through concepts (the interpretive strand), with the 
resulting conclusion that: “facts are theory-dependent but they are not theory-
determined” (Danermark et al., 2002: 15, italics in original). This mediation of 
knowledge by theory is illustrated in the context of tourism research, by the 
observation that the information presented in publicity materials is conditioned by – 
and is not independent of – the culture within which it is generated (Tribe, 2004). 
5.1.3 Critical realist epistemology 
Danermark et al. (2002) argue that conceptualisation in social science should be 
rooted “in a critical realist ontology and epistemology” – reality is socially defined 
and produced, and our knowledge of it is gained through interpretation. The 
sequential interpretation, first of reality by social actors, then of actors’ reports by 
researchers, is described as “double hermeneutics” (Danermark et al., 2002: 32). 
Critical realist research seeks out actors whose “voices are not usually heard” in 
international business research (Sharpe, 2004: 320). Prior qualitative studies have 
achieved this by representing the concerns of shop-floor workers in the UK 
subsidiary of a Japanese manufacturing multinational (Sharpe, 2004), and by 
reporting from the perspective of the local customers, suppliers, competitors and 
employees of a foreign firm entering China (Hansen, 2008). 
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Critical realism is concerned with three domains of reality: the actual (events that are 
independent of people’s experience), the empirical (experienced or interpreted) and 
the real (containing generative mechanisms causing events to occur) (Bhaskar, 
1975). The methodological implications of seeking to understand these domains are 
drawn out by Sharpe (2004): the account given by the agent or research participant, 
which would be the sole subject of a hermeneutic ethnography, are further 
interpreted by the critical realist ethnographer in the light of external social 
structures. The actual structures, when experienced by actors, enable or constrain 
their action: the contribution of the critical realist ethnography is thus to explain the 
effects on human agency of external structures, the interactions between micro-level 
practices and macro-institutional structures. Sharpe further explains how underlying 
mechanisms can be identified by the comparison between cases, for example where 
different results are not explained by differences in the causal conditions or 
structures experienced. The critical realist conception of complex and contingent 
causality is not concerned only with a cause leading to an effect, but also with 
negative cases where the cause does not lead to the effect (Danermark et al., 2002). 
Critical realist enquiry into causal mechanisms is better served by an intensive 
research design, with an in-depth, qualitative study of individual participants in 
context, rather than large-n surveys that seek regularity of events (Welch et al., 
2009). 
Following on from this anticipated interaction between the research participant and 
the context, the critical realist may consider firms to be embedded in their social 
context (Sharpe, 2004). This offers a clear parallel with Granovetter’s (1985) view 
that economic behaviour and transactions are embedded in interpersonal 
relationships, and that human action can be both enabled and constrained by social 
structures. The realist position is that “state unobservable” constructs (such as 
opportunism) can be incorporated into theories (such as transaction cost theory) that 
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give us knowledge and can be used to derive normative rules to guide managerial 
action; qualitative methods such as ethnographic enquiries are an effective way of 
observing the impact on business of that which is otherwise unobservable (Godfrey 
and Hill, 1995). 
This study will seek to apply a critical realist epistemology by exploring both the 
external institutional context – through documentary sources and through context 
interviews (see section 5.2.3) – and its effects on the research participants through 
their interpretation of it. The actors invited to participate in this study, proprietors of 
small firms in rural Western China, had not previously been involved in research – 
neither in the disciplines of Business nor Chinese Studies, with overseas or local 
researchers.  Sharpe’s recommendation of comparing conditions and outcomes will 
be conducted using the Qualitative Comparative Approach (QCA), with the aim of 
exploring the possible mechanism by which institutions mediate between perceived 
transaction costs and participants’ responses to them. The negative cases will also be 
addressed by the qualitative comparison that explores causal conditions associated 
both with the outcome, and with the absence of the outcome, as causal symmetry is 
not assumed (Ragin, 2005b). As Granovetter’s work is central to this author’s 
integration of the transaction cost and institutional theories (see Chapter 4), we 
consider critical realism to be an appropriate perspective from which to explore the 
mediation by institutions between the causes of transaction costs and firms’ 
responses to them – linking the micro level of transaction cost explanations of 
economic behaviour with the macro level of institutional constraints (Madureira, 
2007). 
5.1.4 Strategy of enquiry 
The preferred strategy of enquiry for this study would be a critical realist 
ethnography, but for reasons that will be explained below, the study borrowed some 




Sacha Rawlence  120 
 
elements of the technique in a more limited application. This strategy enables the 
exploration of the influence of structures on the agency of individual firms:  
Critical realist ethnography provides a means of examining and theorising about the 
connections between micro-practices and macro-structures, and between changes in micro-
practices and changes in macro-institutional structures (Sharpe, 2004: 309). 
Ethnographic methods are particularly supported in the research of firms, for 
exploring the reasons behind firms’ economic behaviour and providing “real, basic, 
well-founded knowledge about what companies do, and why they do it” (Chapman et 
al., 2004: 303). Sharpe (2004: 306) explains that by seeking to understand this 
behavioural process an ethnographic approach allows the researcher to avoid an 
assumption of rational economic behaviour, and such an approach – with critical 
realist foundations – “recognises the social embeddedness of rationality, that is, 
rationality is always context-dependent”. In the context of international business 
research, transaction cost economics is identified as a theory well-suited to bridging 
between the disciplines of economics and social anthropology (Buckley, 1998). 
An ethnographic enquiry would typically be characterised by participant or non-
participant observation and questioning during long-term immersion in the site 
(Robson, 2002), and use of the local language (Buckley and Chapman, 1998e). 
Participant-observation in business research normally entails employment in the firm 
studied, as a means of participating in the events observed – for examples see the 
ethnographies set in a Swiss investment bank (Bruegger and Knorr-Cetina, 2002) or 
a Japanese advertising firm (Moeran, 2005).  
An approach incorporating employment was impossible in the current study, due to 
the restricted conditions under which work permits are issued to foreign citizens in 
China, and to the very small number of outsiders employed by the firms under study. 
Participation would also risk losing the sharp focus of the research questions, 
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compromising the ability to compare multiple firms, and diverting employment away 
from locals. Furthermore, the duration of the field study was belatedly curtailed by 
the visa restrictions enforced by the Chinese government during the period before 
and during the Beijing Olympics, when long-stay visas were made unavailable. 
Given these constraints on participation and duration, but already equipped with the 
requisite language skills and access to participants, the author chose to work as a 
known researcher conducting non-participant observation (Lofland and Lofland, 
1995) and unstructured interviews (Bryman, 2008), pursuing the original aim of 
exploring participants’ subjective, constructed meanings (Creswell, 2003). Whilst the 
duration of individual site visits was constrained by visa restrictions, the author 
visited the site three times over three years. This extended engagement with the site 
enabled the researcher to fully understand the environment and restrictions it places 
on the participants, and to gain the confidence of participants such that sensitive 
questions could ultimately be addressed.  
The correspondence between interview-based data collection and a critical realist 
stance appears to be confirmed by Madureira (2007): “A critical realist explanation is 
typically inferred from the accounts of individuals under the assumption that many 
causes are ordinary and fairly well understood by actors” (p16, emphasis added). In 
addition, the field of business research offers work presented as ethnographic or 
anthropological studies, where data were collected by means of workplace interviews 
and some observation – see, for example, an ethnography of 38 family firms in Italy 
(Yanagisako, 2002), cooperative strategies in 19 European firms (Buckley and 
Chapman, 1998c), economic and social ties in 23 American clothing firms (Uzzi, 
1997) and the development of e-commerce in nine organisations (Graham et al., 
1996). To support the collection of rich, qualitative data for this study, the author 
considers interviews to be a more effective research instrument than surveys, because 
of the opportunity to build a rapport with a small number of participants for the 
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collection of richer interpretations, and for its applicability to theory-building 
(Daniels and Cannice, 2004). For research in China, postal delivery of surveys may 
be uncertain, and respondents frequently select “don’t know” as a response (Zweig 
and Fung, 2007); and personal visits to Chinese research sites are strongly 
recommended over surveys, to increase the researcher’s understanding of local issues 
(Eckhardt, 2004). In a recent study of transaction costs in Beijing and Shanghai, the 
questionnaire was administered within a workplace interview, suggesting that face-
to-face contact is more effective in this context and for this topic (Zhou and Poppo, 
2008). 
In summary the author has borrowed elements of ethnographic technique, and whilst 
heeding Wolcott’s advice to avoid describing the output as “an ethnography” (1999: 
220), believes that the method has achieved its purpose: 
The overall aim of an ethnographic approach to small business research would, therefore, 
be to produce a descriptive and ‘explanatory’ analysis of the historical, situational 
biographically mediated interpretations offered by entrepreneurs and small business owners 
of their economic involvement and its significance for themselves and the wider society 
(Curran and Burrows, 1987: 10). 
5.1.5 Abductive inference  
Abductive reasoning makes inferences from specific interview data, to a more 
general development of theory (Danermark et al., 2002). Critical realist abduction 
considers individual phenomena to be manifestations of underlying structures or 
processes that are not actually present in the empirical data. For example, the 
researcher might observe a behaviour and interpret it as part of a normative structure, 
or as a response constrained by another process. This is achieved by redescription or 
recontextualisation, whereby the observations are interpreted in a new contextual 
framework. The possibility of choosing different frames of interpretation leads to the 
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potential for different conclusions to be drawn from an interplay between cases and 
theory (Blaikie, 2000). This means that, although the aim of abduction is to generate 
new insights, the conclusions will be fallible and should not be considered as proof 
of how things must be. 
Abduction will be employed in this study to refine the general theory of transaction 
costs, by making inferences from the participants’ perceptions of transaction costs in 
the new framework of institutional constraints. The interplay between cases and 
theory will be performed using QCA, which will be described fully in section 5.3.3. 
This study will seek new insights by describing connections that are not directly 
observable, to offer a new meaning to the phenomena of firms’ behaviour that are 
already known. 
5.2 Research design: data collection 
The field study drew on site visits made by the author over a period of three years, 
which began with elements of observation, familiarisation and informal discussion, 
and culminated in the principal data collection exercise of 2008. This used 
unstructured interviews with the 13 participating firms. 
5.2.1 Data sources for principal field study 
5.2.1.1 Level and unit of analysis  
The research questions concern the perceptions of and responses to transaction costs 
by decision-makers in the participating firms, so it is logical that the analysis for this 
study should be at the micro-level of the firm. The firm is recommended as the 
appropriate level for transaction cost analyses (Douma and Schreuder, 2008), and has 
been used in empirical research into the impact of institutional context on firms’ 
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decisions and development (Locke, 1996) and into the strategies and developmental 
impacts of hotels in developing countries (Fortanier et al., 2006). 
Although the firm was considered to be the analytical unit, the observational units 
were the decision-makers in the participating firms who were interviewed for their 
perceptions of transaction costs affecting their firms (Douma and Schreuder, 2008).  
5.2.1.2 Selection of site, firms and participants 
The selection of the field site, the tourist destination of the Tiger Leaping Gorge in 
Northwest Yunnan Province, was justified in Chapter 1 on both theoretical and 
practical grounds. 
A relatively small and self-contained area was delimited for the study, to aid clarity 
of observation and explanation in a similar vein to Ostrom’s selection of sites for 
understanding collective action: 
Scientific strategy frequently has involved identifying for empirical observation the 
simplest possible organism in which a process occurs in a clarified, or even exaggerated, 
form. The organism is not chosen because it is representative of all organisms. Rather, the 
organism is chosen because particular processes can be studied more effectively using this 
organism than using another… Because these [her field-sites] are relatively small-scale 
situations, serious study is more likely to penetrate the surface complexity to identify 
underlying similarities and processes (Ostrom, 1990: 26). 
A screening profile was applied in this area to identify the population of firms for the 
study, to enable “meaningful and insightful comparisons” between participants 
(Bechhofer and Paterson, 2000: 2). It sought firms providing services to inbound 
tourists; privately owned getixing enterprises (not collective or state-owned, run by 
one or more households, with up to eight employees – Peng, 2004), and not part of a 
branded chain. Ownership was not restricted to local residents (whether in terms of 
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county, province or country), or to businesses that were formally registered. In the 
absence of a formal sampling frame, which is a common problem in studies of small 
firms (Freel and Harrison, 2006) and of the tourism sector (Novelli et al., 2006), the 
screening profile was applied to all firms in the specified area. The risk of omitting 
firms that were absent from databases or registers (Capelleras et al., 2007) was 
avoided by the author’s physical exploration of the area, to identify all tourist 
enterprises which, by their nature, were openly advertising for clients.  
It was intended that the principal interview participants should be those who 
represented themselves as decision-makers in the case firms, accepting that in China, 
opacity of ownership presents difficulty in distinguishing between owners, managers 
and employees with responsibility. Supporting informants within participating firms 
were sought to give a richer understanding of each firm (Coviello and Jones, 2004). 
5.2.1.3 Resulting participant population 
The screening profile identified 14 suitable firms as comprising the accessible 
population (Ghauri, 2004), from a total population of 16. All 14 were formally 
registered as getixing enterprises, and were family-owned. All offered services such 
as accommodation, food or guiding to inbound tourists in the specified geographic 
area. All 14 firms are described below, including the 13 who participated in the 
complete data collection exercise. One firm withdrew part-way through but made 
interesting comments before withdrawing, which will be attributed to “the non-
participating interviewee” in the remainder of this study.  The firms are not identified 
at this stage, to avoid connecting their descriptions to the subsequent analysis. From 
Chapter 6 they will be referred to as Pn (with numbers allocated in a different 
sequence to their descriptions below), to structure the analysis whilst preserving their 
anonymity. 
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Qiaotou guesthouse 
The founders of this firm are a Tibetan family, who moved from Zhongdian to the market 
town of Qiaotou in 1999 to set up a tourist café, which they expanded into a guesthouse in 
2003. It now employs three family members and two staff. It offers meals and 
accommodation for about 20 guests, and bag storage for non-resident tour groups; it 
competes intensely with Qiaotou’s other tourism firm. The site of Qiaotou offers the most 
comprehensive road transport and communications (landline, mobile phone and email) 
infrastructure, and the large market is vital to this non-farming enterprise.  
The proprietor’s long-term aim is to generate surplus revenue, by attracting more guests with 
en-suite rooms – but these would be funded through future retained profits, and no timescale 
was specified. The slower trade in 2008 was explained by a well-informed list of causes 
including the Olympic visa restrictions, the Sichuan earthquake, the Tibetan protests, floods 
and the winter travel disruption. The business appears to be mature but not growing, and is 
focused on the proprietor’s English skills. 
Qiaotou café 
This is a café and guiding operation in Qiaotou, established in 2001 by an expatriate who 
had worked for another participating firm since 1994. The proprietor chooses to work alone, 
rather than employ an assistant. The café’s prominent location assures a strong passing 
trade, in addition to bookings routinely made by phone, email and via international tour 
operators. All supplies are bought in. 
The aim of the mature and stable business is to provide a livelihood to the proprietor, and to 
contribute to local development by attracting tourists; there are no plans for expansion. 
During 2008 the proprietor had written to the author about the disastrous outlook for local 
tourism, but by September (when the data collection took place) she believed that numbers 
were beginning to recover and that competition had not eased. 
Pony trekking 
In 1998, this Naxi farming family began to take in guests, extending their farmhouse in 
stages to accommodate the growing guesthouse (that now has 50 beds), shop and pony-
trekking business. It employs the immediate family – although the three children are in higher 
education and so are often away from home – and one member of staff, with two more to be 
recruited soon. It is sited on the main tourist path, is the first guesthouse reached from 
Qiaotou, and has dry-weather vehicle access. Good communications include international 
landline, mobile phone and internet. 
The guesthouse provides a comfortable family life and extensive local employment; farming 
is a secondary activity. The most recent extension to the buildings was completed in 2008, 
but there are no plans for further extensions as the proprietor wishes to enjoy a period of 
peaceful stability. He claims not to know why guest numbers were lower for 2008. The 
business is mature and taking a deliberate, rather than forced, step back from investment 
and growth. 
Naxi farmhouse 
This is another Naxi farmhouse, which has been expanding since 2001 to its current capacity 
of 65 guests. It offers accommodation, food and a shop, and employs four members of the 
extended family. It is also on the main tourist path with dry-weather vehicle access. There is 
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mobile phone communication, but the proprietor does not expect ever to be connected by 
landline or internet. 
The aim is to continually increase guest numbers and reduce reliance on farming, to be 
achieved by attention to customer service. The planning horizon is one year, the longest of 
all the guesthouses. Guest numbers were low in the first half of 2008 for understood 
reasons, but the resilient business had already recovered by September. It is mature, had 
extended within five years of establishment in direct contrast to the two that will be described 
next, and is still growing. 
Tibetan farmhouse 
This small working farm has offered very basic accommodation and home-grown food for 
five guests since 2003. It provides part-time employment to the two owners, Tibetans from 
Zhongdian, whose two children are in full-time education. The site is distant from the main 
tourist path and a quarter of a mile from a rough vehicle track; there is mains electricity and 
communication by mobile phone. 
The aim of the guesthouse is to supplement the family’s income from farming and casual 
portering, despite the recognised disadvantage of location and insufficient funds to upgrade 
the facilities. The proprietor proposes to overcome the problems of remoteness and lack of 
publicity by walking two hours to Qiaotou to recruit guests – and recognises the implied cost 
of potentially wasted journeys. He is unsure why trade this year has been so much worse 
than in earlier years. The business is still in its infancy after five years. 
Solo farmhouse 
This is another five-year old guesthouse on a working farm, run single-handedly by a local 
Naxi lady to offer food and accommodation to a dozen guests. It has always been in direct 
competition with its larger neighbour, within sight a mile away, but suffers from being located 
on a more minor branch of the tourist path. There is landline and mobile phone 
communication, and access via a steep vehicle track.  
The purpose of the guesthouse is to supplement farming income, but the proprietor is too 
busy running the farm and the guesthouse to make active efforts to seek new customers. 
Future development would consist of building more rooms if guest numbers demanded it, 
which at present they do not. The proprietor is aware that the Olympics, earthquake and 
Tibetan protests have greatly reduced visitor numbers this year. This business has also 
failed to enter a growth phase, suffering from a shortage of publicity and staff. 
Han farmhouse 
A Han farmhouse that has been gradually extended to 90 beds, since first offering shelter to 
lost trekkers in 1992. It offers meals and accommodation, and employs two family members 
and four staff. There used to be more locals employed as guides on Haba Mountain, but 
environmental degradation caused by mining operations had halted this before the author’s 
first visit in 2007. The proprietor considers all other guesthouses to be competitors. Again, 
this is on the main tourist path with weather-dependent vehicle access, and communication 
is only by mobile phone. 
The guesthouse is intended to fund the education and future overseas travel of the 
proprietor’s three children, by means of efficient and diligent work, and attracting guests with 
upgraded facilities. In 2007 the proprietor told the author that he expected his business to 
peak in the Olympic year of 2008 and then decline; by September 2008 he conceded that 
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the decline had already started. The business has passed its peak, but the proprietor is still 
investing in an attempt to maintain its competitiveness. 
Junction guesthouse 
This 150-bed guesthouse stands on the site of the original Han farmhouse, which began to 
offer accommodation in 1997. It is located at the junction of the tourist path and the all-
weather road back to Qiaotou or onward to the villages of Walnut Garden and Haba. It 
employs eight staff providing accommodation, meals and a shop, and also arranges taxis to 
Qiaotou, a daily scheduled bus to Lijiang, and guided walks down a privately-maintained 
path to the river. There is mobile phone but no internet. 
The proprietor hopes to attract increasing numbers of guests, but feels unable to make plans 
for an uncertain future. She does not expect to add any more buildings to the newest ones 
finished in 2004. This guesthouse adapted to the decline in foreign tourists by marketing 
itself also to domestic tourists arriving by car, and as a result the business is stable. 
The next two guesthouses are located on the road close to this one, but have been unable to 
compete against it. 
River path guesthouse 
This guesthouse opened in 2005, when the Han farming family began to add purpose-built 
extensions. There is now accommodation for 25 guests, dining, a privately-maintained path 
to the river, and a shop that also serves as a taxi-rank. It employs four family members. 
Communication is by mobile phone, and by reportedly slow wireless internet. 
Again, the intention is to raise supplementary income, but guest numbers had already 
peaked within three years of opening. The business appears to be in an early stage of 
decline, with no funds available for investment but with a well-stocked shop and restaurant. 
Struggling guesthouse 
This Naxi farming family opened their guesthouse in 2001, which sleeps 20 and employs 
three members of the immediate family. Communication is by mobile phone only. 
The guesthouse is intended to supplement the family’s income from farming. The proprietor 
would like to transition to the guesthouse as the main source of income, supplemented by 
farming, but does not expect guest numbers to rise before they undertake extensive building 
renovations, for which increased revenues are a prerequisite. In 2007 a family member told 
the author that the business was struggling: this was a year before the events of 2008 began 
to depress other, healthier businesses. The author was the only guest during the 2008 
National Day holiday, a peak period when most other guesthouses were close to capacity.  
The next three firms are all in Walnut Garden, a village on the gorge-road between Qiaotou 
and Haba.  
Oldest guesthouse 
This Bai family began to take in passing foreign trekkers in 1980, and in 1983 set up simple 
accommodation to offer them. It now has accommodation for 40 guests, offers meals and a 
taxi service, and employs three immediate family members and a few casual staff. 
Communication is by mobile phone, but the proprietor expected the installation of a landline 
and internet connection in 2009. 
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The business grew steadily until 1997 when the surfaced road through the gorge was 
completed and trekkers began to travel back to Qiaotou direct from the end of the path, 
heralding a reduction in guest numbers. The family has responded to this decline by 
upgrading (rather than extending, as per their earlier plans as described to the author in 
2007) the guesthouse facilities and seeking two alternative incomes from driving. They 
recognise the opportunity cost of farming, and gave it up in 1997 because the higher returns 
from driving or managing the guesthouse outweighed the cost of buying all food supplies in 
from Qiaotou. The business is mature, but has largely stopped developing as the proprietor 
focuses increasingly on alternative livelihood strategies. 
Teacher’s guesthouse 
This Han-Tibetan farming family first opened accommodation for 16 guests in 2006, and 
three members of the immediate family are employed in the guesthouse and shop. 
Communication is currently by mobile phone, but they expect to acquire a landline and 
internet connection soon. 
The guesthouse is intended to further diversify the family’s livelihood that currently spans 
farming, driving and teaching. The proprietor plans to convert an old building into en-suite 
guest rooms, indicating that the business is coping in the current downturn. The business 
began growing soon after its establishment, when an international tour operator chose it as a 
regular stop. 
Tour guide 
This Tibetan family opened its guesthouse in Walnut Garden in 1982, and has been 
extending it ever since. It now sleeps 80, offers meals and wireless internet, and the 
proprietor conducts tours both independently and on behalf of tour operators. It employs five 
members of his extended family. 
Like the interviewees in Qiaotou, the proprietor is an English-speaker focusing exclusively on 
his tourism business. The return he earns from tourism is high enough that he has even sold 
his fields, and he intends to recruit more staff when the current construction of extensions to 
the buildings is complete.  
Haba guesthouse 
The village of Haba is at the opposite end of the gorge from Qiaotou. This specialist 
guesthouse was established in Haba in 1986 by a Naxi farming family, and now sleeps 30, 
offers meals and cultural walking tours of the surrounding villages, and equips and escorts 
mountaineering expeditions to the summit of Haba Mountain. It employs four family 
members, and also numerous local guides and horsemen on demand. Infrastructure 
provision is recent: the first road to Haba was built in 1993 and surfaced in 1998, and mains 
electricity replaced the household’s own hydropower generation in 2007. There is 
communication by both landline and mobile phone. 
The guesthouse is the family’s sole source of income, supporting two children in higher 
education and allowing the family to contract out their farm work. It has grown constantly 
since 1998, and guest numbers even rose during the Olympic year – the proprietor was 
aware that this had damaged tourism elsewhere. If guest numbers continue to rise, the 
proprietor will respond by adding more rooms. 
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The relatively small number of participants has not been considered to be 
problematic, as it allowed for the collection of rich data from every participant, with 
the researcher focusing on depth rather than breadth (Daniels and Cannice, 2004). 
Moreover, the number of firms was small enough for the researcher to interview 
them all, so there was no need for a sampling strategy (Fletcher and Plakoyiannaki, 
2009). The number of cases fell within the recommended range for enterprise 
research of four to 15 (Stokes and Perry, 2007), and Chapter 6 will show that this 
was sufficient to demonstrate variation before the point of theoretical saturation was 
reached (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
The number of interviewees within each participating firm was limited, because all 
are still owned and managed by the original founder. This is characteristic of Chinese 
private enterprise (Poutziouris et al., 2002), which was first allowed in China after 
economic reforms were initiated in 1978. The scarcity of supporting informants 
increased the researcher’s dependence on context interviews in the evaluation of the 
interview data, which is a recognised feature of research into small, and especially 
Asian, firms (Stokes and Perry, 2007). 
5.2.2 Fieldwork method 
5.2.2.1 Discussion topics 
A series of nearly 100 generative topics was prepared, making a direct link from the 
research questions and concepts, through the specific references in the literature (as 
presented in Chapters 2 and 4), to the topics to be addressed during the interviews. 
The connection from the literature to the topics is illustrated next with the example of 
opportunism, and a tabulated summary of all of the links from research questions 
through references to interviews is presented in Appendix 1; this further adds the 
codes that were subsequently employed for data analysis. 
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The interview topics prompted discussion of whether the participant perceived the 
presence of each individual cause of transaction costs, his perception of levels of 
institutional protection or constraint, and his decisions regarding the structure of their 
firm and relationships with other firms. For example, the transaction costs caused by 
opportunism were discussed in terms of types of opportunist behaviour (with source 
references including Buckley and Chapman (1998a), Wathne and Heide (2000) and 
Williamson (1985)), participants’ perceived risk of being cheated (Williamson, 
1985), how the participant would judge a stranger’s propensity to cheat (Douma and 
Schreuder, 2008), and his likely response to it (Zhou and Poppo, 2008).  
The first of these, concerning types of opportunist behaviour, was operationalised as 
three interview topics. In the first, the author explained her wish to discuss a 
behaviour that the participant might have observed, that could be described as 
opportunism, unfairness, or taking advantage of others – the aim being to clearly 
communicate the intended topic of conversation, but without pre-empting the 
participant’s responses. The author then asked the participant whether they had ever 
experienced such behaviour, and to give examples of types and actors carrying out or 
suffering from such behaviour. The remaining two topics were designed as prompts, 
to help to elicit detail if participants were to struggle with the question. The second 
topic included examples of lawful opportunism, and the third was blatant 
opportunism; both were examples drawn from the literature, of very specific ways in 
which opportunists might behave.   
Chapter 6 will explain in detail how each participant’s responses were coded, using 
the illustrative example of the set of case firms with an awareness of types of 
opportunist behaviour occurring in the research environment. In the table in 
Appendix 1, this appears as fuzzy set code TOL1, and actors performing or suffering 
from opportunism are coded in sets TOL2-TOL5. The interview topics were coded as 
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82 fuzzy sets, and ultimately analysed as six causal conditions; the much larger 
number of topics demonstrates the author’s attempt to offer multiple ways of 
thinking about individual concepts, to ensure the participants’ full understanding. 
Their responses could therefore be distilled into far fewer items. 
5.2.2.2  Interview technique 
The participants were engaged in unstructured interviews using open questions (de 
Geer et al., 2004), in which the style of questioning was informal, the phrasing and 
sequencing of questions varied to suit the needs of each participant, and which 
allowed the researcher flexibility to clarify responses or pursue emergent issues 
(Bryman, 2008). The questioning was based on an interview guide, which listed the 
topics described above as an aide-mémoire for the researcher and included 
translations of key terms, presented both in Pinyin (romanised Chinese, for the 
researcher’s convenience) and Chinese characters (for interested participants). The 
topics on the guide were numbered to facilitate structured note-taking and cross-
referencing by the researcher, but the numbering did not dictate the sequence in 
which the topics were raised in the interviews. The only general pattern to 
sequencing was that company background was addressed first, to inform subsequent 
questioning, and the topics regarding outcomes were addressed before those on 
transaction costs, to avoid the participants offering outcomes that they thought the 
researcher sought. The table in Appendix 1 presents indicative interview questions 
based on the interview guide. 
Questioning was generally in direct form: although the author had earlier considered 
the use of native categories (Harris, 2000), this was abandoned prior to the principal 
data collection exercise in an attempt to maximise the clarity of expression in 
conversations crossing language barriers. However, the style of questioning was 
indirect when the topic under discussion concerned behaviours that the participants 
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might consider negatively. In the style of a recent qualitative study on corruption 
(Antoniou and Chapman, 2009), participants were asked about opportunism, 
cheating or leverage of guanxi as practised by other people rather than by 
themselves. The author was also aware from prior experience – in this and other 
Chinese sites – of the importance of avoiding leading questions, and so took great 
care not to direct participants in prompting them for fuller details or opinions 
(Bryman, 2008). 
Observation was used to supplement the interview data (Hansen, 2008), and also to 
serve for triangulation of participants’ reports. This is recommended for qualitative 
research in China where participants may be unaccustomed to articulating their 
feelings, and participant observation would be difficult to arrange (Eckhardt, 2004).  
The author wrote fieldnotes by hand during the interviews and typed them up as soon 
as possible afterwards; notes were made in the researcher’s native English for speed 
(Yanagisako, 2002), but with key terms being noted in the interview language to 
preserve the speaker’s original expression. The numbering of questions made it easy 
to generate structured notes from the unstructured interviews, without the need to 
transport pre-printed answer sheets (Lapsley, 2004). Although qualitative fieldnotes 
are bound to contain some of the researcher’s interpretation (Miles and Huberman, 
1994), the author maintained a distinction between the participant responses and her 
personal impressions that formed an integral part of the fieldnotes (Sanjek, 1990). 
5.2.2.3 Choice of language 
The choice of language in which to conduct interviews is an important 
methodological consideration, going beyond personal preference to a reflexive 
consideration “of power affecting the dynamics of the interview situation” 
(Marschan-Piekkari and Reis, 2004: 227). They recommend that, where linguistic 
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equality cannot be achieved because parties to an interview do not share a native 
language, the language used should be chosen to the advantage of the research 
participant. Two participants in this study, one of whom was a native speaker of 
English, nominated to have their interviews conducted in English. The non-
participating interviewee also chose to converse with the author in English, which 
enabled him to freely criticise the government without apparent fear of being 
overheard by his staff. 
Five of the remaining eleven participants were native speakers of Mandarin Chinese, 
giving them a linguistic advantage over the researcher whose native language is 
English. The other six participants were members of the Naxi and Tibetan ethnic 
minorities, for whom Mandarin is not native but is necessary in education and 
business, and they spoke only elementary English; the search for a common language 
was therefore restricted to the non-native Mandarin of both researcher and 
participants. In these cases, speaking Mandarin offered a mutual linguistic challenge 
to participant and researcher alike, which is preferable to the researcher taking the 
linguistic advantage. This mutual challenge can negatively impact the 
communication between participant and researcher (Chapman et al., 2004), or 
alternatively can encourage the speakers to use simpler expressions and so achieve 
clearer and more direct communication (Ghauri, 2004). The author found the latter to 
be the case: the researcher was forced to avoid specialist terms, and the responses 
were given in slower and plainer Mandarin than native speakers would have used. 
Furthermore, the author had observed a tendency of some Han Chinese tourists, as 
native speakers of Mandarin, to condescend to their minority hosts: the author was 
keen to avoid repeating this. 
However, construct bias can be a risk in crossing languages and cultures (Marschan-
Piekkari and Welch, 2004). This was resolved by pursuing the ideas in non-technical 
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terms, as is common in research with management practitioners as participants 
(Buckley and Chapman, 1998d). This applied particularly in the cases of the 
concepts of information asymmetry, where responses to open-ended questions 
indicated an incomplete understanding, and of opportunism which was understood 
very differently by participants and merited further investigation rather than 
treatment as a translation error (Chapman et al., 2004).  
On the other hand, the researcher’s being non-native had its advantages (Wilson, 
2004): sensitive questions could be posed in the guise of language clarification or of 
naïveté, and pursued despite non-verbal, culture-dependent warning signals. Many 
participants also appeared to feel comfortable discussing political topics in Chinese 
without fear of repercussions, since the author was clearly not related to national or 
local government. This also helps to explain why the author chose not to work with 
an interpreter, as the benefit of linguistic clarity might have entailed the sacrifice of 
the author’s non-native advantages by introducing a local third party (Marschan-
Piekkari and Reis, 2004). 
If a researcher in this context were to use English only, their pool of potential 
respondents and therefore findings would have been so restricted as to compromise 
the validity of their research (Wright, 2004). Therefore despite the difficulty of 
preparing to conduct unstructured interviews in a foreign language (Marschan-
Piekkari and Reis, 2004), the author agrees with the view of Chapman et al. (2004) 
that local language is of primary importance to international business studies, and 
that the viability of a research project is determined by the language skills of the 
researcher.  
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5.2.2.4 Contextualisation of method  
Michailova (2004) describes aspects of conducting empirical research in Eastern 
Europe, highlighting issues that are not anticipated by the mainstream methods 
literature written in and about the West. Some aspects require considerable 
adaptation to the research context, as described below, whilst others – the use of 
personal networks to secure interviews, lack of company registers, difficulty of 
planning meetings – simply require flexibility on the part of the researcher, as 
practised during this field study. 
The author avoided dependence on written materials during the interviews. These 
might include interview reports for validation by research participants (Silverman, 
2005), but this practice becomes inapplicable in a setting where participants’ time 
and inclination to engage with the research ceases with the end of the interview 
(Michailova, 2004), or where low levels of literacy would then become grounds for 
deselection of potential participants. 
Making audio recordings of interviews is recommended for increased reliability of 
results (Peräkylä, 2004), and to enable detailed analysis of how things were said 
without diverting the researcher’s attention to note-taking during the interview. 
However, the author had been advised by Chinese and British academics who 
conduct research in China, supported by Xin and Pearce (1996), that making audio 
recordings of interviews would be culturally inappropriate here. It also seems likely 
that participants would have been less frank in their reports of the business and 
political environment if their comments were being recorded (Daniels and Cannice, 
2004). On a practical note, many of the interviews were conducted in public areas of 
the guesthouses, so background noise would have reduced the quality of the 
recordings. Consequently, the data collected is the author’s account of what was said 
and observed, based on her handwritten fieldnotes (Yanagisako, 2002). 
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A researcher might contemplate relaxing the ethical standards prevalent in Western 
research, if they considered these to impede the research out of proportion to the 
context. For example, Michailova (2004) reports telling participants that interviews 
would be recorded rather than asking their permission, and the current author chose, 
on occasion, to continue despite non-verbal cues signalling participants’ discomfort 
with the line of questioning. The cues were noted to identify topics requiring closer 
attention during the data analysis.  
Opportunities for the independent collection of primary, qualitative data by foreign 
researchers in China are recognised as being very limited (Quer et al., 2006). The 
author therefore considers these adaptations to have been worthwhile in facilitating 
her collection of a rare dataset. 
5.2.2.5 Negotiation of access 
An informal and contact-based approach to field access has been recommended by 
Michailova (2004) in emerging markets in general, and specifically for China by the 
author’s academic advisors. As such, the first approach to potential participants in 
the principal data collection exercise of 2008 took the form of an informal 
conversation, with the author introducing the purpose of her research, and checking 
the screening profile. They were then invited to participate, given an estimate of the 
time commitment, and reassured as to the research ethics of confidentiality. The 
author was already known to several of the participants prior to this, following an 
informal visit to the site in 2006 and the exploratory field study in 2007, so in some 
instances a rapport was already present between researcher and participant. This 
existing rapport coincides with the advice of Lofland and Lofland (1995: 19) of 
“starting where you are”: choosing a research site in which you have an interest and 
where you are already established, so that access should be more straightforward to 
arrange than would be the case for an unconnected researcher. It was to prove 
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especially valuable given the time constraints imposed on the 2008 collection 
exercise, when tightened visa restrictions curtailed the intended study period. 
Despite this rapport, the author’s role was as an “outside”, or non-participating, 
observer (Lofland and Lofland, 1995). As such an outside researcher, close access to 
the participants could have been made problematic by differences such as nationality, 
age and gender. In the event, the nature of the participating firms – guesthouses 
targeting foreign visitors – made them react positively to the foreign researcher’s 
initial approach. The first individual with whom the female researcher came into 
contact was almost always female, often of a similar age, and so conversation was 
not hindered by social constraints. The Caucasian researcher was clearly of a 
different nationality, but this served usually to prompt questions from the participant 
about how families, farmers or even teenage girls live in the West, rather than 
causing them to guard their responses. 
The author therefore presented herself as an outsider with some background 
knowledge, but with a keen interest in learning about the individual participants 
(Lofland and Lofland, 1995). A polite, unthreatening and ever-approachable 
presentation was maintained, but always balanced with impartiality. As Lofland and 
Lofland (1995) warn of unwitting association with particular factions in the research 
site, the author needed to be friendly enough to encourage the participation of each 
firm in the population, without alienating or causing jealousy between fiercely 
competing enterprises or individuals. 
5.2.2.6 Participant-researcher relationship 
In the manner of Zhang et al. (2006), the researcher conducted interviews and 
observation as a paying guest at the participating guesthouses. In an attempt to 
compensate participants for their considerable time spent in interviews, whilst 
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avoiding the ethical question of paying for information or offering a findings 
summary that may have been of little interest to the participants (Michailova, 2004), 
the author offered tuition in English conversation. This type of arrangement had 
worked well during the exploratory trip. An exchange of time and skills was thus 
proposed, rather than a direct demand for participants’ time that was not 
compensated by the hotel bill, or that would suggest a guest-host power relationship 
(Swain, 2004) – and the researcher came off worse in this bargain, on more than one 
occasion. Tension in the researcher’s dual role as paying guest and researcher arose 
on three occasions, when participants postponed previously agreed interview times 
with the consequence that the researcher had to stay another night (experiencing 
opportunism at first hand, perhaps). This was successfully resolved with two 
participants, and the third was the non-participating interviewee who withdrew 
during the course of the study. 
After initial access had been secured, the foreignness of the researcher generally 
continued to enhance the relationship. In the context of researching Chinese 
businesses, foreign researchers are still more of a novelty than a commonplace 
nuisance (Hansen, 2008). The very fact that the researcher was foreign meant that 
she could ask questions or be forgiven for mistakes that a local could not 
(Yanagisako, 2002), and felt that “for some respondents, the fact that I was not part 
of local kinship or social networks enhanced the degree of openness and trust 
possible” (Wilson, 2004: 435). The corresponding disadvantage is naturally the risk 
of missing nuances in some responses, but the author considers this worthwhile in a 
study that otherwise capitalised on her individual characteristics that were helpful to 
the relationship (Chapman et al., 2004). 
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5.2.3 Context interviews 
As mentioned in section 5.1, it was important to obtain reports independent of the 
participants in the field study, regarding the broader research context. In addition to 
the field interviews, context interviews were therefore conducted with relevant 
government bodies and professionals who were not directly associated with the field 
site (Yanagisako, 2002). This was intended to support or give an alternative 
perspective on the field participants’ reports (Stone and Wall, 2005), with the aim of 
allowing an outside view to challenge the privilege that this study would otherwise 
have accorded to these reports (Yanagisako, 2002). Over three years, these context 
interviews have included representatives of local governments, tourist boards, 
investment promotion bureaux, universities, banks and law firms, in Kunming and 
Chengdu (the capitals of the Western provinces of Yunnan and Sichuan, 
respectively). 
Access was negotiated more formally than for the field interviews. It drew 
procedural credibility and increased formality (Yeung, 2004) from introductions 
made through intermediate contacts (Thomas, 1996) in the British Chamber of 
Commerce in Southwest China, the British Academy, the Department for 
International Development and the United Nations Development Programme. This 
approach is particularly recommended for attempts to gain access to “political, legal 
or bureaucratic units of the nation-state” (Lofland and Lofland, 1995: 41). 
Most of these Chinese interviewees were confident speakers of English, having been 
introduced via British or international intermediaries, so interviews were conducted 
in English without serious implications for linguistic advantage. The opportunity still 
arose for the author to clarify points using Chinese, or in the case of a local 
government interview when an interpreter was provided, to pick up further nuances 
in the slight changes or omissions made in translation. The author also continued to 
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make use of her foreignness to pursue sensitive questions such as whether the banker 
could trust borrowers’ signed guarantees, and to what extent local government policy 
was disseminated freely, despite signals of discomfort that a local would observe and 
respond to. 
5.2.4 Data management during the collection period  
During field and context interviews, the researcher made handwritten notes that she 
typed up soon afterwards. All interview records were anonymised to safeguard the 
confidentiality of the participants, and the “key” to identifying the records was stored 
separately. 
As the context interviews each addressed very different topics, no standard format 
was used for writing them up. Each interview was simply typed up in Microsoft 
Word, with references to the literature maintained. The field interviews, in contrast, 
were all typed up in the same format, facilitating cross-reference from the responses 
to the literature driving the question, and between respondents. This was done in 
Microsoft Word tables, to prepare for a straightforward consolidation of interview 
summaries into a single (but very large) grid for Framework analysis (see section 
5.3.1) following the field research period – up to this point, all input, storage and 
retrieval was in electronic format. This grid was later printed onto a series of A0-size 
posters, to aid data visualisation during thematic analysis and coding by the 
researcher. 
5.3 Research design: data analysis  
The data analysis was performed in three distinct stages, each with its own purpose. 
The first stage was a cross-firm thematic analysis of the interview data, exploring the 
range of participant responses and the degree of agreement shown with the literature, 
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and answering the first two research questions. The second stage involved coding 
interview data as fuzzy sets, in preparation for analysis. The third stage used the 
Qualitative Comparative Approach (QCA), which is a systematic data analysis 
method that supports theory-building by cross-case comparison. This technique was 
chosen for this study because it is designed to help analyse causal complexity, which 
was considered to be critical to the understanding the interaction between institutions 
and isolation in answering the third research question. 
In the following paragraphs, each of these stages will be described and its use in this 
study justified. The results of the thematic analysis are presented in Chapter 6, whilst 
the use of fuzzy set coding and QCA analysis in deriving the findings are explained 
in detail in Chapter 7. 
5.3.1 Thematic analysis  
A preliminary review of the interview data was conducted prior to the thematic 
analysis and fuzzy set coding, to familiarise the author with the responses and to 
make overall quality checks (Ritchie and Spencer, 1994). These included checking 
for completeness and consistency within case firms, inserting cross-references 
between cases, and adding impressions or observations to cases where, on reflection, 
they became relevant. Areas of commonality were noted, as were tensions or 
contradictions within and between cases.  
The underlying technique used to analyse the individual interview records into 
thematic summaries was the Framework method (Ritchie and Spencer, 1994). The 
thematic framework draws on the original research aims, emergent issues raised by 
the participants, and analytical themes arising from recurrence. This is presented as a 
grid, with a theme in each row and a column for each participant; extracts from the 
interview data can then be arranged in accordance with the themes, but still kept 
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separate for each participant. This has the advantages of ensuring the full and 
systematic review of all the material collected, of avoiding partial or selective 
inclusion into the analysis, and of making the comparisons between participants very 
transparent. The grid was constructed in a table in Microsoft Word: although 
specialist software is available for this task (FrameWork software form the National 
Centre for Social Research), the author did not consider it to offer substantial 
analytical advantages. 
The results of this comparative analysis are presented in Chapter 6. This presentation 
was structured in keeping with the main ideas in the literature, offering clarity and 
continuity between the literature review and the presentation of findings. The broad 
themes presented each draw upon multiple interview topics, and later feed the coding 
of multiple fuzzy set codes (Bryman, 2008). 
5.3.2 Fuzzy sets 
Fuzzy set coding is a method of reducing interview data into summary form for 
analysis of patterns and interaction between the sets, without the loss of detail that 
results from binary coding. For example, the membership of crisp sets has a binary 
definition of 0 or 1, indicating that a case is a full- (1) or non-member (0) of the set. 
In contrast, fuzzy set membership has values ranging from 0 to 1 inclusive, to 
describe a full range of membership from non-membership (0), partial membership 
(1>x>0), and full membership (1) of the set. Ragin (2000) attributes the first use of 
the term “fuzzy” meaning varying degrees of membership in a set, to Zadeh (1965: 
338): “A fuzzy set is a class of objects with a continuum of grades of membership… 
ranging between zero and one”.  
Researchers should use theory to guide their selection of causal conditions to code as 
fuzzy sets (Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009), as described in recent studies on the 
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performance of industrial clusters (Öz, 2006) and on the influence of institutions on 
inward FDI (Pajunen, 2008). The literature reviewed in Chapters 2 and 4 identifies 
the theoretical strands of transaction cost and institutional theories that guided the 
researcher’s choice in this study. The link between literature and the interview topics 
derived from it is further strengthened by the calibration of set values to reflect both 
theory and empirical findings from the field (Ragin, 2008a). The first stage in this 
process is the siting of the qualitative anchors of 0 and 1, to contain the relevant 
variation in the empirical data with regard to the conceptualisation of the set. For 
example, a set conceptualised as describing “large firms” might have the upper 
bound (membership score of 1) set at a particular value of turnover, above which any 
variation is not considered to be meaningful with regard to the underlying concept; 
equally, turnover anywhere below another set value might constitute non-
membership, and so the lower bound of relevant variation (membership score of 0) 
does not extend as low as a turnover of zero. The researcher therefore needs to 
interpret actual turnover values with reference to the concept of firm-size 
categorisation, rather than using them to populate a ratio-scale variable of firm 
turnover – which also would be limited to a lower bound of 0. The setting of upper 
and lower bounds, or minimum and maximum values, distinguishes fuzzy sets from 
ratio variables with their limitation to a minimum value (Ragin, 2000). 
The third anchor, 0.5, is again set with reference both to the literature and to the 
empirical data. Ragin (2008a) points out that that this offers the researcher the 
opportunity to determine the point of maximum ambiguity between full- and non-
membership of a case in the theoretically determined set, rather than having to 
assume it to equate to the central tendency of the sample (as was done in the study by 
Schneider et al., 2010). Following the establishment of these three qualitative 
anchors, further incremental values can then be set to reflect the quantitative 
variation evident in the data. The number of values for each set is established by the 
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researcher depending on the level of theoretical and empirical detail available, and 
would typically comprise three (0, 0.5, 1), five (0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1) or seven (0, 
0.17, 0.33, 0.5, 0.67, 0.83, 1) values. It can be seen that calibrating fuzzy sets is an 
interpretive process, which is distinct from defining ordinal, interval or ratio 
variables (Ragin, 2008a): 
Fuzzy sets are fundamentally interpretive tools – they operationalise theoretical concepts in 
a way that enhances the dialogue between ideas and evidence. With fuzzy sets it is possible 
to establish a much closer fit between theory and data than is possible using conventional 
procedures (Ragin, 2000: 162, italics in original). 
The fuzzy sets used in this study represented the causal conditions (relating to 
perceptions of transaction costs and institutions) and the outcome condition (isolation 
from or integration into the market) under examination. The coding of interview data 
involved assigning case-firms to levels of group membership for each causal 
condition and the outcome condition, to enable an assessment of the strength of any 
apparent relationship between cause and outcome. The Data Reduction section of 
chapter 7 explains, with reference to a worked example, how the sets in this study 
were calibrated and scored, resulting in a series of conditions “carefully tailored to fit 
[the] theoretical concepts” rather than ready-made measures (Ragin, 2000: 4). As the 
researcher documented the steps taken in the selection, calibration and coding of 
fuzzy sets, and the reasoning for them, an audit-trail of coding decisions was 
generated to support the reliability of the subsequent interpretation (Silverman, 
2005). 
This method is appropriate to the author’s current study, because it matches both the 
data and the aims of the research. Fuzzy set coding of interview questions has 
enabled reduction of the field data, without the loss of detail that would have resulted 
from coding into crisp sets or other types of variables. Fuzzy set scores based on 
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ethnographic or interview data are intended to understand the conditions from the 
point of view of the research participants (Ragin, 2000), which is consistent with the 
research aims of understanding participants’ perceptions of transaction costs and 
institutions, and abductive theory-building from their interpretations. Fuzzy set 
analysis has been recommended for the study of transaction costs, in particular for 
bounded rationality and uncertainty, due to its lack of dependence on or sensitivity to 
assumptions (Rao, 2003). Pajunen (2008) recommends the use of fuzzy set analysis 
at the micro level, as demonstrated in a comparison of organisational configurations 
(Fiss, 2007) and an analysis of market research surveys (Kent, 2005). Berg-Schlosser 
et al. (2009) suggest that any subjective or qualitative data that can be transformed 
into categories or numbers can be analysed with fuzzy sets, and Haege (2007) 
demonstrates this with a fuzzy set analysis of the characteristics of EU negotiations 
on data collected through interviews and participant observation. Ragin (2000) 
confirms the applicability of fuzzy sets to the operationalisation of concepts, in his 
description of fuzzy sets as a: 
…system designed to join formal logic, which is crisp and precise, and verbal concepts, 
which are not.… Virtually all social science concepts are verbal formulations. Thus, fuzzy 
sets are useful not only for representing membership in social categories [,] but for 
operationalising any social science concept that addresses differences across cases or 
instances (Ragin, 2000: 160). 
The purpose of fuzzy set analysis is to explore combinations of and interactions 
between the theoretically-selected causal factors, rather than to discover new themes 
in the data. We have explained that this study used causal conditions selected from 
theory and formalised in the thematic analysis. As such, a variety of well-known 
computer-assisted qualitative data analysis (CAQDAS) packages are designed 
specifically to uncover themes in the data – such as Nudist, ATLAS.ti and NVivo – 
are unsuited to this study. This study does, however, enjoy the benefits of systematic, 
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comprehensive and exhaustive data analysis (Gephart Jr., 2004) and generation of an 
audit trail that are common to software-assisted study (Lindsay, 2004), as will be 
described in the section on the fsQCA software. 
5.3.3 The Qualitative Comparative Approach 
This section is intended to introduce the Qualitative Comparative Approach (QCA) 
and justify its use in this study. Section 5.3.4 will describe the associated analytical 
procedures in detail. 
QCA is a transparent, systematic data analysis method in support of theory-building 
rather than hypothesis-testing, that was originally developed in the late 1980s in the 
fields of comparative politics and historical sociology (Rihoux and Ragin, 2009). It is 
a cross-case comparison that considers each case as a configuration of causal factors 
or conditions, emphasising the exploration of theory-driven relationships between the 
conditions describing a small number of cases (Ragin, 2000). It helps to formalise the 
process of observing commonalities in the data, and creates an audit-trail of the steps 
in data analysis to support the reliability of the interpretation. QCA can be seen as 
both deductive, as theory guides the selection of conditions, and inductive, as the 
cases offer insights as to further conditions to examine (Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009).  
Because this approach takes a holistic view of the cases as configurations of features 
(Haege, 2007), it emphasises the consideration of the context in which the cases are 
situated, and the potential impact of the context on the causal connections under 
study (Ragin, 2000). This fits well with the current study’s critical realist perspective 
that explores actors’ perceptions, their institutional environments and the interactions 
between them, and also the combined causes of transaction costs. 
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QCA uses Boolean logic to propose set-theoretic relationships between the fuzzy set 
scores representing causal conditions and the outcome condition. For each case, if 
the score on the outcome condition is lower than the score on a causal condition, then 
the outcome is a subset of that cause, indicating that the cause is a necessary 
condition of the outcome (Ragin, 2000). This is illustrated as a Venn diagram in 
Figure 6 below, taking the form of concentric rings with the outcome completely 
surrounded by the cause, showing that the outcome is always associated with this 
cause. An outcome score greater than the causal score indicates a sufficient cause, 
and the cause is a subset of the outcome. This ability to distinguish between 
necessary and sufficient conditions is of recognised value to applied research in the 
fields of social policy (Ragin, 2000) and local economic development (Ostrom, 
1992). 





Figure 6 Illustration of necessary and sufficient causes  
(Source: author) 
Scores for combinations or configurations of causal conditions are found by taking 
the maximum score of all the conditions in the configuration for the union of the 
fuzzy sets (a Boolean ‘OR’, as in “a OR b OR c”), or the minimum score for the 
intersection between the sets (Boolean ‘AND’, as in “a AND b AND c”). The 
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thus be compared with configurations that are associated with similar outcomes in 
other cases. In a group of cases whose scores for the cause is consistently lower than 
their scores for the outcome, a subset relation can be demonstrated; the researcher 
may then interpret this as a sufficient cause with reference to his substantive and 
theoretical knowledge (Ragin, 2009). This “causal interpretation of an association” 
(Olsen, 2004: 1) is an argument that can be supported by the scores; it is not claimed 
to be proof of a cause-and-effect relationship. Illustrated on a scatter-plot, with 
causes on the x-axis and outcomes on y, cases indicating sufficient cause would 
cluster above the diagonal towards the upper-left of the plot (where y>x) – see Figure 
7 below. A case to the extreme top-left of the plot would not be considered an 
outlier, but rather a very strong member of the outcome set, but with further – as yet 
unexplored – causes that could be incorporated into the causal statement to bring the 
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Ragin (2000) contrasts variable-oriented quantitative research, which seeks 
correlations across many cases and assumes the effect of each cause to be 
independent of the next, with QCA’s case-oriented approach. This focuses on the in-
depth study of a small number of cases, anticipating that causes will act in 
combination, and seeking out diversity between cases that might only be reflected in 
a single condition. The conditions are not separable from each other, from the case or 
from the context; the case is a “complex combination of properties, a specific 
‘whole’ that should not be lost or obscured in the analysis” (Berg-Schlosser et al., 
2009: 6). This suggests micro-level study, as “cases should be well known rather 
than anonymous” (ibid.). 
QCA adopts a complex conceptualisation of causality. It may be multiple, if there are 
many alternative causal paths (indicated by an ‘OR’ statement), and/ or conjunctural 
where each path composed of a combination of causal conditions (indicated by an 
‘AND’ statement) (Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009). Contingent causality describes 
interaction effects between causal conditions, resulting in a condition having two 
different outcomes (Ragin, 2000). For example, fear of opportunism (Condition1) 
might be associated with isolation (positive outcome) in firms lacking legal 
protection (Condition2), but might be associated with integration (negative outcome) 
in firms with legal protection. QCA, in contrast with statistical approaches, does not 
assume additivity (each causal factor having its own, independent effect on the 
outcome), causal symmetry (where the presence and the absence of the outcome are 
explained by opposite causal factors) or uniformity of causal effects (the causal 
factor always having the same effect on the outcome, regardless of its combination 
with other causes). It does, however, allow for equifinality, whereby different causal 
paths may lead to the same outcome (Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009). This reinforces 
QCA’s emphasis on configurations of causes, and its search for the different causal 
models present in the data’s comparable cases rather than seeking a single causal 
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model with “best fit” to all data. Rather than averaging out distinctions between 
cases as statistical methods would – for a relevant example, see Peng’s (2004) study 
of entrepreneurship and institutions in Chinese villages – QCA highlights diversity in 
order to refine theory and propose analytic generalisation (Öz, 2006).  Berg-
Schlosser et al. (2009) recommend “modest” generalisation to cases similar to those 
included in the empirical dataset used in QCA, and reiterate Ragin’s (2005b) point 
that QCA is not intended for making statistical inference from sample to population 
but rather to assist in causal interpretation. QCA’s combination of case-orientation 
and complex causation has been recommended for research very similar to the 
current study, where complex patterns are sought at a micro level: 
The aim of this paper is to advocate the use of this method in the IM [international 
management] field to delineate patterns of causalities or regularities in microsociological 
phenomena embedded in historical contextual singularities (Saka-Helmhout, 2009: 4). 
QCA is particularly appropriate to this study, in its characterisation as a small-N 
approach (with a population in the range of 2-15 cases) that originates from its early 
application in macro-comparison between countries (Rihoux and Ragin, 2009). Its 
requirement for an in-depth knowledge of individual cases fits the current research 
design, in which “the researcher is able to engage in regular interaction with the 
individuals (the ‘cases’) that are the object of the study”, and where the number of 
cases is small enough to permit real familiarity by the researcher (Berg-Schlosser et 
al., 2009: 4). Such analysis is well suited to qualitative data (Rihoux et al., 2009), 
such as that collected in this study. QCA permits analytic generalisation from small-
N studies (Öz, 2006), and Berg-Schlosser et al. (2009) cite several such studies 
published in the fields of politics and management research. QCA is also more 
appropriate to this study than cluster analysis. Although the input data and first stage 
of analysis may appear similar in QCA and cluster analysis – the truth table and the 
matrix of interobject similarity (Lorr, 1983), respectively – the aims are very 
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different. QCA’s aim of making complex causal interpretations by investigating 
subset relations diverges greatly from cluster analysis’s grouping of cases into 
homogenous classes or clusters, for the purpose of constructing and testing a 
hypothesised scheme of classification. 
5.3.4 fsQCA Software 
fsQCA (fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis) is a software package 
developed by Charles C. Ragin specifically to assist in QCA studies, by adding speed 
and systematic rigour to the processing of data to aid the observation of complex 
causal configurations. Transparency and traceability are ensured by a package that 
“opens the ‘black box’ of formalised analysis, by demanding from researchers not 
only that they make choices but also that they account for them” (Berg-Schlosser et 
al., 2009: 14). This analytical approach will assist this study’s critical realist 
comparison of idiographic cases (Sharpe, 2004), and it fits well with a methodology 
that aims to study cases in depth, but also in relation to theory and to the constraints 
imposed by contextual factors such as institutions. The software version used in this 
study was v2.2, dated December 2007; at the time of writing, an incremental update 
was available (v2.5, June 2009) which maintained the same core functionality.  
Summary fuzzy set scores are imported into the fsQCA software as cause or outcome 
conditions. fsQCA then summarises the configurations of causal factors that exist in 
the data, and displays them in a “truth table”. Truth tables are used to evaluate the 
argument of causal sufficiency, based on the strength of the subset relationship where 
membership scores in the causal conditions are consistently less than or equal to the 
scores on the outcome. The rows of the truth table each represent a case, or a 
configuration of causal factors, and these rows correspond directly to the corners of 
the multi-dimensional vector-space that is described by the conditions. fsQCA 
calculates the membership score for each case in each corner of the vector-space with 
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Boolean algebra; as each case may have varying degrees of membership in the 
different corners, fsQCA makes statements about the characteristics of the corners 
and summarises them in the truth table (Ragin, 2005b). As such, each row in the 
truth table has a score of 1 or 0 for each condition in a causal configuration; the 
corners are where the presence or absence of the conditions meet in combination (so 
“a AND b NOT c” describes a corner). In the simple example in Table 1 below, 
Case1 has strong membership of both Condition3 and Condition4 (so could be 
described as “3 AND 4”), whilst Case2 has strong membership of Condition3 but 
weak membership of Condition4 (so could be described as “3 NOT 4”). 
Table 1 Example of a truth table  
(Source: author) 
 Condition3 Condition4 
   
Case1 1 1 
Case2 1 0 
 
Because this highlights where various causes are associated with a common 
outcome, or where causes unexpectedly are not associated with an outcome, the 
researcher is prompted to explore the data further (Öz, 2006).  The software uses 
Boolean logic to assist the user in identifying necessary and sufficient causes or 
causal configurations, and reduces them to a series of algebraic statements (Rihoux 
and Ragin, 2009). Cases that match the statements but are not associated with the 
outcome are negative cases. They require further investigation into which element of 
their context, that is not accounted for by any of the conditions, causes them to 
behave as exceptions. The causal statements derived for this study are presented in 
the Chapter 7. 
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Published studies in International Business using fsQCA are still limited in number, 
and include those on the relationship between institutions and export performance 
(Schneider et al., 2010), institutional effects on FDI (Pajunen, 2008), 
internationalisation of small firms (Loane et al., 2006), and resource management by 
international organisations (Stokke, 2007). More numerous examples are available in 
related fields including corporate strategy (Kogut et al., 2004), market research 
(Kent, 2005), organisation studies (Fiss, 2007), determinants of corporate 
performance (Greckhamer et al., 2008), the comparative study of institutions (Kogut 
and Ragin, 2006), tourism research (King and Woodside, 2001), comparative politics 
(Schneider and Wagemann, 2005, Pennings, 2003) and cross-national economic 
performance (Vis et al., 2007). 
Proponents of fsQCA have argued that its strengths include the use of 
counterfactuals (which enables inferences to be made beyond the observed data, and 
makes its treatment of them explicit), the equal weight it gives to all cases (which is 
in fact a strength for case-oriented studies that seek diversity), and the need to 
maintain an appropriate ratio of conditions to cases (which forces researchers to 
select the conditions with care, de Meur et al., 2009). Ragin (2005a) rejects charges 
that fsQCA is inferior to traditional quantitative techniques, highlighting its intended 
use for causal interpretation with small numbers of cases, in contrast to the causal 
inference from large numbers by correlational analyses. Fiss (2007) defends its 
ability to identify conjunctural causation, which is not matched by regression models, 
and Pajunen (2008) considers it more appropriate than conventional statistical 
techniques for studying causal combinations in small numbers of cases. 
5.3.4.1 User interventions during the fsQCA analysis 
This section outlines the choices that the user needs to make during the analysis. The 
actual decisions made during the course of this study are discussed in Chapter 7. 
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The truth table is used to evaluate an argument of sufficiency for the causal 
configurations it represents, and there are 2k logically possible causal configurations 
(where k is the number of conditions). The truth table is therefore likely to contain 
rows with empirical cases, and rows without – whether because the vector-space has 
more corners than there are cases, or because a row represents a combination that 
would be impossible in reality (Ragin, 2000). This is a reflection of the limited 
diversity of social phenomena (Ragin, 1987), and the user must address it by 
assessing the distribution of observed cases across the logically possible 
configurations that make up the vector-space (Ragin, 2009). Each case is 
mathematically constrained to have a strong membership score (higher than 0.5) in 
only one configuration, and the user sets the minimum number of strong cases that 
merit the inclusion of the configuration in further analysis. This is the frequency 
benchmark for identifying empirically relevant causal configurations; any 
configurations falling below this benchmark are treated as logical remainders, and 
are removed from the truth table (Rihoux and de Meur, 2009). 
The user examines the consistency scores of the remaining rows. This score 
calculates the degree to which the cases sharing the row’s conditions display the 
subset relation of sufficiency; social scientific data are not expected to be so uniform 
as to demonstrate a perfect fit (Ragin, 2005b). It therefore measures the extent to 
which each configuration is a subset of (has a lower score than) the outcome. Where 
X is a cause, Y is an outcome, and MIN takes the lowest of two scores, this is 
calculated as: 
Sum of MIN (cause or outcome) / Sum of all causes, or 
Consistency (X <= Y) = SUM (MIN X, Y) / Sum (X)   (Ragin, 2009) 
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The score would be 1 for perfect consistency (where the causes score less than the 
outcome for all cases), slightly lower for a few near misses, or much lower (below 
0.5) for many cases with a wide margin. High scores would cluster in the upper-left 
of a plot of causes against outcome, indicating that the causes are sufficient for the 
outcome. The user selects a threshold value for consistency, and codes the outcome 
to 1 for rows above this threshold, and 0 for rows below it. The truth table now 
illustrates the empirically observed configurations of causes that are associated with 
the presence (1) or the absence (0) of the outcome (Ragin, 2009). 
The truth table may contain contradictions, which can be crisp (a row in which some 
cases are associated with the outcome and others are not) or fuzzy (a row that is 
associated with the outcome but has a low consistency score) (Ragin, 1987). 
Although the presence of contradictions confirms that the ratio of cases to conditions 
is appropriate for fsQCA processing (Marx, 2006), they must be resolved through 
reexamination or recoding of the data (Ragin, 2009) before minimisation can proceed 
(Rihoux and de Meur, 2009). 
Minimisation is a series of logical reductions to derive complex, intermediate and 
parsimonious solutions, based on an algorithm first developed in the 1950s by Quine 
and McCluskey to simplify electrical switching circuits. Simplification in fsQCA is 
desirable to enable generalisation from cases, rather than just providing descriptions 
of each case. The complex solution may have many terms, as it can only reduce very 
closely matched pairs of truth table rows into a single solution term, and exercises no 
assumptions regarding logical remainders (Ragin and Sonnett, 2008). This may result 
in a descriptive formula with very little generalisation, reflecting an early stage of 
interpretation (Rihoux and de Meur, 2009). 
In order to achieve greater simplification under conditions of limited diversity, which 
lack identical cases from which generalisations can easily be drawn, the user must 
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make simplifying assumptions (Ragin, 2008b). This enables the analysis to move 
from a very complex expression that describes a subset of the observed cases, to a 
more parsimonious expression that describes more cases or achieves more 
generalisation. This is done by eliminating some conditions from the complex 
expression, even where there are no matched pairs of observed cases to support such 
elimination. A notional matched pair is created by selecting from the logical 
remainders (unobserved but logically possible causal configurations), and the 
simplifying assumption is made that – if the logical remainder had actually been 
observed – the presence or absence of certain conditions (as specified by the user) 
would be associated with the outcome (Rihoux and de Meur, 2009). In this respect 
the user can benefit from the unavoidable limited diversity of social phenomena, to 
provide counterfactual cases to simplify the results (Ragin, 2008b). 
The use of simplifying assumptions in the reduction from the complex to the 
intermediate solution is controlled by the user. The assumptions take the form, “The 
presence of (condition X) should contribute to the outcome”, or “The absence of 
(condition X) should contribute to the outcome”. The user only enters assumptions 
that he considers to be “easy counterfactuals”, which are so called because their 
propositions are consistent with theory, even though they lack empirical observations 
(Ragin, 2008b). When fsQCA has generated an intermediate solution for each 
simplifying assumption, the user must identify the counterfactual configurations that 
have actually been exercised, and make his own assessment as to their plausibility 
with reference to theory and to substantive knowledge (Ragin and Sonnett, 2008). On 
this basis, the user decides which assumptions to retain, and so which of the 
proposed intermediate solutions to progress. 
A further reduction is possible, from the intermediate solution to a parsimonious 
solution. This allows fsQCA to incorporate any logical remainders into simplifying 
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assumptions even if they constitute hard counterfactuals, without any intervention by 
the user, in order to reach the most simplified solution possible. The complex and 
parsimonious solutions should be seen as occupying opposite ends of a continuum 
rooted in the same evidence; the complex solution is a subset of the parsimonious, 
still retaining its key elements but with less tolerance of counterfactual simplification 
(Ragin, 2008b). The user’s task is to choose between the extremes of a parsimonious 
solution that is simple and generalisable but is potentially over-simplified, and a 
complex solution that may have achieved little simplification but can be easily 
justified. Ragin’s (2008b) conclusion is that the intermediate solution makes 
justifiable eliminations of surplus conditions from the complex solution, whilst 
retaining its subset relation to the parsimonious solution:  
Intermediate solutions strike a balance between parsimony and complexity, based on the 
substantive and theoretical knowledge of the investigator (p175).  
All solutions – parsimonious, intermediate and complex – are reported alongside 
scores for consistency and coverage. Whereas “solution consistency is the strength of 
the subset relation indicating sufficiency, … solution coverage is the empirical 
importance of this relation” (Ragin, 2008b: 45). Coverage indicates the degree to 
which the solution accounts for instances of the outcome; if this were illustrated on a 
Venn diagram, with the sufficient cause being enclosed as a subset of the outcome, a 
higher coverage score would correspond to a greater overlap between the circles for 
cause and for outcome. 
In a solution composed of more than one term or causal path, coverage scores enable 
the user to distinguish between the relative importance of each path rather than 
considering them all to be equivalent. A complex solution with many terms might 
have a high consistency score but low coverage for each term as each only describes 
an empirically trivial number of cases, which would undermine the consistency 
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argument (Ragin, 2008b). The user must therefore select the preferred solution based 
on the reasonableness of any simplifying assumptions made, the consistency scores 
and then the coverage scores. 
5.3.4.2 Adjusting the ratio of conditions to cases 
It was noted above that the ratio of conditions to cases is important to the quality of 
the study. In a study with too many conditions relative to the number of cases, it is 
likely that each case will comprise a unique configuration of conditions and be 
impossible to generalise from (Berg-Schlosser and de Meur, 2009, Marx, 2006), and 
a large number of logical remainders will result with consequences for the inferential 
authority of the study (Wagemann and Schneider, 2007). Whilst Ragin (1987) 
accepts that logical remainders are a natural consequence of limited diversity as the 
number of cases simply will be smaller than the number of causal configurations, 
Marx (2006) proposes that there should be fewer conditions than cases to avoid 
uniqueness, and suggests guidelines for an appropriate ratio of conditions to cases. 
Chapter 7 will illustrate these guidelines with reference to the study data. 
A study drawing on rich theory is bound to comprise many conditions, and “a large 
number of conditions often cannot be excluded a priori” (Berg-Schlosser and de 
Meur, 2009). As the number of cases is generally fixed by the nature of the data 
collection exercise, the issue is how to moderate the number of conditions 
(Wagemann and Schneider, 2007) a posteriori. Ragin (2000) proposes mechanisms 
for the functional reduction of the number of conditions by creating higher-order 
constructs, by the methods of substitutability (replacing multiple substitutable 
conditions with a single expression, whose score is the maximum of the original 
scores) and of compensation (taking the average of the component scores). 
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The implication for the fsQCA analysis is that it will be iterative, as the user 
compares the relative merits of different approaches to the data in their attempt to 
produce a truth table free of contradictions (Rihoux and de Meur, 2009).  
Those readjustments should not be considered opportunistic manipulations of the data 
[because they are necessary and follow] formal rules that are fixed and stable, [and] they 
allow replicability. Simply stated, this means that another researcher using the same dataset 
and selecting the same options will obtain the same results (Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009: 
14). 
Chapter 7 shows how the interview data were coded into 12 fuzzy sets, this being the 
largest number of conditions appropriate to the 13 cases, and it presents the iterations 
in the fsQCA analysis that concluded with a six-condition model. 
5.4 Ethical issues concerning data collection 
The study received ethical approval by the author’s academic department (the 
University of Edinburgh Business School), and the data collection was conducted in 
compliance with the ethical guidelines adopted by the Association of Social 
Anthropologists of the UK and the Commonwealth (ASA, 1999). The study was 
funded by an Economic and Social Research Council studentship, and so no pressure 
or conflicts of interest were introduced by commercial funding. 
Participants’ agreement to participate in the study was secured verbally, as “signing 
an informed consent form ... may be undesirable, impolite or impossible in certain 
locations” (Punnett and Shenkar, 1996). This departure from common Western 
practice was supported in the author’s consultation with two senior academics in 
Western universities, who are active in the research of Chinese politics. Both 
recommended basing verbal consent on an explanation of the purpose of the 
research, and using this to justify non-attributed quotation of the participants’ speech. 
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The researcher discussed anonymity with the participants, rather than assuming that 
it would be desired in all cases (Grinyer, 2003). Whilst no participants wished to 
have material attributed directly to them, some asked for their firm to be named in a 
list of contributors in the hope of attracting a little publicity. 
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CHAPTER 6 THEMATIC ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
The previous chapter presented the research methodology, including the data 
collection techniques and the method of data analysis, and explained that the 
participants would be referred to as Pn. The numbering of the 13 is not continuous 
because the total population originally identified contained 16 firms; the numbers in 
use are P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P7, P10, P11, P12, P13, P14 and P16. This chapter 
presents a cross-firm thematic analysis of the interview data, showing the range of 
participant responses and the degree of agreement they show with the literature, with 
regard to the causes of transaction costs, their responses to them, and the strength or 
weakness of institutions. It answers the first two research questions, and offers a 
preliminary answer to the third question. The purpose of this chapter is to familiarise 
the reader with the detailed findings, before Chapter 7 describes the data reduction 
and analysis, followed by a full discussion of the third research question in Chapter 
8. 
6.1 Causes of transaction costs 
6.1.1 Bounded rationality 
Bounded rationality in the form of information asymmetry (Williamson, 1975) was 
readily grasped by P11. The other participants understood an example of information 
known to sellers but not to buyers (North, 1990), which is a feature of local trading 
custom where prices are not displayed but are negotiated separately with each buyer. 
The difficulty for buyers of establishing fair prices for goods was identified as a cost 
and a trading risk by five participants (P1, P2, P3, P7 and P11). A further five firms 
(P4, P5, P6, P12 and P14) acknowledged the additional cost entailed by comparing 
or negotiating prices, but did not consider this to increase risk. Only P10 did not 




Sacha Rawlence  164 
 
perceive any asymmetry, and P13 and P16 felt able to overcome it with no 
transaction cost implication. Perceived asymmetry did not simply increase with 
distance from the market town of Qiaotou, indicating that relative location is less 
important for these small firms than He (2002) reports for national firms. 
Language often hindered participants’ understanding of customer transactions 
(Buckley and Chapman, 1998d), with few clients speaking Chinese. P2, P3, P11 and 
P12 were frequently prevented from entering into transactions by the language 
barrier which became self-perpetuating, and P5, P6, P7 and P13 spent additional time 
seeking to ensure their understanding of transactions. Only P1 claimed never to have 
incomplete understanding. 
Bounded rationality had little perceptible impact on the capacity for planning 
(Williamson, 1975), as the majority of cases simply do not attempt this. Only firms 
P10 and P13 reported a constraint on planning, and P5 was able to plan over a one-
year time horizon. The remaining firms were accustomed to responding to demand 
rather than planning, offering little evidence either way.  
The completeness of contracts (Williamson, 1985, Williamson, 1975) and the cost of 
monitoring counterparties to contracts (North, 1990, Zhou and Poppo, 2008) turned 
out not to be appropriate to the context, as verbal agreements are the norm. The only 
reported contracts concerned construction at P1, where the work would be performed 
on site and so be easy to monitor. P4, P6, P13 and P14 thought that bounded 
rationality was preventing them from entering into contracts, but section 6.3.3 will 
also address the barrier presented by the legal system. 
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6.1.2 Opportunism 
The majority of interviewees were aware of opportunism, whether as an exception 
(P3, P5, P6 and P13) or as the rule (P1, P4, P7, P11 and P14). The reported forms of 
opportunism centred on information: distorting or hiding information, or charging 
unfair prices. There was no reported crime or contract-breaking (Williamson, 1985), 
and most reports were of active opportunism (Wathne and Heide, 2000) although P4 
offered examples of passive failure to offer complete information. Of the participants 
acknowledging opportunism, all felt some weakness in their ability to identify 
potential opportunists (Douma and Schreuder, 2008), to retaliate against opportunism 
(Carson et al., 2006), or in the protection afforded by institutions (Zhou and Poppo, 
2008). 
Although many participants had experienced opportunism by suppliers (reported as 
frequent by P1, P7, P11 and P14 and exceptional P4, P5, P6 and P13), only four (P1, 
P3, P7 and P11) had acted on any fear of opportunism (Williamson, 1985). Further 
questioning showed that the perceived threat of opportunism receded because 
participants had already guarded against it though exclusively personal trading 
(North, 2003) that enabled them to rely on their prior knowledge of the 
counterparties (Douma and Schreuder, 2008) – thus incurring transaction costs of a 
different nature than the internalisation or cooperation predicted by theory. Only P1, 
P13 and P16 were willing to trade with strangers; all others restricted their volume of 
impersonal trading or avoided it altogether, demonstrating an unsatisfied need for 
institutional protection.  
The only example of ex post opportunism (Buckley and Chapman, 1998a) was 
customers failing to pay their bills (P1, P7 and P14). P10 offered an opportunity to 
triangulate the methods of interview and observation, as she denied the existence of 
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opportunism of any kind, and yet was one of only two participants to charge guests 
in advance – the other being P7, who did this specifically to avoid non-payment. 
Outside the customer-supplier relationship (Schauwecker and Kühlmann, 2007), 
opportunism by competitors was only reported by P1 and P3. P3, P4, P6 and P14 
reported observing opportunism by locals against customers, with P6 incurring extra 
costs by offering free meals to local horsemen, whom some participants suspected of 
overcharging (and so deterring) customers. 
The author considers Hill’s (1990) expectation that opportunists would be eliminated 
by the market not to apply in this context, as the risk of opportunism is strongly 
perceived by the participants. 
6.1.3 Transaction characteristics 
Specificity was investigated in terms of provision by guesthouses for individual tour 
operators. There was no specific investment in fixed assets (Lamminmaki, 2005), 
staff training (Langlois and Robertson, 1995) or dedicating staff (Poppo and Zenger, 
2002) to meet the unique needs of tour operators, but this might change as operators 
come under increasing government pressure to employ local tour guides (which was 
reported by tour operator TO2). Although some firms have standing arrangements 
with tour operators (P4, P5, P6, P7 and P13), these are not formal enough to have led 
the tour operators to make specific investments or to demand this of the guesthouses. 
The only commitment of resource (Williamson, 1991) was temporary exclusivity of 
use when guesthouses were fully occupied by a single tour group, which had 
happened in just three firms (P4, P6 and P14). P6 was aware of dependence on these 
clients but perceived no risk in it, whilst P4, P7 and P10 associated dependence with 
risk and so took deliberate action to avoid it (Rao, 2003). 
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Transaction frequency concerned the planned recurrence of customer (i.e. tour 
operator) and supplier transactions (Colbert and Spicer, 1995). Short- or long-term 
planning with tour operators (up to one year ahead, within the annual budgets set by 
tour operators) was more common (P6, P13 and P14) than having standing 
arrangements with a supplier (P12), but neither was ever governed by a contract 
(Williamson, 1985). Active attempts to nurture long-term, if non-contractual, 
relationships were not widespread, but far more common with customers (P4, P5, P6, 
P13 and P14) than suppliers (P1 and P12). 
Williamson closely associates specificity and frequency to changes in the governance 
of the transaction or the firm. Since these firms display largely non-specific non-
repeated transactions, their failure to adjust their governance structures (see section 
6.2.1) does not contradict his theory, but suggests that Nooteboom’s (1993) 
expectation of small firms experiencing behavioural transaction costs might apply 
more readily. 
6.1.4 Uncertainty 
The author had expected to hear serious concerns about uncertainty, as three 
participants in the 2007 exploratory study (named P4, P5 and P7 in 2008) had told 
the author of their fear of a rumoured (and still uncertain) government proposal to 
build a series of hydro-power dams across the gorge with consequent flooding and 
forced relocation. Hayes (2007) identifies the parties to this proposal as the Huaneng 
Power Group and the Yunnan Provincial Government. Soon after the exploratory 
study, the nongovernmental organisation International Rivers estimated that 100,000 
residents would be displaced (2007). Despite this, only five participants (P1, P2, P4, 
P5 and P7) in the 2008 data collection expressed concern for their firm under 
uncontrollable risks and an uncertain future. With the exception of P11 and P12, all 
others were aware of the risk but remained unconcerned by it. 
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Perception of risk in some areas was reduced because of the impossibility of 
foresight (Wholey and Brittain, 1989, Dess and Beard, 1984). For example, despite 
the Sichuan earthquake just four months earlier, participants did not worry about 
natural disasters (Williamson, 1985) – P12 observed that she couldn’t predict or 
control these things, so it would be pointless to worry about them. Actions by others, 
including government policy (Guler and Guillen, 2010) and changing customer 
demand (Williamson, 1985, Werner et al., 1996) were mostly seen as beyond their 
knowledge, although P4 (and in relation to other questions, P1, P3, P6, P7, P10, P13 
and P16) associated visa restrictions for the 2008 Beijing Olympics with a sharp fall 
in demand. The economy (Werner et al., 1996) had caused P3, P4, P7, P13 and P16 
to raise their prices in response to inflation, but only P4 was aware of the further risk 
to demand by the unfolding banking crisis. The slow pace of improvement to 
transport and telecommunications infrastructure suggests that technological change 
does not have a strong impact on firms’ decisions, supporting Williamson (1985) 
rather than Tremblay (1998).  
Concern focused on increasing competition (Sutcliffe and Zaheer, 1998), and 
uncertainty about whether, when and how high the dam would be built. The variation 
in participants’ perception of the risk demonstrates high uncertainty: P1 does not 
expect to be flooded, although her guesthouse is the lowest at about 20m above the 
current river level, whereas fearful P7 is sited 500m higher. As P4 explained, “The 
government is deliberately keeping business people ill-informed”.  
There was no adaptation of strategy or structure in response to uncertainty, and there 
were few contracts to adjust (Krishnan et al., 2006; see section 6.2.1). Only P1 and 
P4 have contingency plans in the event of flooding by the dam, and the non-
participating interviewee had already petitioned the National Government’s 
Development and Reform Committee. Other participants did not protest, some 




Sacha Rawlence  169 
 
because they felt powerless (P1, P5, P7, P12, P13 and P16), and others were too 
afraid as illustrated in the 2007 exploratory study. 
No participants avoided trade in response to uncertainty (Keister, 2001), although 
section 6.2.4 will show avoidance for other reasons. The participants’ priority was 
business survival and competitiveness, rather than reducing transaction costs for fear 
of the unknown (Martinez and Dacin, 1999). P5 fears losing everything if the dam 
should be built, but his immediate need is to extend and upgrade his accommodation 
to meet demand and to beat the competition. Similar views were expressed by P6, 
P7, P12 and the non-participant: trading and capital investment are not discretionary, 
they are a business imperative, and responding to uncertainty with contracts, 
modified governance or reduced trade would not increase the prospects of these 
firms. In contrast, TO2 and P4 reported that international tour operators avoided 
contracts because of uncertainty, showing they perceive a wider range of options 
including cooperative relationships. This suggests that a Western conception of 
uncertainty as undesirable, and responding to it by (incurring transaction costs 
whilst) attempting to reduce or work around it, does not apply in this context: the 
research participants conduct business as usual regardless of their uncertain 
environment, incurring no additional costs. In contrast, later discussion will show the 
participants’ attempts to work around weak formal institutions or substitute for them 
with informal institutions. 
6.1.5 Research question 1 
The first research question asked which types of transaction costs were perceived by 
participating firms. The most widely-reported type was opportunism, with all 
interviewees who acknowledged it feeling some weakness in their ability to identify 
or retaliate against opportunism, or in the protection afforded by institutions. Almost 
all firms perceived risks of opportunism in impersonal trade, and avoided it or felt 
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constrained from trading more widely. Bounded rationality raised the cost of 
information search, and uncertainty was extremely high due to the possible dam. The 
transaction characteristics of specificity and frequency showed little variation in this 
context. 
Behavioural causes are key to the firms’ perception of transaction costs, in contrast 
to the minimal impact of transactional causes. Their decisions are thus steered by a 
need to protect the business from uncertainty, opportunists and the effects of 
bounded rationality, rather than by a wish to economise on the costs of repeated 
transactions. As such, the interview findings support the view of Nooteboom (1993) 
that these small firms will incur high transaction costs associated with opportunism, 
uncertainty and bounded rationality, and McGee and Sawyerr’s (2003) related 
observation that costs of information search will be higher for such firms. 
6.2 Responses to transaction costs 
As discussed in Chapter 3, a sensitising concept of isolation was adopted to guide the 
exploration of firms’ responses to transaction costs the principal field study. Guided 
by the literature review, this was structured around the responses of transaction 
governance, organisation structure, specialisation and isolation. Section 6.1.4 has 
shown that uncertainty alone does not cause the firms to avoid transactions, so any 
avoidance here may be a response to other or multiple causes. 
6.2.1 Governance of supplier transactions 
Arm’s length, market transactions with many suppliers were reported by P5 and P13, 
and with few suppliers by P2. These market transactions did not tend to involve 
contracts at all, which were only reported for P1’s construction work, and leases 
between the local government and the two Qiaotou firms. Although arm’s length 
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governance is expected when specificity and frequency are low, the uncertain 
environment explains the low incidence of arm’s length trading (Williamson, 1985) 
and contracts (Zhou et al., 2008). Uncertainty is expected to lead to relational 
governance (Williamson, 1985), which was reported with small numbers of suppliers 
by P7, P10, P14 and P16, but this could be ineffective if opportunism were also 
present (Carson et al., 2006). The remainder of the firms reported that their 
transactions were not relational, but not quite arm’s length either, as they were 
conducted within a pool of regular and trusted suppliers. 
6.2.2 Organisation structure 
No firm had taken over or been taken over by another, or been party to a parent-
subsidiary relationship or to a formalised cooperative relationship. The only 
relationships approaching a (modified) vertical structure were P10’s affiliation with 
China’s Youth Hostelling Association, which provides online marketing but takes no 
share in the ownership or management of the guesthouse, and long-standing but 
informal cooperation between tour operator TO2 and guesthouses P6 and P13. It 
should be noted that the participants described valued working relationships with 
TO2, which sounded less personal than the close relationships and even friendships 
that had been described to the author by TO2. This may be due to exaggeration on 
TO2’s part, or may be due to the manager’s comparison with his firm’s commercial 
relationships with suppliers in other contexts, whereas the participants’ comparator is 
closely-knit village life. A close but informal, horizontal, cooperative arrangement 
was in evidence between P4 and P6, who pooled booking information received from 
TO2, which increased market access for both firms (Larson, 1992). P4 suggested that 
the other firms saw business as a winner-takes-all competition, and lacked the vision 
or the trust to engage in cooperation. Trust will be discussed in section 6.4.1. 
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The absence of internalisation is consistent with the transactions’ not being 
characterised by specificity or frequency (Williamson, 1985), and with the firms’ 
shortage of financial resources to fund a takeover (Granovetter, 1985) – this was 
beyond the scope of even the longest-established and best-equipped guesthouses. 
Furthermore, the firms appear not to perceive a pressure to increase efficiency 
through internalisation (Granovetter, 1985): P6 expressed deep satisfaction at having 
built up her firm from scratch and had no inclination to take over someone else’s 
firm to improve performance, suggesting a preference for organic growth. Overseas 
tour operators are deterred from internalising guesthouses by uncertain property 
rights, limits on foreign investment and the trend in tourism practice away from 
direct ownership (Dunning and McQueen, 1981). However, cooperative alliances 
would be expected, given the shortage of resources (Oviatt and McDougall, 2005) 
and the opportunism, uncertainty and bounded rationality experienced by these small 
firms (Nooteboom, 1993). Their absence merits further investigation, as the high 
transaction costs suggest that these transactions would be more economically placed 
within a hierarchy or alliance (Douma and Schreuder, 1991), when in fact they 
continue to be placed in (a trusted segment of) the market. 
A distinction that may be worth making, is between the theoretical expectation that 
firms will actively extend their boundaries by choosing to bring formerly market-
based transactions in-house, in rational response to the high transaction costs of an 
imperfect market (Buckley and Casson, 2009), and those of the firms participating in 
this study who have always performed a wide range of activities internally. Having 
converted their farmhouses into guesthouses, many of these firms have elected to 
continue with their own agricultural production rather than buying produce in, and 
some have begun to offer additional services internally (such as guiding or running a 
small shop) as part of the guesthouse. This behaviour has also been observed in 
large, state-owned hotels in the provincial capital of Kunming, whose range of guest 
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services are all still performed in-house rather than contracted out. Although these 
firms have drawn their boundaries where the benefits of internal activities are 
perceived to be greater than the alternative purchase and transaction costs, and so 
succeed in bypassing an imperfect market, this does not “bring under common 
ownership and control the activities which are linked by the market” (Buckley and 
Casson, 1976: 33), as would occur in internalisation. This is rather an indication of 
their decision not to specialise. 
6.2.3 Specialisation 
All but four cases were engaged in a wide range of productive activities, continuing 
to farm their land in addition to running their tourism enterprise. P2, P3, P11, P12 
and P13 were almost self-sufficient for food inputs and labour, suggesting already 
that they would have little need of external suppliers. P5, P6, P7 and P10 bought in a 
few goods or specialist labourers such as electricians: these are large and mostly 
successful guesthouses, some on the road and some more remote, showing that 
reluctance to procure from outside was not simply dictated by low income or 
inaccessibility. P14 had specialised out of farming, but held two paid jobs in addition 
to running the guesthouse. The specialists were P16, whose farm work was all 
contracted out, and P1 and P4, who were the only firms that had no history of 
farming; these three only performed tasks directly related to the tourism services they 
offered. The boundaries of P14 and P16 have undergone the most change, as 
following their withdrawal from farming they now buy in all necessary supplies. P5 
and P13 have altered the balance of time they spend on farming and running their 
guesthouses, but the scope of activities is unchanged. 
P10’s high degree of self-reliance was intended to avoid the risk of depending on 
market supply (Buckley and Casson, 1998), and this was confirmed in a cross-check 
between questions by her assertion that this practice would not change even if 
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production costs rose or purchase prices fell (Lyons, 1995) – the proprietor laughed 
at the suggestion that her thriving firm might not be able to afford to purchase its 
inputs. P5 and P13 were also concerned with the risk of low quality rather than the 
cost of bought-in supplies, indicating opportunism as a factor here too. In contrast 
P2, P3, P6 and P12 simply had insufficient cash incomes and had to produce their 
own, demonstrating tighter constraints on their options than transaction costs can 
account for. P7 also justified in-house production because purchase costs could never 
be less than his own production costs, but perhaps had the freedom to choose as he 
was able to keep his three children in full-time education. Risk was not a concern of 
P14 and P16 in abandoning farming and committing to buying in all future supplies: 
they both explained the high opportunity cost of farming with reference to the far 
higher margin they could earn on their specialist occupations. In the terms used by 
Stigler (1951), they specialised in tasks with increasing returns, leaving co-located 
farmers to continue the tasks with constant or diminishing returns. P14’s motivation 
thus turned out to be very different than the author had thought during the 
exploratory study, when she thought the choice not to grow his own food might be 
due to a lack of kin to supply labour. The contrast is interesting, between current 
farmers who perceive a high cost of buying in, and ex-farmers who consider 
agriculture to be a waste of their time and skills. 
The uncertain environment drove P5, P7 and P10 to avoid exclusive specialisation in 
their guesthouses (North, 1990), so that they could revert to farming if tourism 
demand were to dry up. TO2’s ground manager had expected that this would apply to 
all of the farming firms, but his tour leader thought that the failure implied by closing 
a guesthouse would make this a last resort. P6, P11, P12, P13 and P14 described non-
specialisation as a way of maintaining flexibility, allowing them to reallocate labour 
whilst maintaining both farming and tourism activities. Only P2 and P3 said that 
their non-specialisation was dictated by low demand (Stigler, 1951), which meant 
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that the income generated from the guesthouses could not support the proprietors’ 
families and had to be supplemented by continued farming. The author suspects this 
also to be the underlying reason for P12’s non-specialisation: her fieldnotes describe 
P12’s activities as being “more like two complementary forms of under-employment, 
rather than a diversification of business activities”. 
Multiple incomes were used as a livelihood strategy (Ellis and Biggs, 2001) by P2 
(who had two jobs, also in tourism but for unrelated pools of clients), P11 (with a 
second tourism job and a family member working independently in Zhongdian), P13 
(with a teacher’s salary and a taxi business), and P14 (also operating a taxi and 
further working as a driver for tour operators and for the firm operating the tungsten 
mine). P3, P5, P6, P7, P10 and P12 had potential income streams from both tourism 
and farming, whilst P1, P4 and P16 felt the return from specialisation compensated 
for the risk of depending on a single income source. 
Although the non-specialists are largely self-sufficient, P10 and P13 are non-
specialists and are also well-integrated into the client market (as will be discussed in 
section 6.2.4). Their supply-side isolation, attributed above to the risk of supplier 
opportunism and the need for flexibility in the uncertain environment, has not 
prevented them from successfully attracting customers. In these cases, especially 
P13, which is a small firm, viable businesses are hindered from participating in the 
supply network by transaction costs. In contrast, those who have specialised out of 
farming have no intention of re-internalising farm production, perceiving the 
transaction costs of procurement to be offset by the productivity gains of 
specialisation. For the specialists with no history of farming, internalisation would 
require them to take over the farms that are their suppliers. As will be discussed in 
section 6.3.3, the farmers do not have the right to sell the land they farm, so the 
closest option would perhaps be for the guesthouses to sign a long-term, exclusive 
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supply contract with them – and the transaction costs of contracting in this context 
have already been found to be excessively high. The intervention of formal 
institutions between transaction costs and anticipated responses therefore continues 
to merit attention. 
6.2.4 Isolation 
The concept of integration into or isolation from trading networks was addressed by 
examining each participating firm’s relationships with their customers, suppliers and 
neighbouring guesthouses.  
The number of suppliers varied widely between participants (North, 1990). At the 
extreme, P12 bought from just one regular supplier in an attempt to reduce the risk of 
supply: this supplier had agreed to take responsibility if a guest were to fall ill after 
dining at the guesthouse. The proprietor valued this perceived reduction in risk very 
highly, even if it seemed doubtful to the author that this could be enforced or blame 
could be attributed, as bought-in and home-grown supplies are cooked together in the 
same chaotic kitchen. P3 and P7 always bought from the same limited circle of 
trusted suppliers in Qiaotou, whereas P2, P5, P6, P10, P11 and P13 shopped across 
the Qiaotou market. The widest trading was exhibited by P1, P4, P14 and P16, who 
were integrated into a dense network of supplier relationships extending to Qiaotou, 
and beyond to Lijiang and Zhongdian for goods not available locally. The contrast 
between P12’s very limited trading despite good road access and P6’s wider trading 
circle coupled with more difficult access to the high path, shows that supplier 
isolation is not simply determined by inaccessibility. 
The frequency with which purchases were made appeared not to depend on the 
supplier relationships, so much as on the number of guests in residence at any given 
time, and the carrying capacity of transport used – when rain washes out the access 
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tracks to the guesthouses on the high path, the staff revert to carrying supplies in 
from the road. 
The duration of trading relationships was important, suggesting that there might be a 
reliance on informal sanctions that would be effective in personal exchange (North, 
1990). P2, P3, P6, P7, P10, P12, P14 and P16 all restricted their purchases to 
suppliers they knew personally, to avoid the risks of cheating and low quality. This 
group included large, established firms with many suppliers as well as small or 
struggling firms, indicating that some conducted trust-based exchange (Zhou and 
Poppo, 2008) by choice and were not restricted to it by their size or resources. 
Trading was confined to the same ethnic group by P11, which allows her to buy from 
people she does not know personally, but she can rely on them being known to others 
and so deterred from cheating. P1 and P2 purchase mostly from known suppliers but 
are willing to buy from unknown traders if the need arises; only P5 and P13 
expressed a straightforward acceptance of impersonal trade. All participants except 
P11 and P13 expected to trade with the same suppliers again in the future, supporting 
Poppo and Zenger’s (2002) emphasis on a long-term orientation. This confinement 
of supply relationships to long-standing contacts hindered business integration and 
contributed to the isolation of the least-specialised firms. Only a small minority of 
participants was prepared to conduct impersonal trade, and these firms have emerged 
as specialist service-providers, deeply integrated into a local supply network.  
Customer relationships are focused on tour operators, as passing trade is usually 
limited to one-off visitors with whom no relationship exists. P2, P3, P11 and P12 
have limited commercial success, attracting little passing trade and no tour operators, 
whilst P1 has a high volume of passing trade but again no tour operators. P2 and P3 
are disadvantaged by their locations set back from the tourist path, but the others are 
sited on the road, close to other successful firms, so their weak performance cannot 
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simply be attributed to location or remoteness (Rodrik et al., 2004). P16 had just 
started working with tour operators in 2008, whilst P7 and P14 were seeing a decline 
in the number of tour groups they hosted. P4, P5, P6, P10 and P13 attracted both tour 
groups and passing trade. P5 explained the attraction of tour operators as a source of 
high volume, repeat trade. He found the groups very easy to look after with 
homogenous requirements, and he emphasised the importance of regular contact with 
the operators to maintain numbers. The aim of a client relationship was thus 
maintenance of demand, rather than trust-based exchange. 
As described above, pooling of information between P4 and P6 was the closest 
approximation to a cooperative alliance in lieu of internalisation (Artz and Brush, 
2000). Other forms were not reciprocal: P1 would refer customers on to other guest 
houses and telephone ahead for them, whilst the display of publicity materials (by P4 
for the non-participating guesthouse, by P6 for P5, by P12 for P6; P3 mistakenly 
believed that P4 displayed a map showing her guesthouse) was not equivalent to the 
cross-marketing observed in the urban sites of the exploratory study. P12 and P16 
explained that making recommendations would put their own reputation at risk, in 
the event that the client disliked the recommended firm and felt cheated. In 2007, P7 
had said that he cross-referred customers with the non-participating interviewee, but 
in 2008 – like the remainder of the participants – he no longer made 
recommendations. 
6.2.5 Refining the concept of isolation to answer research question 2 
In refining the concept of isolation, the author incorporated all elements of the value 
chain that are connected to the participating firms. These included supplier 
relationships (integration up the value chain), customer relationships (down the 
chain), inter-guesthouse relationships (along the chain), and personal exchange as a 
potential constraint on each of these links in the chain. All of these were of concern 
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to the participants and have shown variation within and between firms – illustrated 
most strongly by P13 – and so all four were incorporated into the scoring of the 
outcome variable, using benchmarks derived from the literature, as will be explained 
in the Data Reduction section of Chapter 7. 
The other forms of response to transaction costs were not directly included in the 
coding of the outcome. In the cases of contract, pure market transactions and 
internalisation incorporating a change of ownership, the field study simply confirmed 
that these responses were minimally or not present. Other transaction cost responses 
were more relevant, and the features that were present are reflected in the outcome, 
and contribute to our understanding of it. For example, where questions on 
governance showed relational trading, this is addressed by the outcome of personal 
exchange; organisation structures incorporating an element of cooperation were 
reflected in the outcome of inter-guesthouse relationships; low internalisation meant 
that most firms did not specialise, and the related limited trading is shown in the 
outcome for supplier relationships.  
Consideration has also been given as to whether the direction of causality could in 
fact run the other way – whether this kind of isolation could be a cause of rather than 
a response to transaction costs. This cannot be the case for specificity or frequency, 
which are characteristics of the transaction itself and so cannot be caused by 
withdrawal from trading. Nor can this work for uncertainty, which is a feature of the 
external environment that affects – rather than being affected by – the actors and 
their actions in that environment. It might be said that bounded rationality and 
opportunism could increase for an actor who was isolated from trading and lost touch 
with market conditions and practices, but when bounded rationality and opportunism 
are considered as causes of transaction costs, it does not make sense that an actor’s 
avoidance of transactions has the effect of increasing the cost of those transactions. 
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These findings answer the second research question: isolation is the principal 
response to transaction costs, being evident in the structures, activities and 
relationships of many participating firms, followed by cooperation. The implication 
is that this study will contribute to filling the first gap in the literature, concerning 
isolation as a little-researched response, and the task of the analysis will therefore be 
to explore whether common combinations of transaction costs are perceived by 
isolated firms. As the response of isolation is not the predicted response to the causes 
of transaction costs that are present in the research site, other potential causes should 
be taken into account, so we proceed with the third research question. 
6.3 Formal institutions 
This section discusses how the participating firms perceived formal institutions to 
affect the level of transaction costs, and to shape their responses to these costs. All of 
the participating firms were registered, so the nature of the institutions had not 
prevented them from joining the formal economy, as feared by Cleaver (2007). The 
author also conducted context interviews on these topics with government, financial 
and legal bodies, to broaden her understanding of the issues raised by the 
participants, and to confirm the participants’ interpretation of relatively complex 
issues. 
6.3.1 Local government 
The local government bodies were (in descending order of seniority) Yunnan 
Province, Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Region, Zhongdian County, Qiaotou and 
Haba townships, and individual village councils. Of these, the townships were the 
bodies that most influenced the firms’ operations, with villages simply organising 
work-teams for tasks such as the maintenance of roads and drainage channels – this 
impacted the staffing of P16 during a visit by the author. 
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The author was aware that discussing the government might put participants at risk, 
and so took care to ask the questions in neutral language, and did not press 
participants to answer questions they avoided in this area. This led to incomplete 
responses in some cases, but the insights obtained are considered by the author to be 
valuable and probably rare. 
P10, P12 and P13 considered local government to have a positive effect on their 
firms, with P13 giving the example of a good environment for entrepreneurship in 
which competitive firms would succeed.  P3, P4, P6, P7, P11, P14 and P16 
considered local government not to harm their operations, but P1 qualified this by 
saying that no harm was done if taxes were paid and rules obeyed. No participants 
described it as having a strong negative impact (Zhou and Poppo, 2008, Peng, 2004), 
and P11 went so far as to volunteer the statement that “the government doesn’t steal 
our money”. P2 and P5 had no opinion, positive or negative of a government that 
seemed remote to their daily concerns, supporting Levitsky (1989).  
No participants reported receiving financial support, confirming Luo’s (1997) fears, 
and perceptions of the tax burden varied. An urban participant found it high whilst 
P3, P5 and P13 said their tax bills had fallen, reflecting the abolition of the largely 
regressive agricultural taxes and fees in 2006, which had previously consumed 15% 
of average rural income or 17% for the poorest quintile (OECD, 2010). None were 
aware of any enterprise support (Elkan, 1995), which the Small Enterprise Service 
Division (that supports the development of local small and medium enterprises, or 
SMEs) of the Chengdu Municipal Economic Commission had advised the author was 
available from the SME division of the Diqing Economy and Trade Committee. But 
despite Mair and Marti’s (2007) suggestion that this minimal level of institutional 
support might contribute to the limited market participation by some firms, P12’s 
decline was not being stopped by the beneficial effect she claimed the government 
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had on her firm, and although the market participation of P2, P3 and P11 was very 
limited, they did not attribute this to failure on the government’s part. 
Half of the six participants expressing an opinion found local government inefficient 
or inept (Rao, 2003). P4 described the time-consuming task of chasing the local tax 
officer to send her a bill, knowing from past experience that non-receipt of a tax bill 
was not considered to be a valid reason for failing to pay it.  
The author was able to code ten responses to Child and Moellering’s (2003) question 
of confidence in officials’ honesty. This drew on interview questions directly 
concerning government and on broader questions of whom the participants could 
trust. The author interpreted responses to indicate less trust where there were tensions 
between responses by the same participant (P16 answered a broad question with the 
statement,  “Naturally we can trust the Communist Party”, but was less emphatic 
when asked directly about the government) or body language that contradicted a 
positive spoken answer (observed for P6). P1, P4, P10 and P12 expressed some 
confidence in local government, outweighed by P6, P7, P11, P13, P14 and P16 
stating or suggesting distrust. Only one interviewee used the word “corrupt” to 
describe the government. 
Just two (P7 and P11) out of ten participants found it difficult to understand or 
comply with local regulations (Child and Moellering, 2003), and three (P1, P4 and 
P7) out of eight found it difficult to stay up to date with changes to regulations.  
Five out of ten participants perceived unfairness by local officials, and three of these 
felt it hindered the development of their business. One of these, P7, felt powerless to 
defend his firm, whereas P1 used guanxi for protection as expected by Peng (2004). 
Peng’s idea of predation was illustrated, albeit by national government, by a claim 
that the Beijing government blocked websites so regularly that the proprietor was 
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forced to post advertisements for his guesthouse on four separate websites in the 
hope that at least one of them would be available at any given time. 
Similar issues had been reported by the foreign-invested firms (FIEs) interviewed by 
the author in Chengdu in 2006: two struggled to keep up with regulatory changes, 
one found the local government unfair unless persuaded to behave otherwise with 
gifts, and one judged the bureaucracy in Yunnan to be more inefficient than that in 
Chengdu. Mixed opinions were held as to the quality of service offered by the local 
tax office. In 2008 a newly-established FIE reported that regulations and tax still 
took up much of the small firm’s time, and that it received no support. The Small 
Enterprise Service director claimed that the constraints on small firm development by 
multiple regulations were being reduced, and that regulations were readily available 
(to Chinese and foreign firms) on the internet. He was surprised to be asked about 
firms too small or remote to have internet access, but thought they could see policy 
announcements in the press. He also explained that SMEs would only be paid 
compensation for compulsory relocation if they owned their land, and he 
acknowledged that few did. 
6.3.2 Funding 
P2, P3, P6, P7, P11 and P13 reported that they were unable to borrow from banks, as 
anticipated by Elkan (1995) and Peng (2004), and P4 and P10 had not tried. P1, P5, 
P12 and P14 reported great difficulty in securing bank funds, and only P16 had 
borrowed without difficulty. Some thought it would not be possible to borrow 
sufficient sums to fund extensions to accommodation (P1, P2, P11 and P13). 
The difficulty or impossibility of formal borrowing was widely attributed to the 
banks’ procedures for securing loans – except by P11, who was the only participant 
to express concern as to how she would repay any loan. The use of guesthouse 
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buildings as collateral worked only for P1 and P16, both of which are urban sites not 
subject to rural land-use restrictions. The rural participants’ property rights allow 
them to build but not to secure loans on the collectively-owned land they occupy 
(Bai et al., 2006, Cleaver, 2007)3, so the only alternative security is a personal 
guarantor who deposits a sum equivalent to the loan with the lending bank, for the 
full period of the loan. This procedure was widely understood, being cited by P2, P5, 
P6, P11, P12, P13 and P14, although none had access to such a guarantor. The 
Branch Manager of a foreign-owned bank in Chengdu, interviewed by the author in 
2008, confirmed that Chinese banks require guarantors and acknowledged that in 
these cases the banks add no value. He reported that his had been the first bank, and 
was still the only foreign bank, to offer loans to local, private SMEs from 2004, but it 
has no representatives in Yunnan yet and does not serve the rural market. His bank 
offers unsecured loans, because SMEs often lack assets to offer as security: he 
denied that property rights were the issue. The principal impediment to SME lending 
(above availability of capital) was lack of reliable financial information on potential 
borrowers (Poutziouris et al., 2002), for which his bank compensates with a labour-
intensive search for complementary “soft information” by relationship managers. 
The bank considers this a sufficient basis for lending to hand-picked clients who 
cannot offer the security demanded by other banks (who also lack client financials) – 
their dependence on personal guarantee, based on a trust relationship with SME 
board members, demonstrates the vital importance of personal trust even in the most 
                                               
3 Following the author’s most recent field visit, she heard from a contact in a Chengdu law firm that 
the Chengdu Municipal Government had just adopted a policy recognising title and so enabling the 
mortgage and sale of rural housing, with the intention of speeding up reconstruction following the 
earthquake. It was expected that this would serve as a pilot after which it might be applied across 
China, but the author cannot verify whether or not this has happened. 




Sacha Rawlence  185 
 
formal of organisations. The manager confirmed that small firms’ borrowing costs 
were high, and the alternatives were informal borrowings or “underground” lenders 
who sell on funds obtained as personal bank loans. Local banks, such as the Qiaotou 
branch of the Agricultural Bank, are supposed to lend to SMEs but lack the requisite 
information to reduce risks, and so fear increasing their stock of non-performing 
loans – illustrating the conflicting government instructions described by Herd et al. 
(2010).  
The Chengdu Small Enterprise Service director recognised that small firms were 
constrained by their inability to borrow, and that this in turn was due to their lack of 
mortgageable assets. His organisation attempted to make up for this by offering 
credit guarantees of their own, although if it were instead to formalise the provision 
of financial information to market lenders, it could contribute to correcting the root 
cause of this market failure (Herd et al., 2010). 
As formal borrowing was inaccessible to most participants, the interest rates and 
repayment terms were not a key concern to them. This led some to imagine that they 
wanted to borrow amounts that appeared risky to the author: P2, P11 and P13 
thought they would need RMB 30k-50k to build en-suite extensions, with the capital 
alone equating to at least 2-3 years’ total income for an unskilled labourer earning 
RMB 50 per day. P1 expressed frustration that the sum borrowed could not exceed 
the value of the property posted as security, causing the author to consider that the 
shortage of lending may in fact have had a positive effect in constraining 
irresponsible lending, particularly in the light of the banking crisis that was just 
unfolding at the time of the 2008 field study. 
Peng’s (2004) expectation is partially borne out, with all but three participants having 
access to informal lending by family or friends. However, the participants had a 
higher degree of reliance on reinvesting profits than had been suggested by the 
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literature: the available volume of informal borrowing simply could not meet the 
participants’ demand for investment in extensions and upgrades to accommodation. 
P7’s extensions had all been funded through retained profits, as had P16’s until the 
hospitalisation of a family member in late 2007 consumed his savings and informal 
sources, such that in 2008 he reported bank loans for the first time. P1, P3, P13 and 
P14 intend to reinvest profits once their firms are earning a significant return. Only 
P11 receives a remittance from a migrant worker (Elkan, 1995). 
A further potential source of financial support would be the proceeds of the road toll 
charged to all users of the gorge road, including trekkers. Neither the toll-booth staff 
nor most of the local guesthouse owners have been able to explain to the author who 
charges the money or on what it is spent. P4’s report is supported by Donaldson 
(2007): the private firm, owned by Li Xiaopeng (son of the former Premier, Li Peng), 
that bought the tungsten mine in 2002 charges the fee and is expected to maintain the 
road in return, but P4 does not know who charged the fees prior to 2002. The funds 
are apparently not reinvested in local development, as the participants are unaware of 
this and section 6.3.3 shows it does not compensate for environmental damage. As 
the number of toll tickets sold is not controlled, it is not a check against estimated 
carrying capacity of the site, so even the administration of toll charges does not have 
an environmental benefit. Finally, P4 and P7 fear that the toll charge deters potential 
visitors. 
As a result of this funding constraint, P2 and P3 had insufficient working capital to 
put up signs advertising their participation in the market (Mair and Marti, 2007), P11 
and P12 could not invest in any upgrades to facilities, and P1, P6 and P13 perceived 
it as a constraint on the growth of their firms. Only four interviewees routinely made 
purchases on credit, and only four were satisfied with the level of cover of their 
buildings insurance. 
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6.3.3 Legal 
Six of the interviewees reported a significant cost (either financial or in terms of 
administration time) of maintaining their company registration (Cleaver, 2007), and 
two of these (P6 and P13) felt this brought no benefit to them beyond legal 
compliance. In contrast, P16 considered the cost to be negligible and to be 
outweighed by the benefits of reduced liability. 
P2, P3, P6, P7, P11 and P12 all avoided impersonal trade because they were not 
confident of legal protection (Zhou and Poppo, 2008). P1, P4 and P14 also doubted 
the effectiveness of protection, but traded despite this. Only P5, P10, P13 and P16 
felt that they could rely on the law to protect their interests in impersonal trading 
(North, 2003). 
Of the eight participants who acknowledged the risk of opportunism, P4 and P7 
would have no faith in legal redress and would seek informal resolution if cheated 
(Luo, 2007), and P11, P12, P14 and P16 would attempt informal resolution first 
(Zhou and Poppo, 2008). However, P11 feared that she would be unable to afford the 
attendance fee that the police usually charged: the context interview with a Chengdu 
law firm confirmed that there was no legitimate reason why the police should charge 
fees. P6 and P13 would confidently take legal action, and P1 would take it but 
without confidence of success. When asked about resolving disputes rather than 
cheating, only P11 would consider legal action; the others would use informal 
methods in preference or exclusively – suggesting the importance of mediation to 
preserve relational trading, unless trust were broken by cheating. The Chengdu 
solicitor explained that Chinese people were more accustomed to informal than legal 
resolution, confirming North’s (1994b) view that change of formal institutions can 
happen more quickly than informal, and in her opinion social pressure was more 
effective than the law in deterring opportunism. 
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In terms of the capacity of the legal system for overall risk reduction, P4, P7 and P11 
did not feel that it reduced the risks of opportunism or uncertainty (North, 2003, 
Cleaver, 2007). P6, P14 and P16 acknowledged some reduction, with P6 adding her 
own judgment of character to reduce risks of opportunism. P1 and P5 distinguished 
between effective risk reduction for opportunism, and ineffective reduction of 
uncertainty. 
Property rights were readily understood in the context of the planned dam, with 
expressed views of the risk evenly split. Half of the participants were confident, 
feeling their rights were secure (P2 and P16) or that compensation would be 
sufficient to re-establish a business (P1, P6 and P12), whilst the other half (P5, P7, 
P10, P11 and P14) anticipated expropriation without adequate compensation. Only 
P4 and the tour operators avoided investing in property for fear of expropriation (Bai 
et al., 2006, Khanna, 2007). The solicitor thought that in the vast majority of cases of 
expropriation in the public interest (where the definition of “public interest” was a 
controversial issue), compensation was insufficient to buy an equivalent new home, 
and the only other course of action was to accept alternative accommodation of 
unspecified quality and location. 
Although only P1 had direct experience of contracts, twice as many participants 
thought contracts could be enforced than thought they could not (P7, P10 and P16) 
(North, 1994a). This inexperience precluded them from knowledge of enforcement 
costs (Hoskisson et al., 2000), or of the procedural steps required for drafting and 
enforcement. None, however, would consider contracting with someone they did not 
already trust (Zhou and Poppo, 2008). This was perhaps just as well, since the 
Chengdu solicitor advised the author that incorrectly drawn contracts would not be 
legally binding, and enforcing out of court would be far more economical than 
pursuing a civil action. She felt that an impediment to legal enforcement was rural 
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people’s lack of knowledge about the law, and the (affordable) services offered by 
solicitors. 
Externalities were discussed in terms of the pollution and environmental damage 
caused by tungsten mining above the gorge (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). All 
participants were aware of it, except four who were sited on the road rather than the 
high path. Five participants (P3, P4, P7, P13 and P14) experienced consequent costs 
of reduced trade or seeking a new water supply that were neither prevented nor 
compensated by the environmental protection authority (Rao, 2003). The problem 
appears to have worsened over time, as respondents who had been unaware of it in 
2007 reported costs in 2008. In contrast, nine participants contributed financially 
towards compliance with environmental protection measures. 
The low confidence of participants in legal protection, and their inclination to seek 
supplementary or alternative protection by informal means, confirms the need to 
continue with an examination of their perception of informal institutions. To 
conclude our discussion of formal institutions, it appears that the problems are 
caused by the absence of institutions. Legal shortcomings are due to a lack of legal 
enforcement, rather than necessarily being due to problems with the law itself. The 
local government appears not to do harm, but government support could perhaps 
have a beneficial effect; the same applies to the lack of funding. The formal 
institutions appear to be weak, rather than strong and harmful. 
6.4 Informal institutions 
6.4.1 Trust 
Interpersonal trust was commonly restricted to family and close friends or long-
standing social contacts (P3, P6, P7, P12, P14, P16) (Child and Moellering, 2003), 
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although P10 and P13 would extend this trust to individuals introduced to them by 
such social contacts – relying still on acquaintance rather than description (de Soto, 
2006). Trust was never confined to family alone, which Fukuyama (1995) and Peng 
(2004) anticipated.  Beyond the social network, business contacts of long duration 
were trusted by P2, P5 and P11, and recent business contacts by just P1 and P4 
(Granovetter, 1973). The urban participants tended to display more flexibility in 
categorising who they would trust. 
Trust appeared not to be generalised (Knight, 2001), as it was in part tied to 
individuals or reputations within the social group (see section 6.4.4 for discussion of 
reputations). Nine participants were likely to trust people they perceived to be similar 
to themselves, limiting the scope for complementary economic benefits (Lewicki and 
Bunker, 1996) and contributing to the feeling of a small gene-pool – even for P1 who 
had seemed very flexible in the first question. This idea was readily understood, 
suggesting it approximated very closely to participants’ conceptions of trust, and it 
corresponded to earlier responses that favoured trade with members of the same 
ethnic group.  
Impersonal trust (Humphrey and Schmitz, 1998) was present for eight participants 
(P1, P4, P5, P10, P11, P12, P13 and P16), but was often limited to specified firms or 
institutions.  Only P5 and P13 exercised this trust by conducting impersonal 
exchange (Rao, 2003). Minimal trust for simple trades was far more common (eight 
participants) than extended trust for long-term planning (Humphrey and Schmitz, 
1998). Only P4, P5, P6, P7 and P13 exhibited the latter in terms of cooperation with 
foreign tour operators, but it was never contractual. 
Barney and Hansen’s (1994) typology of trust appeared not to be appropriate to the 
context, and was excluded from coding. Rather like earlier questions about fear of 
opportunism, most respondents claimed not to have any vulnerabilities and so 
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indicated weak trust. However, this was not because of perceived invulnerability so 
much as because they already had safeguards (such as personal trading) in place. The 
theory expects to describe confidence in the protection of acknowledged 
vulnerability as semi-strong or strong trust. 
Ten participants stated that a trust relationship had to precede business transactions 
(Zhou and Poppo, 2008), and only P4, P5 and P13 used small-volume, low-value 
trades to develop trust (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996). No respondents reported a 
relationship that had survived a cessation in trading, contrary to the expectation of 
Dibben and Harris (2001), but trading had ceased either because of cheating which 
terminated the trust relationship, or because of a change in circumstances unrelated 
to the relationship. Dispositional trust (P7, 11, 14 and 16) was not associated with 
willingness to conduct impersonal exchange, supporting Hardin’s (2001) view that in 
isolation it has little effect. 
Interpersonal trust was effective in reducing the expectation of opportunism 
(Steensma et al., 2000): of the ten participants acknowledging a risk of opportunism, 
four (P1, P3, P11 and P13) felt that trust could reduce this risk, and trust removed the 
risk for the other six (P2, P5, P6, P7, P10 and P16). This supports the views of 
McDonald and Vertova (2002) and Buckley (2004) that social networks can increase 
trust, but the author considers this effect to be of finite benefit because – as warned 
by Storper (1991) and Keister (2001) – it restricts trade to a pool of trusted 
counterparties that can only be extended over a long time period. This restriction 
could be rooted in the undermining of social interaction by the enforced dependence 
on centralised formal institutions (Knight, 2001) during China’s Cultural Revolution 
(1966-76), which has yet to be repaired. However, although history is “a very 
important conditioning feature in the background context [that can provide] some 
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sense of the trajectory of development along which an economic system may be seen 
as evolving” (Redding, 2005), it is not our main concern in this study. 
6.4.2 Kinship 
Kinship was an absolute condition for employment by P6, P12 and P13, which was 
relaxed to include members of the social network by P1, P7, P10 and P16. Only four 
of the 11 participants who were not sole traders would consider drawing employees 
from outside the social network. Purchasing was also affected by the extent of the 
network, with half of the participants preferring to trade within it. This suggests that 
the constraint on the growth of the participating firms was not composed exclusively 
of kinship, which was expected by Fukuyama (1995) and Whyte (1996), but by a less 
sharply defined constellation of kinship and social ties as described by Peng (2004). 
As an example of the time taken to build up these ties, the co-proprietor at P13 still 
feels a relative outsider in the gorge even though she moved there in 1990 and the 
family set up the firm in 2006. A beneficial effect of network-based recruiting can be 
seen by comparing P16 with guesthouses in the Yubeng valley (mentioned in 
Chapter 1 as a possible field site). Both employ large numbers of horsemen on a 
casual basis, to escort tourists on pony-treks. As P16 recruits them from his social 
network, this provides occasional paid employment to local residents. In contrast, the 
Yubeng tourism services have far outgrown the capacity of the local workforce, and 
now pull in large numbers of young men from further afield who have no connection 
to Yubeng, and nothing to do or anywhere to go after stabling the horses in the 
evenings. 
P13 and P14 report some protection from opportunism through kinship ties (Peng, 
2004), and P1, P5, P6, P10 and P16 group family and friends together as a single 
source of protection. The remaining participants were entirely self reliant regarding 
the threat of opportunism. No participants sought help from their families for dispute 
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resolution. Of the participants who have had disputes, P1, P6 and P14 would attempt 
resolution by friends, and they confirm Peng’s (2004) view that this avoids 
transaction costs (understood as expense or delay) of enforcement but with less 
reliable effectiveness. P5, P7, P11, P12, P13 and P16 would not involve family or 
friends at all. 
6.4.3 Wider networks 
Hu’s (2007) term “guanxi community” reflects the participants’ habit of drawing on 
a social network extending beyond the family. For P1, P5, P7 and P10 the network 
serves business and social purposes, but P12, P13 and P14 maintain a distinction 
between business and social contacts (Li et al., 2008b). 
Structuring the business around this network is common practice, with the majority 
of participants accustomed to trading within it (Zhou and Poppo, 2008). Only P4 and 
P5 routinely trade outside their networks, and P1, P13 and P14 appear to be in 
transition as they occasionally trade outside their usual group. This latter grouping of 
participants is composed of urban and long-established firms. 
All but P6 and P10 considered the time-investment to maintain these networks to be 
insignificant (counter to the expectations of Peng (2004) and Douma and Schreuder 
(2008)), or easily outweighed by the competitive advantage inherent in an 
established network. P2 and P3 felt confined to trading within their network because 
of their dependence on the integral trust-relationships, supporting Child and 
Moellering (2003), whilst P6 and P10 acknowledged this constraint but placed a 
higher value on the protection from opportunism that it offers. The remaining 
participants felt able to extend the boundaries over time or to seek opportunities 
outside the network, showing less restriction than Poppo and Zenger (2002) had 
anticipated.  
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P2, P3, P11 and P12 were examples of Keister’s (2001) concern for path-
dependence: all four firms considered themselves to be at a competitive disadvantage 
due to their limited networks, such that none of them described their firm as growing 
or as having had a notable growth phase. This could not be attributed simply to 
location (two were on the road, two were not), ethnicity (which varied), the founder’s 
recent arrival in the locale (three were resident farmers before opening guesthouses, 
the other had moved in seven years earlier), or youth of the firm (three were as old as 
P6, who had laid foundations for the first set of extensions by the time of the author’s 
first visit five years after its founding). For other reasons, they had simply failed to 
gain entry to a network. P1 and P13 expected to overcome this disadvantage over 
time, or by compensating for a lack of local contacts by increased contact with non-
locals. P6 was an exception to Whyte’s (1996) expectation: she compared her firm to 
P7, pointing out that it was ten years older and bigger than her firm, but claiming that 
hers was performing much better in spite of this and that her less-established network 
did not hinder her from competing successfully. The remaining participants were the 
longest-established firms, all acknowledging that their networks were a competitive 
advantage, except P5, who denied it was an advantage and suggested that the 
younger firms ought to show some spirit and build up their networks – much as P6 
has done. 
The participants differentiated clearly between their social or business ties and 
political connections (Peng and Luo, 2000), with only P1, P4 and P11 claiming to 
have any political guanxi (Li et al., 2008b). This appears to be a characteristic of the 
research site, as the author has confirmed the literature’s expectation of the need for 
such ties in the cities of Chengdu (where multiple FIEs stated that government 
guanxi were vital, with two specifying their importance for start-up firms) and Dali 
(where a Chinese tourism entrepreneur used them to circumvent the bureaucracy on 
behalf of his clients). There were no reports of guanxi being used in defence against 
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officials (Xin and Pearce, 1996). Some participants considered guanxi to be an unfair 
source of competitive advantage that their small firms could not access – but one of 
the three firms condoning it as the local way of doing business, was a small and 
simple guesthouse that still felt able to make useful connections. Strongly negative 
views of the practice were expressed, as anticipated by Guthrie (1998) and Luo 
(2008), by P3, P5, P12, P13, P14 and P16 – using the terms “deception”, “cheating”, 
“low integrity” and “not virtuous” – and with P5 adding that he wanted to avoid 
owing anyone any favours. The other participants preferred not to engage in guanxi 
practices, but refrained from judging those who did. Exclusion from or denunciation 
of guanxi practices were not associated with common ethnic groups or urban/ rural 
locations, and the generally low importance of guanxi may be attributable to the 
distance of the research site to any bases of significant political power. 
6.4.4 Social sanctions 
This topic turned out to be a poor fit with the research context, despite Peng’s (2004) 
assertion that protecting one’s reputation is an effective deterrent to dishonesty in 
China. P3, P6 and P7 insisted there was no need for a deterrent as there was no 
dishonesty, yet all three had reported the presence of opportunism in earlier 
questions. This inconsistency in the data, and the lack of variation in the responses 
(all the remaining participants except P1 considering that other mechanisms, such as 
family pressure or village norms, were adequate) caused the author to omit this topic 
from the later iterations of the fsQCA analysis (see Chapter 7). Again, the premise 
that societies will establish systems of sanctions if they expect dishonesty 
(Humphrey and Schmitz, 1998) trips up in a context where individuals have already 
shielded themselves though personal trading, and so no longer feel the need for 
protection by sanctions. 
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However, the author does not suggest that the participants considered their 
reputations unimportant. On the contrary, they reported setting great store by their 
own good reputations. The issue was that only half of the participants thought that 
communicating changes to other people’s reputations (to make the deterrent credible, 
Douma and Schreuder (2008)) could actually happen – two implied that the 
reputation of the communicator would be damaged in the process of telling tales. 
Since this results in relatively static reputations, trust attaches to personal knowledge 
of the individual rather than their reputation. Despite this, all but P4, P12 and P14 
expressed a preference for trading with counterparties of known reputation, reducing 
the number of trading partners as feared by Keister (2001). 
6.4.5 Empirical study of informal institutions in the research context 
The second gap in the literature that this study aimed to address was a lack of 
empirical research on informal institutions in China. This study has found trust, and 
the social structures within which trust develops, to be crucial in enabling and 
safeguarding transactions. The drawback, however, is that only insiders can benefit 
and it takes a long time for an outsider to gain admittance – if they do at all. 
Although the presence of trust can be effective in reducing transaction costs in this 
context as anticipated by Hu (2007) and enable cooperation, the scarce supply of 
trust in this research context hindered cooperation and raised the transaction costs of 
establishing trust. The slow and deliberate development of trust before transactions 
commence is intended to reduce the risk of opportunism. As such, its development 
represents a transaction cost just as the reduction of opportunism through detailed 
contracts or internalisation would.  
Participants did not consider themselves to be acting against their firms’ own 
interests as a result of informal constraints (Oliver, 1991), but their confinement of 
trading to the network exposes them to the risk of paying higher prices than might be 
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available in a more competitive market. This raises the question of what more 
strongly constitutes the firm’s best interests: pursuing best prices on the open market, 
or being shielded from the risks of that market through reduced trading or isolation. 
In the absence of more robust formal institutions to protect transacting parties, the 
latter currently takes higher priority, with the former being less realistic until future 
institutional reform enables firms to extend into impersonal trade (North, 2003). 
Under current conditions, however, firms that are established in a network will be 
freer to trade than the firms outside whose only protection is isolation and, 
consequently, a continued inability to specialise. 
6.4.6 Research question 3  
The third question asked whether an appreciation of the institutional context could 
help to explain firms’ responses to transaction costs. Here we offer a preliminary 
answer, prior to the detailed analysis in fsQCA. 
The interview findings support the view of Zhou and Poppo (2008) that transaction 
cost theory assumes a stronger formal institutional starting-point than is the reality in 
China, and suggest that this affected firms’ responses to transaction costs. Their 
decisions were steered more by a need to protect their firms from uncertainty, 
opportunism and the effects of bounded rationality, than by a wish to economise on 
the costs of specific or repeated transactions. Although they perceived these 
behaviourally-driven transaction costs, the firms generally responded to them by 
reducing the number of transactions they conducted, rather than by placing them in a 
different organisational structure as their response was constrained by the 
institutional environment.  
The anticipated response of increasing the complexity of contracts will remain 
inapplicable to this research site until such time as the legal infrastructure to support 
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them may be strengthened, and made available locally. The predicted response of 
internalisation is made unattractive by uncertain property rights, is not viable due to 
all firms’ lack of resources and access to finance, and is unnecessary in the case of 
the unspecialised firms whose operations already include food production. The 
author had considered cooperation to be a more realistic response, but the scope for it 
is severely limited by the constraint on forming new business relationships, which 
results from the long-term nature of trust and its roots in kinship and social networks, 
and the lack of legal protection for parties to transactions. North (1990) also observes 
that game theory’s prediction of cooperation assumes no end-game position, whereas 
the threatened flooding of the gorge presents such a position.  
The hesitation to conduct impersonal exchange, and the self-reliant withdrawal from 
the market, appear to have evolved as a logical and practical response to the 
transaction costs of risk in the absence of protection by reliable formal institutions. 
Whilst this appears to support the idea of institutions affecting the relationship 
between the causes of and expected responses to transaction costs – relying on 
informal agreements, lending and dispute resolution to enable firms to respond – the 
substitution of informal for weak formal institutions was not found to be 
straightforward. P5 did not know how closely his words echoed those of North 
(1994a), as he presented his opinion that either formal or informal sanctions would 
be ineffective in the absence of the other, as formal rules needed informal acceptance 
and informal sanctions needed to be backed up by formal rules. Trust is not 
sufficiently widespread in this research context to act as a direct substitute for weak 
formal governance, as had been suggested by Poppo and Zenger (2002), and 
informal institutions are filling only some of the gaps left by absent formal 
institutions (Li et al., 2008b). More resilient informal institutions could address more 
of these gaps, or alternatively, stronger formal institutions that help to protect 
transactors from opportunism could act as a functional substitute for trust 
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(Granovetter, 1985) and so facilitate the integration into the supplier network of 
firms currently outside it. 
6.5 Summary 
The thematic analysis has identified they key features of the environment and the 
effects they have on firms, which are summarised in Table 2 below. This shows the 
constraint imposed on firms by the high transaction costs of opportunism and 
bounded rationality, answering the first research question. It shows isolation as a 
common response to high transaction costs in the second research question, with 
little trading, cooperation or specialisation. The table also shows weak institutions 
failing to reduce transaction costs and constraining firms’ responses to them. 
Although this highlights problems with individual features of the trading 
environment, recommendations for their improvement would be better made on the 
basis of a consideration of the interactions between the features of the environment 
as a whole. After the next stage of the analysis has further investigated any 
relationship between institutions and isolation, Chapter 9 will make such 
recommendations. 
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Table 2 Summary of interview findings 
Feature Effect 
  
Transaction costs Raise the cost of protecting firms 
Bounded rationality Information asymmetry in purchasing 
Opportunism Fear of it prevents impersonal trade 





Transactions Number minimised, governance more relational than contract or 
market 
Organisation structure Unitary, little cooperation 
Specialisation Rare. Largely due to fear of opportunism, some due to lack of 
resources 
Isolation Due to opportunism, prevents wider or impersonal trade and 
specialisation 
  
Formal institutions Ineffective, do not reduce transaction costs 
Local government Offers no help, little hindrance 
Funding From informal sources and retained profits 
Legal No reliance on protection 
  
Informal institutions Important now but difficult to scale up 
Trust Vital, but confined. Only interpersonal, not impersonal 
Kinship and networks Source of trust/ protection, and a constraint. Exclusivity 
Sanctions Absent 
 
In sum, the apparent effect of high transaction costs and weak institutions, is to 
maintain or contribute to the constraint of personal exchange. This will be expressed 
as: 
High transaction costs and weak institutions  isolation 
This expression will be used in Chapter 8, as an ideal type configuration against 
which to compare the results of the fsQCA analysis. 
The effect of institutions in limiting the range of responses available to firms shows 
that institutions should be incorporated into transaction cost theory, before it can be 
considered to apply fully in this emerging market context. Furthermore, a more 
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detailed analysis is required to explore any interactions between transaction costs, 
responses and institutions. The fsQCA analysis in Chapter 7 will help to unravel the 
causal complexity to identify whether such causal patterns are present, and which 
particular conditions appear to be associated. This will contribute to our 
conceptualisation of how these factors work together as a system, to better identify 
where the problem lies that we seek to address. 
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CHAPTER 7 fsQCA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
The previous chapter presented a thematic analysis of the interview data, and 
identified the need for a more sophisticated analysis to interpret the complex 
causation inherent in answering the third research question. This chapter will begin 
by describing how the interview data were reduced to six fuzzy sets representing five 
causal conditions and the outcome condition, and how they were scored for all 13 
cases. It will then describe the analysis in fsQCA of this fuzzy set data, with the aim 
of making the analytical process transparent and offering a rationale for decisions 
made (Rihoux and Ragin, 2009). To perform an fsQCA analysis, the same series of 
steps must be repeated in parallel for both the presence of the outcome (being 
isolation in this study) and for the absence of the outcome (integration into the 
market), to allow for causal asymmetry. These steps are illustrated in Table 3 below, 
and reference is made to the section of this chapter in which the step is described. 
Table 3 Procedural steps for an fsQCA analysis 
For the presence of the outcome:  For the absence of the outcome 
Test for necessary conditions  
(section 7.2.1.1) 
 Test for necessary conditions  
(section 7.2.1.2) 
Construct a truth table (section 7.2.2.1)  Construct a truth table (section 7.2.2.2) 
Analyse the truth table (section 7.2.3.1)  Analyse the truth table (section 7.2.3.2) 
 
This chapter will close with a presentation of the findings of this analysis, which will 
be discussed in Chapter 8. 
7.1 Data reduction 
This section explains and illustrates how the interview data were converted into 
fuzzy set scores, and then further reduced for upload into the fsQCA software. 
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7.1.1 Transformation from field notes to fuzzy sets 
As described in Chapter 5, the interview data were summarised into a Framework 
grid containing all the participants’ responses to all the questions asked, linked back 
to the literature, and offering clear visibility of all the data. This visibility was 
important during the transformation of this data from field notes to fuzzy sets, for 
checking the consistency of responses when a similar issue was raised in different 
sections of the interview guide, or for cross-referencing responses. 
The first pass of coding served first to group together interview questions addressing 
similar topics from different authors’ viewpoints, or questions where responses had 
little detail for some cases. Rihoux and Ragin anticipate this: “The nature of the 
evidence is not [always] identical across cases” (2009: 90). As was discussed in 
Chapter 5, the author ensured uniformity of scoring for each set by specifying 
qualitative anchors with reference to the literature, setting them to contain only 
relevant variation, and then adding further incremental scores to reflect the degrees 
of quantitative variation present in the case data (Ragin, 2000, Ragin, 2008b). This 
procedure was applied systematically to all the sets in turn. 
As an example of the coding process, the set of case firms with an awareness of 
opportunist behaviour in the research environment (set code TOL1, for Transaction 
costs, Opportunism, topic L, sequence 1 – which is included in the list of fuzzy set 
codes in Appendix 1) was coded as shown in Table 4 below. This uses a five-value 
scale incorporating two breakpoints derived from the literature, and three incremental 
points from participants’ responses and additional observations by the author.  
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Table 4 Calibration of the fuzzy set for firms that are aware of opportunism 
Value Criterion  Implication for set membership 
0.00 Participant reports that there is no opportunism of 
any kind. 
 The firm is not a member of the 
set. 
0.25 Occurs only in exceptional cases by few actors, or a 
limited number of types are reported. 
 Weak membership, firm is more 
out of the set than in it. 
0.50 Participant reports that there is no opportunism of 
any kind, but their observed actions demonstrate 
that there is. 
 Point of maximum ambiguity, 
firm can not be said to be in the 
set or out of it. 
0.75 Opportunism by multiple actors occurs in the normal 
course of events, it is considered to be usual. 
 Strong membership, firm is more 
in the set than out of it. 
1.00 Many types of opportunism, by many or almost all 
actors, occur frequently. 
 Full membership of the set. 
 
The cases are not only scored relative to each other for their awareness of 
opportunism, but also within the calibrated bounds of 1 and 0. This makes it possible 
to distinguish which cases (if any) are in the set that are aware of frequent 
opportunism (scoring 1), and which are outside it, being qualitatively different in 
their denial of the presence of opportunism in the research site (scoring 0), without 
having to derive these positions relative to a sample-specific measure of central 
tendency such as the mean of a sample (Ragin, 2008b). This process of calibration 
directly connects the empirical findings to the theory even in the absence of a 
measurable variable, as the concept of opportunism can be used to define a target set 
(cases with awareness of opportunism), which is then calibrated for varying degrees 
of membership, and each case is finally given a membership score within the set. In 
the paragraphs that follow, detailed examples are given of how indicative sample 
questions were scored, to make the coding process transparent to the reader (Haege, 
2007). 
The upper bound (1) was set where participants identified multiple types of 
opportunist behaviour, with examples drawn from Williamson (1975) and 
Schauwecker and Kühlmann (2007), and the lower bound (0) was set where these 
types of behaviour were said to be absent. Further, local examples of opportunist 
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behaviour given by P4, such as over-charging or selling poor-quality goods, were 
also incorporated into the scale in an attempt to “operationalise theoretical concepts 
in a way that enhances the dialogue between ideas and evidence” (Ragin, 2000: 162). 
The crossover point (0.5) indicates an ambiguous response, which can neither be said 
to be in the set nor out of it. This was used to describe P10, who said that there was 
no ex post opportunism by customers (which could take the form of them leaving the 
guesthouse without paying their bill), but was one of only two guesthouses to charge 
in advance. The other, P7, explained that this was done to avoid non-payment. In this 
case the author has used triangulation between the data collection methods of 
interviewing and observation, and between participants, to modify the initial scoring 
of the participant’s verbal response.  
There was sufficient theoretically relevant detail in the responses to add two further 
increments on the scale, enabling a more finely-grained quantitative distinction in the 
degrees of set membership. A score of 0.75 shows awareness of opportunism as a 
common occurrence, but with less frequency than was described by participants 
scoring 1 – making them strong but not full members of the set. In the scores shown 
in Table 5 below, P7 and P14 scored 0.75 for citing Williamson’s (1975) behavioural 
examples of false promises made and omission or distortion of information, but 
excluding deliberate lying which would be unacceptable in the context of village life. 
The author also used this score to include participants whose descriptions restricted 
the frequency of opportunism in terms of perpetrators rather than behaviours. P1 and 
P11 both distinguished between types of people who would or would not be expected 
to behave opportunistically; in the case of P11, this distinction was drawn along 
rural/ urban lines. Set membership of 0.25 was given to participants demonstrating 
an awareness of opportunism in principle, but with limited ability to identify types or 
perpetrators in practice – making them weak members of the set, but not non-
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members. For example, P3 and P6 identified distortion of information as a form of 
opportunism, but had never experienced lying or false promises. In contrast, P5 and 
P13 were unable to specify types of opportunist behaviour, but identified market 
traders as a subset of people who might act opportunistically. 
Table 5 Fuzzy set score for interviewees’ awareness of opportunism 
Case Score 
P1  0.75 
P2  0.00 
P3  0.25 
P4  1.00 
P5  0.25 
P6  0.25 
P7  0.75 
P10  0.50 
P11  0.75 
P12  0.00 
P13  0.25 
P14  0.75 
P16  0.00 
 
A similar procedure was followed for all the remaining 81 sets (see Appendix 1 for a 
complete list), with the number of values in the scale of set membership determined 
by the amount of detail and variation in the responses. In all cases, a score of 1 
showed perception of high transaction costs or weak institutions that might be 
associated with the outcome of isolation, and 0 showed low transaction costs or 
strong institutions that might be associated with integration into the market (or the 
absence of the outcome of isolation). 
In some instances, a four-value scale without a mid-point is appropriate (Ragin, 
2005b). For example, in the questions for sets TOL3, 4 and 5, which asked whether 
an interviewee had experienced opportunism by customers (Buckley and Chapman, 
1998a), competitors (Schauwecker and Kühlmann, 2007) or suppliers under small-
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numbers conditions (Provan, 1993, Williamson, 1985), there were no ambiguous 
responses, and so no need for a score of 0.5. A four-value scale was therefore used, 
with the scores evenly spaced at 0 (never experienced), 0.33 (exceptional, only 
experienced once), 0.67 (experienced occasionally) and 1 (experienced frequently). 
There are also circumstances when uneven spacing of scores is applicable (Rihoux 
and Ragin, 2009). Question TOL7 asked whether interviewees felt able to judge the 
likelihood of a person’s being an opportunist (Douma and Schreuder, 2008). The 
responses could populate four values with a mid-point, namely 0 (easy to judge, no 
transaction cost implication), 0.5 (not relevant, follows denial that there is any 
opportunism), 0.75 (possible, but transaction costs are incurred in making or acting 
on the judgment), 1 (impossible, so isolation results). As there were no responses that 
would fit a weak membership score of 0.25, it was omitted from the scale for this 
question.  
7.1.2 Reduction of fuzzy sets to fsQCA conditions 
As stated in the Chapter 5, the data collection exercise was intended to capture a high 
volume of detailed material, to provide a solid background to the study as well as to 
provide the raw input to the fuzzy set coding. The 82 fuzzy sets that were coded from 
the field interview data gave a very rich summary of the interview findings, but 
required further reduction prior to analysis in fsQCA. It also mentioned that the 
literature offers guidance as to the number of cases (participating firms) and 
conditions (scored attributes describing the cases) that fsQCA can manage, and the 
ratios of cases to conditions that are expected to give reliable solutions.  
The number of cases in the study is 13, which conforms with the recommendations 
for the small-N studies for which the qualitative comparative method is intended: 
ranging from 2 to 15 (Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009), 4 to 30 (Ragin, 2000), or 5 to 50 
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(Marx, 2006). The cases are few enough in number that the author has been able to 
become familiar with each one, and yet they incorporate both positive and negative 
outcomes (Berg-Schlosser and de Meur, 2009). 
The conditions analysed in fsQCA must include one, and only one, outcome 
condition. This was derived as a higher-order construct from the four sets numbered 
23D*, concerning relationships and isolation. These were reduced to a single 
construct using Ragin’s (2000) method of compensation, which takes the mean of the 
scores for each case to enable a strong performance in one set to make up for weaker 
performances in others. The author considered this to be the most effective way to 
climb the ladder of abstraction (Sartori, 1984), as it retains more variation than the 
alternatives of substitution (which would take each case’s highest score from the four 
sets) or the weakest link (which takes the lowest score). For example, the 
compensation approach allowed P13’s strong performance in customer relationships 
and personal exchange to make up for a weaker score in horizontal cooperation, and 
it distinguished between P6 and P14 who share the same maximum and minimum 
scores. This is very similar to Peng and Luo’s (2000) averaging of survey responses 
concerning strength of participants’ ties with customers, suppliers and competitors to 
create a composite measure for interfirm ties. As a further example of the strength of 
this approach, cases P2, P12 and P16 all scored 0 for awareness of opportunism in 
Table 5. But by incorporating P12’s high scores for sets TOL9, 11 and 12, this case’s 
overall score for perceived risk of opportunism just crosses the midpoint with 0.52. 
So the method has been sensitive to the discrepancy in the responses to multiple 
questions on a related subject – the interviewee said there was no opportunism, but 
perceived a risk of impersonal exchange from which the only protection was to 
confine oneself to personal trading. 
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The most general guidance from the methodological literature is that the total 
number of conditions (including the outcome and the causal conditions) should be 
fewer than the number of cases. If there are as many conditions as cases, the problem 
of uniqueness makes it likely that each case will comprise a unique combination of 
conditions, and be impossible to generalise from (Marx, 2006); this would limit the 
fsQCA output to a description of all the cases, rather than a reduced solution. Marx 
(2006) further discusses a reported possibility that fsQCA could fail to distinguish 
between real and random data, with the user then in danger of accepting a random 
and therefore unreliable model. His experiment is based on the idea that fsQCA 
would have failed to make this distinction if it generated a valid (contradiction-free) 
model from random data; it would have made the distinction if it did not produce a 
valid model (i.e. many contradictions remained) from random data. He argues that 
the ratio of cases to conditions determines this ability to distinguish real from random 
data, on the basis of uniqueness – if there are so many conditions that the cases are 
unique combinations, then they cannot be reduced, no contradictions can emerge, 
and fsQCA is bound to find a contradiction-free model. So the aim is to provide data 
that offers the scope for reduction and for contradictions, and then to generate a valid 
model from it. He calculates “safe” proportions of cases to conditions where there is 
little or no risk of fsQCA generating a model from random data, and so considers 
these to produce robust models. 
A “perspectives approach” was taken to selecting a smaller number of conditions, 
drawing on theoretical perspectives in the literature to enable the analysis “to 
adjudicate between competing explanations and to allow for ‘interaction effects’ 
among certain conditions” (Berg-Schlosser and de Meur, 2009: 26). These 
perspectives included the recognised causes of transaction costs that might contribute 
to the outcome, and the institutions that might mediate between the costs and the 
outcome. The author then used an iterative approach (as recommended by Marx, 
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2006) to determining the optimum balance between the reduced complexity 
obtainable by using fewer conditions, and the greater richness of retaining more 
conditions. This would balance the proportions proposed by Marx (2006) with the 
presence of contradictions in the truth table. 
In the first iteration, the maximum possible of 12 conditions was tested to allow for 
the most interaction and competition between explanations, whilst still being smaller 
than the number of cases. The 11 causal conditions were the transaction cost drivers 
of specificity/ frequency, uncertainty, bounded rationality and opportunism; the 
formal institutions of finance, government and legal system; and the informal 
institutions of trust, kinship, guanxi and sanctions.  
The first of these causal conditions was a higher-order construct, composed of the 
conditions for specificity and frequency which the author wished to treat as 
substitutable transaction characteristics, calculated with a Boolean ‘OR’ (Ragin, 
2000). The other conditions were reduced using the compensation method again, 
which had the advantage of creating a continuous range of scores that were more 
nuanced than would have resulted from applying ‘AND’ or ‘OR’ across the board, 
which would flatten the results. For example, in the questions that relate to 
opportunism, P7 and P13 would be scored the same (because both include one or 
more 0 and 1 scores), where the average scores (see Table 6) put them almost at 
opposite ends of the scale.  At this time, the scores for opportunism were also 
adjusted upwards by one increment (Ragin, 2000) to reflect the author’s concern that 
the calibration had been affected by the participants’ consistent understatement of the 
issue. Early responses denying opportunism later displayed a tension with the 
discovery that these individuals traded only with known suppliers – implying that 
they did in fact perceive the risk of opportunism, but were confident that they had 
addressed this risk. The adjustment meant that nine participants scored over 0.5 for 
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opportunism compared to only four before, showing that the five changed scores had 
been near misses. 
Chapter 6 mentioned that there were incomplete data for the questions concerning 
local government. The compensation approach was modified here to allow for 
missing values, by calculating the mean for each case based on the number of 
responses received rather than questions asked. 
It was expected that this test of 12 conditions would inflate the problem of limited 
diversity, which “refers to that situation that not all theoretically possible 
combinations are represented through empirical cases” (Wagemann and Schneider, 
2007: 15). The number of possible combinations is 2k, where k is the number of 
conditions; 212 equals 4,096 combinations, and so only a fraction of these could have 
empirical cases. Furthermore, fsQCA’s resulting truth table and complex solution 
were composed of unsimplified descriptions of the 13 unique case configurations. 
Having established that the 12-condition test was over-complex, in the next iteration 
the author attempted to over-simplify, thus defining the bounds between which the 
best solution must sit. The author chose to use only five conditions, because Marx’s 
(2006) calculations show this ratio of conditions to cases would entail only a minimal 
risk of an unreliable result from fsQCA. The condition for sanctions was discarded, 
as it showed insufficient variation in the truth table to contribute to the analysis 
(Rihoux and Ragin, 2009) and had shown a poor fit with the interview findings. 
Specificity/ frequency was also discarded, on the basis that this part of the theory was 
the least-good fit with the context as discussed in Chapter 6. Higher-order constructs 
were created with the compensation method for formal institutions and for the 
remaining informal institutions, with the exception of set ITN1 whose minimal 
variation also suggested a limited applicability of the literature to the cases. A 
compound set for “transaction costs of incomplete information” was created from the 
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sets for bounded rationality and uncertainty, linking the risks of information 
asymmetry and an environment that cannot be fully understood or controlled. This 
was an experimental compromise to reduce the number of conditions, and not one 
that the author felt was truly justified by the literature.  
This yielded five conditions for the test, the outcome and the four causes of 
opportunism, incomplete information, informal institutions, and formal institutions. 
The solution was technically acceptable, having few logical remainders or 
configurations without cases, and two contradictions. However, the author suspected 
this to be unnecessarily parsimonious, and so attempted a final test without the 
compound set for bounded rationality and uncertainty. 
The final test, then, used six conditions: the outcome and five causes of opportunism, 
bounded rationality, uncertainty, informal institutions and formal institutions. 
According to Marx’s (2006) calculations, this would have an acceptably low risk of 
unreliable results. Furthermore, the resulting truth table included a contradiction, 
showing that the solution was in fact robust. 
This section closes with a presentation of the final scores to be analysed in fsQCA. 
They are presented in Table 6 below, and the analytical process and findings are 
discussed in the next section. 
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Table 6 Fuzzy set data for analysis in fsQCA 
Case  oisolated topportunism tuncertainty tboundedrat iinformal iformal 
P1 0.25 0.58 1.00 0.25 0.39 0.27 
P2 0.83 0.39 0.67 0.75 0.82 0.81 
P3 0.92 0.75 0.33 0.75 0.90 0.90 
P4 0.17 0.57 1.00 0.62 0.26 0.62 
P5 0.33 0.36 1.00 0.33 0.21 0.32 
P6 0.42 0.54 0.33 0.71 0.62 0.55 
P7 0.69 0.87 1.00 0.67 0.69 0.75 
P10 0.58 0.60 0.33 0.46 0.58 0.54 
P11 0.75 0.79 0.00 0.75 0.64 0.69 
P12 0.83 0.52 0.00 0.67 0.88 0.45 
P13 0.33 0.32 0.33 0.67 0.44 0.43 
P14 0.58 0.65 0.33 0.62 0.53 0.63 
P16 0.52 0.23 0.33 0.33 0.68 0.43 
 
7.2 Analysis of the fuzzy set data 
The conditions to be examined in the analysis are: 
TOPPORTUNISM high transaction costs of opportunism 
TBOUNDEDRAT high transaction costs of bounded rationality 
TUNCERTAINTY high transaction costs of uncertainty 
IINFORMAL  constraint of weak informal institutions 
IFORMAL  constraint of weak formal institutions 
OISOLATED  outcome of isolation 
The standard notation for qualitative comparative analysis is used. Upper case 
indicates the presence of a condition, and lower case indicates the absence of a 
condition. The symbols used are: 
 *   Boolean ‘AND’ 
 +   Boolean ‘OR’ 
   indicates association between condition and outcome 
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7.2.1 Necessary conditions 
As this procedure precedes the truth table analysis, the test for necessary conditions 
is presented here. However, the results will not be drawn upon until the section 
presenting the solutions proposed by fsQCA. 
7.2.1.1 Conditions necessary for the presence of the outcome 
A broad indication of necessity is given by the shape of XY plots, showing each 
causal condition in turn plotted against the outcome. Figure 8 below shows the causal 
condition IINFORMAL plotting largely on or below the diagonal, approximating to 
the lower-triangular plot that would indicate a necessary condition for the outcome. 
The argument of causal necessity is supported when the outcome is a subset of the 
cause, that is, where outcome scores are consistently less than or equal to the scores 
on the cause.  
 
Figure 8 XY plot of IINFORMAL against OISOLATED 
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The plots for IFORMAL, TOPPORTUNISM and TBOUNDEDRAT both had a less 
defined shape on both sides of the diagonal, and TUNCERTAINTY was randomly 
dispersed – suggesting that none of these three conditions on its own is either 
necessary or sufficient for the outcome. 
The fsQCA calculations for necessity offer more detail than the XY plots. 
Anticipating that empirical data will not fit the subset relation for every case, this 
measures the degree of fit by adjusting for the number of cases that do not fit, and the 
distance by which they do not fit (applying less weight to near misses); Ragin 
(2008b) explains the derivation of the formula used, which is similar to the formula 
for sufficiency that was presented in Chapter 5. In Table 7 below, condition 
IINFORMAL (marked in bold) has a high consistency score, supporting the 
argument of necessity, and this is backed up by a fairly high coverage score showing 
its empirical relevance. The author has defined this “high score” using the procedures 
recommended for testing the consistency scores for sufficient conditions (see section 
7.2.2.1) in the absence of more specific guidance in the literature, using a natural 
break in the consistency values4.  
The scores for IFORMAL, TBOUNDEDRAT and TOPPORTUNISM are less 
definitive, whilst TUNCERTAINTY with its random XY plot behaves differently to 
all the other conditions: its absence scores more highly than its presence, in a test of 
necessity for the presence of the outcome. This suggests that the final fsQCA 
solutions might invert TUNCERTAINTY, but not the other conditions; and therefore 
                                               
4 In contrast, Schneider et al. (2010: 254) set their threshold at 0.9 on the grounds of 
“conventionality”, even though this resulted in their highest score falling below the threshold by a 
margin of just 0.01 despite a gap to the next score of 0.08, apparently ignoring the patterns in the 
actual scores. 
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that the anticipated link between uncertainty and isolation may be reconsidered 
because case firms have a broader range of responses to it. 
Table 7 Calculation of consistency and coverage for necessary conditions 
Conditions tested:      Consistency Coverage 
IINFORMAL 0.956944 0.901832 
IFORMAL 0.913889 0.890392 
TBOUNDEDRAT 0.897222 0.852243 
TOPPORTUNISM 0.830556 0.834031 
tuncertainty 0.697222 0.789308 
topportunism 0.618056 0.763293 
iformal 0.590278 0.757576 
tboundedrat 0.586111 0.778598 
TUNCERTAINTY 0.566667 0.614458 
iinformal 0.519444 0.697761 
 
7.2.1.2 Conditions necessary for a non-outcome 
The results of the test of necessity for a non-outcome show a similar pattern to the 
test for the outcome reported above. The absence of IINFORMAL, IFORMAL, 
TBOUNDEDRAT and TOPPORTUNISM are associated with the absence of the 
outcome, although the consistency scores are lower (IINFORMAL has the highest 
consistency score of just 0.87069, coverage 0.942164). TUNCERTAINTY is again 
with the exception: its presence has a higher score for consistency with a non-
outcome (0.768965) than its absence (0.558621). 
The results of the tests for necessity do not form part of the truth table procedure, but 
will be incorporated into the presentation of the fsQCA solutions in section 7.3. 
7.2.2 Construction of the truth table  
Truth tables are used to evaluate the argument of causal sufficiency, based on the 
strength of the subset relationship where membership scores in the causal conditions 
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are consistently less than or equal to the scores on the outcome. fsQCA generates a 
truth table from the fuzzy set data, with its rows representing causal configurations, 
and the 1/ 0 values in the cells indicating the individual conditions for which the 
cases have strong fuzzy set membership scores. 
This section presents the two fsQCA truth tables, and explains the decisions made by 
the author in their construction. For both tables, the frequency benchmark for 
identifying empirically relevant causal configurations was set to one case with strong 
membership in the configuration. This is appropriate given the number of cases in 
this study (Rihoux and Ragin, 2009), and a higher benchmark would fail to include 
the recommended minimum proportion of 75% of cases (Ragin, 2006) because most 
rows contained just one case. 
7.2.2.1 Truth table for the presence of the outcome 
The 13 cases produced a ten-row truth table, with one row including four cases, and 
leaving 22 configurations as logical remainders. The author set the threshold value 
for consistency with the argument of sufficiency to 0.97, resulting in six rows being 
coded as 1 for the outcome OISOLATED. This decision follows best practice in that 
the chosen value is both substantially higher than the recommended threshold of 
0.75-0.85, and is set to coincide with a natural step in the consistency scores (Ragin, 
2005b), as shown in Table 8 below: 
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Table 8 Truth table for presence of the outcome 
Case topportunism tuncertainty tboundedrat iinformal iformal oisolated consist 
P10 1 0 0 1 1 1 1.000000 
P12 1 0 1 1 0 1 0.989831 
P16 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.981949 
P7 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.975343 





1 0 1 1 1 1 0.971292 
P13 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.912214 
P4 1 1 1 0 1 0 0.877676 
P1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0.829851 
P5 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.800000 
 
This truth table contains one contradiction (Ragin, 1987), suggesting that the data has 
an appropriate ratio of cases to conditions to enable fsQCA to generate a valid model 
(Marx, 2006). The multi-case row describes the configuration of conditions for cases 
P3, P6, P11 and P14, all of which show the outcome except for P6 in which the 
outcome is absent – meaning that this case is not isolated. There are no rows with 
fuzzy set contradictions, that is, cases with the outcome but with a low consistency 
score. 
Various options were considered for addressing this contradiction (Rihoux and 
Ragin, 2009) prior to the analysis of the truth table: 
• Adding conditions was rejected, as this would harm the ratio of cases to 
conditions, and necessitate a return to the field; 
• Removing the contradictory case from the analysis was rejected because this 
would close off a route for exploration of the diversity of cases, in the interests of 
clean data; 
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• Examining the outcome scores did not explain the contradiction as a near miss, as 
P6’s score of 0.42 was substantially further from the mid-point than P16 at 0.52, 
and equidistant with P10 and P14 at 0.58; 
• Recoding all cases on the row to 0 was considered unreasonable as two of these 
cases had a very strong outcome score (P3 = 0.92, P11 = 0.75), and this would 
also move the threshold value away from the natural break; 
• A reexamination of the field notes offered an explanation for the contradiction, 
but not a solution. All four cases experience similar conditions, and three respond 
by operating in relative isolation, so a reason was sought as to what made P6 
respond differently. P6 and P14 are the best-matched cases for comparison, in 
terms of their scale of operations. In a detailed comparison between P6 and P14 
for the elements contributing to the outcome score, it emerged that both had a 
similar disinclination to engage in impersonal trade, and both had comparable 
trading relationships – although P6 had stronger customer relationships due to 
strong links with international tour operators, while P14 had more diverse 
supplier relationships which were facilitated by the travel involved in his 
secondary occupation. The key difference lay in their involvement with 
horizontal cooperation: P14 does not engage in any form of cooperation, whereas 
P6 cooperates closely with P4 and loosely with P5. A difference in their trust of 
remote partners (Zhou and Poppo, 2008) explains their opposite outcome scores, 
and appears to confirm that P6 is a real negative case – having the relevant causes 
but not the outcome (Ragin, 2000) – rather than a measurement error. 
• The author therefore considered the best option to be a frequency-based coding 
of the row, where all four cases were coded to 1, in accordance with the outcome 
displayed by three of the four cases. Amenta et al. (2005) used a frequency basis 
of more than half of the cases in the row. The validity of the author’s decision is 
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supported by the row having a high consistency score, which would have been 
lowered if P6 had been a remote outlier. To the contrary, it is a reasonable fit 
with the configuration of causes scoring less than the outcome. 
The decisions regarding the frequency benchmark, the consistency threshold and the 
contradiction were subsequently reviewed in a series of sensitivity tests, as reported 
in paragraph 7.2.4. Whilst the discussion above considers case P6 as a truth table 
contradiction to be addressed, Chapter 8 will explore this case more fully. 
7.2.2.2 Truth table for a non-outcome 
This again had ten rows, with the four contradictory cases achieving the lowest 
consistency score out of all the rows: this row would of necessity fall below the 
consistency cutoff, and so the contradiction had no bearing on the further analysis of 
the truth table. A natural gap in the consistency scores suggested a cutoff at 0.98 
leaving four rows to be coded as 1, being consistent with sufficiency for a non-
outcome. This truth table is presented in Table 9 below:  
Table 9 Truth table for absence of the outcome 
Case topportunism tuncertainty tboundedrat iinformal iformal ~oisolated consist 
P5 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.991304 
P1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0.991045 
P4 1 1 1 0 1 1 0.990826 
P13 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.988550 
P16 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.895307 
P12 1 0 1 1 0 0 0.833898 
P2 0 1 1 1 1 0 0.818452 
P10 1 0 0 1 1 0 0.813380 





1 0 1 1 1 0 0.622010 
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7.2.3 Analysis of the truth table 
The analysis involves a series of minimisations: from the truth table to the complex 
solution using matched cases, from the complex solution to the intermediate solution 
using simplifying assumptions that involve easy counterfactuals (Ragin, 2008b), and 
from the intermediate solution to the parsimonious solution using simplifying 
assumptions with hard counterfactuals. 
7.2.3.1 Analysis for the presence of the outcome 
The complex solution has four terms: 
(1) TOPPORTUNISM*tuncertainty* IINFORMAL* TBOUNDEDRAT + 
(2) TOPPORTUNISM*tuncertainty*IINFORMAL*IFORMAL + 
(3) TBOUNDEDRAT*TUNCERTAINTY* IINFORMAL*IFORMAL + 
(4) topportunism*tuncertainty*tboundedrat*IINFORMAL*iformal 
 OISOLATED 
The first term corresponds to the truth table row for P12 and to the row for P3, P6, 
P11 and P14. These are matched cases, whose configurations differ only on the 
condition IFORMAL, which is absent for P12 but present for the other cases. The 
common outcome of these cases demonstrates that the presence or absence of 
IFORMAL is not causally important, so can be eliminated to reduce two truth table 
rows into one solution term. 
In a similar manner, condition TBOUNDEDRAT has been eliminated from the row 
for P10 where it was absent, and from P3, P6, P11 and P14 where it was present, to 
arrive at the second term. TOPPORTUNISM has been eliminated from P2 where it 
was absent, and P7 where it was present, to give the third term. The fourth term is an 
unsimplified reproduction of the row for P16, which could not be matched with any 
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other cases. We now explain the use of simplifying assumptions and logical 
remainders in detail, to make this very transparent to the reader (Wagemann and 
Schneider, 2007). 
To reduce the complex solution to a series of intermediate solutions, the following 
simplifying assumptions were proposed by the author. They were considered to 
include easy counterfactuals due to their consistency with theoretical knowledge 
linking their presence with transaction costs (see Chapter 2), with the empirical 
data’s demonstration of their effect in the research context, and with the author’s 
extension of theory from transaction costs to isolation: 
1. The presence of TOPPORTUNISM should contribute to the outcome; 
2. The presence of TBOUNDEDRAT should contribute to the outcome. 
No assumptions were made regarding TUNCERTAINTY due the implication from 
the majority of positive cases (those displaying the outcome), from the necessity test 
and from the intermediate solutions tested, that it may be inversely related to the 
outcome. No assumption was made for a combination of TOPPORTUNISM and 
TBOUNDEDRAT because such combinations are the subject of this study, rather 
than the theoretical foundation upon which it is based. Nor were assumptions made 
for IINFORMAL or IFORMAL, because these are hypothesised by the author to 
have a moderating effect on the relationship between transaction costs and the 
outcome, rather than having a theoretically established expectation that they will 
contribute to the outcome. 
Both assumptions were worked through in turn to examine whether the 
counterfactuals employed by fsQCA would be acceptable to the author. The 
intermediate solution yielded by the first simplifying assumption – the presence of 
TOPPORTUNISM – is: 
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Note that the first term of the intermediate solution contains both the first and the 
second terms of the complex solution. 
The author has aligned the terms of the intermediate and complex solutions in Table 
10 below, highlighted (in bold font) which conditions are eliminated from the 
complex solution, and identified the counterfactual configurations that have been 
used. This was done to illustrate the derivation of this intermediate solution, and to 
enable an assessment of the plausibility of the counterfactuals used. 
Table 10 Derivation of the intermediate solution where TOPPORTUNISM 
is assumed to contribute to the outcome 
Complex  
solution 

















































The fourth term is a clear example of the use of a counterfactual configuration. In 
order to eliminate the absence of opportunism from this term, the configuration 
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‘TOPPORTUNISM*tuncertainty*tboundedrat*IINFORMAL*iformal’ must be used. 
This configuration is a logical remainder and so can be exercised as a counterfactual 
to make a matched case, with the assumption that if there were such an empirical 
case (with TOPPORTUNISM present), it would display the outcome. In this way the 
configuration leads to the outcome whether opportunism is present or absent, and so 
it is eliminated from the term in the intermediate solution. 
The third term has not been simplified, because TOPPORTUNISM had already been 
eliminated during the derivation of the complex solution from the truth table. 
The first term eliminates TBOUNDEDRAT, using the counterfactual configuration 
‘TOPPORTUNISM*tuncertainty*tboundedrat*IINFORMAL’ – which is in 
keeping with the simplifying assumption that TOPPORTUNISM is present. The 
logical remainder exercised is 
‘TOPPORTUNISM*tuncertainty*tboundedrat*IINFORMAL*iformal’, which 
implies an assumption that the presence or absence of IFORMAL can be associated 
with the outcome, because P10 has the configuration 
‘TOPPORTUNISM*tuncertainty*tboundedrat*IINFORMAL*IFORMAL’. 
The author is prepared to accept this assumption, because IFORMAL was 
demonstrated to have no effect on the outcome during the derivation of the first term 
of the complex solution from the truth table, and the interview data showed formal 
institutions to constrain the participating firms less strongly than did informal 
institutions. Kogut et al. (2004) discuss their own decisions to exclude or retain 
simplifying assumptions, based on theory and their empirical knowledge. 
A similar procedure has been carried out on the second term. IFORMAL is 
eliminated using the counterfactual configuration 
‘TOPPORTUNISM*tuncertainty*IINFORMAL*iformal’.  
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It uses the logical remainder 
‘TOPPORTUNISM*tuncertainty*tboundedrat*IINFORMAL*iformal’, implying that 
the presence or absence of TBOUNDEDRAT can be associated with the outcome, 
because P12 has the configuration 
‘TOPPORTUNISM*tuncertainty*TBOUNDEDRAT*IINFORMAL*iformal’. 
Again, the author is prepared to accept this assumption, because TBOUNDEDRAT 
was earlier eliminated to derive the complex solution. 
In a test of the second simplifying assumption, that the presence of 
TBOUNDEDRAT should contribute to the outcome, less reduction is possible. The 
resulting intermediate solution is: 
(1) TOPPORTUNISM*tuncertainty*TBOUNDEDRAT*IINFORMAL + 
(2) tuncertainty*TBOUNDEDRAT*IINFORMAL*iformal+  




The first two terms, marked in italics, are prime implicants (PIs). PIs are logically 
equivalent options for the minimisation of the truth table, and user intervention is 
required to select the implicant(s) most consistent with theoretical and substantive 
knowledge (Ragin, 2006). In this case, there are two PIs, relevant to the second and 
sixth rows of the truth table in Table 8. The user may choose either or both of the 
PIs, leaving a solution of four or five terms. The relative merits of the PIs are not 
evaluated here, because they will not appear in the final solution.  
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The simplifying assumption cannot be used to reduce the third term, because 
TBOUNDEDRAT was eliminated from this term during the derivation of the 
complex solution. 
The fourth term has TBOUNDEDRAT present, so this cannot be simplified in 
keeping with the simplifying assumption.  
TBOUNDEDRAT has been eliminated from the fifth term, using the counterfactual 
‘topportunism*tuncertainty*TBOUNDEDRAT*IINFORMAL*iformal’.  
This is the only counterfactual used, and it contains no assumptions about conditions 
other than TBOUNDEDRAT. As the presence of TBOUNDEDRAT was proposed 
by the author as an acceptable assumption, there are no further judgments to be made 
regarding the acceptability of the result. 
The limited power of reduction of the second intermediate assumption, and an 
assessment of the scores for consistency and coverage, resulted in the first 
intermediate solution being selected as the final solution for a present outcome. 
Table 11 below presents the coverage and consistency scores, for each of the 
solutions under consideration. In terms of solution consistency which is the strength 
of the subset relation indicating sufficiency, followed by solution coverage which is 
the empirical importance of this relation (Ragin, 2008b), the first intermediate 
solution is the strongest, closely followed by the complex and the second 
intermediate solution, regardless of which PIs were chosen.  
This tabulation also shows the first intermediate solution to be strongest at the level 
of individual terms, because the terms have been simplified. For example, where the 
first and second terms of the complex solution have been amalgamated to form the 
first term of the first intermediate solution, the consistency of the argument becomes 




Sacha Rawlence  228 
 
stronger, and both the raw and unique coverage scores are higher because the term 
includes more cases. 
The second intermediate solution is further considered to be weaker than the first, 
because four of its five terms have a consistency score lower than the lowest term-
level consistency score in the first solution (0.97254). In conclusion, the first 
intermediate solution is chosen because it has stronger explanatory power, and its 
simplifying assumptions are justified in the literature. 
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Complex 0.851389 0.959311 TOPPORTUNISM*tuncertainty*TBOUNDEDRAT*IINFORMAL+ 0.573611 0.009722 0.971765 
   TOPPORTUNISM*tuncertainty*IINFORMAL*IFORMAL+ 0.575000 0.011111 0.971831 
   TUNCERTAINTY*TBOUNDEDRAT*IINFORMAL*IFORMAL+ 0.547222 0.225000 0.977668 
   topportunism*tuncertainty*tboundedrat*IINFORMAL*iformal 0.377778 0.026389 0.981949 






0.856944 0.959565 TOPPORTUNISM*tuncertainty*IINFORMAL+ 0.590278 0.179167 0.972540 
   tuncertainty*tboundedrat*IINFORMAL*iformal+ 0.394444 0.026389 0.982699 
   TUNCERTAINTY*TBOUNDEDRAT*IINFORMAL*IFORMAL 0.547222 0.225000 0.977668 






topportunism*tuncertainty*IINFORMAL*iformal+ 0.416667 0.026389 0.940439 
 TOPPORTUNISM*tuncertainty*IINFORMAL*IFORMAL+ 0.575000 0.011111 0.971831 
 
















TUNCERTAINTY*TBOUNDEDRAT*IINFORMAL*IFORMAL+ 0.547222 0.225000 0.977668 
   tuncertainty*TBOUNDEDRAT*IINFORMAL*iformal+ 0.425000 0.004167 0.956250 
   TOPPORTUNISM*tuncertainty*TBOUNDEDRAT*IINFORMAL 0.573611 0.000000 0.971765 
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The parsimonious solution, in which fsQCA exercises any necessary assumptions 
and hard counterfactuals without any intervention by the user, is: 
 IINFORMAL 
  OISOLATED 
– meaning that a high score for informal institutions would be considered to be 
sufficient for the outcome. 
This simplification from the first intermediate solution uses hard counterfactuals and 
assumptions that the author rejects. These assumptions are presented as two rounds 
of eliminations in Table 12 below:  
Table 12 Derivation of the parsimonious solution for the presence of the 
outcome 




















































In the first round of eliminations, TOPPORTUNISM is eliminated from the first term 
by using the simplifying assumption that if opportunism were absent, the outcome 
would be unchanged. This contradicts the author’s simplifying assumption of 
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opportunism being present, which was an easy counterfactual, and so cannot be 
accepted. 
The second and third terms require the elimination of both the presence and the 
absence of IFORMAL, but without the support of matched cases. This effectively 
assumes that formal institutions have no impact on the outcome regardless of the 
other conditions, but this is not evident in the literature and so would constitute a 
hard counterfactual: this is also rejected. Note the distinction between this and the 
acceptable elimination, which was performed during the derivation of the complex 
solution that was based on matched cases. 
The second round of eliminations assumes both the presence and absence of 
TBOUNDEDRAT from the second and third terms, which again are not matched. 
The presence of TBOUNDEDRAT was considered as an easy counterfactual in the 
derivation of the intermediate solution, and so this assumption of its absence cannot 
be accepted. 
The final stage reduces two matched terms, ‘tuncertainty*IINFORMAL’ and 
‘TUNCERTAINTY*IINFORMAL’. In this case the presence and absence of 
uncertainty, in combination with IINFORMAL, is associated with the outcome, and 
so uncertainty can safely be eliminated. 
Because the parsimonious solution requires three sets of assumptions that the author 
does not accept, the intermediate solution is selected in preference to the 
parsimonious solution. Furthermore, the parsimonious solution has a much lower 
consistency score (0.901832) than all the other solutions, making it a less powerful 
solution despite having higher coverage (0.956944). The reader should note that this 
is a rejection of the parsimonious solution on methodological grounds, but that the 
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importance of informal institutions (as a necessary condition and in the intermediate 
solution) is a key finding of this study. 
7.2.3.2 Analysis for a non-outcome 






The first term is a reduction of the truth table rows for cases P1 and P5, which are 
matched for all conditions except TOPPORTUNISM, which can therefore be 
eliminated. The second and third terms are the complete truth table records for cases 
P13 and P4 respectively, which could not be matched with other cases. 
A series of simplifying assumptions were tested for the non-outcome. These were 
informed both by theoretical knowledge, and by the substantive knowledge gained 
from the tests for the presence of the outcome. They comprised the absence of 
TOPPORTUNISM, TBOUNDEDRAT and IINFORMAL, and the presence of 
TUNCERTAINTY, contributing to a non-outcome. However, the intermediate 
solutions were rejected for three reasons: 
1. Whilst assumptions could reasonably be made regarding the relationship between 
transaction cost drivers and the outcome based on the literature, this is less easy 
to justify for the non-outcome. The literature does not anticipate the outcome of 
an absence of transaction cost drivers. 
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2. The non-outcome describes a much broader range of behaviours (including 
specialisation or integration in response to low transaction costs, and 
internalisation or cooperation with high transaction costs) than the outcome of 
isolation, so it is harder to make assumptions about individual causes of these 
types of behaviour. 
3. Very little simplification was achieved by the assumptions tested: none was able 
to reduce the number of terms, and only a very few conditions were removed 
from individual terms. 
In sum, the assumptions could not be strongly justified, and there would further have 
been very little gain in terms of minimisation. As a numeric illustration, see the 
assessment of scores in Table 13 below: the first intermediate solution with 
TOPPORTUNISM absent has slightly higher scores for solution coverage and 
consistency than all the other solutions, but lower term-level scores than the second 
and third intermediate solutions. This is not considered to be sufficiently strong 
statistical support to overturn the author’s rejection of the simplifying assumptions, 
and so the complex solution is the preferred solution. 
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0.818965 0.993724 TUNCERTAINTY*tboundedrat*iinformal*iformal+ 0.648276    0.122414 0.992084 
   topportunism*tuncertainty*TBOUNDEDRAT*iinformal*iformal+ 0.446552 0.120690 0.988550 
   TOPPORTUNISM*TUNCERTAINTY*TBOUNDEDRAT*iinformal*IFORMAL 0.558621 0.043103 0.990826 






0.827586 0.993789 TUNCERTAINTY*tboundedrat*iinformal*iformal+ 0.648276 0.122414 0.992084 
   TUNCERTAINTY*TBOUNDEDRAT*iinformal*IFORMAL+ 0.584483 0.051724 0.991228 
   topportunism*tuncertainty*TBOUNDEDRAT*iinformal*iformal 0.446552 0.120690 0.988550 








TOPPORTUNISM*TUNCERTAINTY*iinformal+ 0.622414 0.043103 0.991758 
   TUNCERTAINTY*tboundedrat*iinformal*iformal+ 0.648276 0.058621 0.992084 
   topportunism*tuncertainty*TBOUNDEDRAT*iinformal*iformal 0.446552 0.120690 0.988550 






0.818965 0.993724 topportunism*iinformal*iformal+ 0.717241 0.120690 0.992840 
   TUNCERTAINTY*tboundedrat*iinformal*iformal+ 0.648276 0.037931 0.992084 
   TOPPORTUNISM*TUNCERTAINTY*TBOUNDEDRAT*iinformal*IFORMAL 0.558621 0.043103 0.990826 
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The parsimonious solution was: 
 iinformal 
  oisolated 
This is the inverse of the solution for the presence of the outcome, and is derived by 
means of simplifying assumptions that are rejected for the same reasons. The author 
rejects the parsimonious solution for the non-outcome because it relies on assuming 
the presence and absence of IFORMAL, TBOUNDEDRAT and TOPPORTUNISM 
for non-matched cases. Furthermore, the parsimonious solution has a much lower 
consistency score (0.942164) than all the other solutions, making it a less powerful 
solution despite having higher coverage (0.87069). 
7.2.4 Sensitivity testing 
The decisions made during data analysis have been presented, and justifications 
offered, in the preceding sections of this chapter. In the following section, they will 
be subjected to sensitivity tests with the intention of further demonstrating their 
validity.  These tests do not address simplifying assumptions: although the findings 
are sensitive to the assumptions adopted, they were tested during the iterations of the 
main analysis, and only justifiable assumptions were accepted. 
7.2.4.1 Frequency benchmark in the truth tables 
In both of the truth tables there were ten rows containing cases, nine rows with one 
case each, and one row with four cases. In order to set a more stringent benchmark 
than the frequency of one case that was used in the main body of the analysis, it 
would be necessary to raise the threshold so that only the single row of four cases 
was included. 
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In the table for the presence of the outcome, this would leave one row representing 
one causal configuration, and only 31% (4/13) of the cases. Although it would be 
feasible to analyse this table, the empirical support it would offer to the conclusions 
would be unacceptably weak. The recommended minimum coverage of cases is 75% 
(Ragin, 2006), and the main analysis was far stronger with 100%. 
If this test were applied to the truth table for the absence of the outcome, the same 
31% of cases would be included. However, because they occupy the contradictory 
row with three of the four cases having the outcome, the analysis for a non-outcome 
could not proceed. 
7.2.4.2 Contradictory configuration in the truth tables 
The most practical alternative for addressing the contradiction that was not pursued 
in the main analysis, was to recode all of the cases on the contradictory row to 0. 
Rihoux and Ragin (2009) cite Nomiya’s (2001, material in Japanese) testing of a 
truth table, with contradictory rows coded first as 1, and then again as 0. When the 
current author performed this test in a separate iteration of the present analysis, by 
raising the consistency cutoff from 0.971 to 0.973 to exclude this row, the result was 
weaker: 
• The cutoff point had moved from a natural break in the consistency scores, to an 
arbitrary point between two values. Only five rows with five configurations and 
38% (5/13) of the cases remain to be analysed, instead of six rows representing 
69% (9/13). 
• The resulting solutions could not be minimised as effectively as in the main 
analysis. The complex solution contained four rows – the same number as in the 
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main analysis, but with more conditions. Its consistency was slightly higher at 
0.968978, but the coverage was markedly lower at 0.7375. 
• The minimisation of the parsimonious solution was unsatisfactory, still 
containing three terms after the selection of one out of two PIs. Here again, 
consistency was a little stronger than in the main analysis at 0.911565, but with 
much lower coverage of 0.744444. 
• The substance of the parsimonious solution was also inconclusive, with 
TOPPORTUNISM being eliminated altogether, and TUNCERTAINTY being 
both present and absent (or just present, depending on the PI chosen). 
The author has interpreted these weaker solutions as supporting the original decision 
to code the contradictory row to 1 in the truth table where the outcome is present. 
In the truth table for a non-outcome, the contradictory row was originally coded as 0, 
and so was already excluded from the sufficiency analysis and had no impact on the 
results. There were no instances of fuzzy set contradictions, and so no need to apply 
sensitivity tests to their resolution. 
7.2.4.3 Threshold value for consistency 
The aim here will be to test whether changing the consistency threshold from that 
used in the main analysis can effectively simplify the resulting solutions or increase 
the scores for consistency or coverage. 
The truth table for a positive outcome originally had six rows coded to 1. The 
preceding paragraph concerning contradictory rows has already explored the effect 
of raising the threshold value, and found the results to be less strong than the original 
analysis. The remaining test, therefore, is to lower the threshold. 
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By lowering the threshold from 0.97 to 0.91, case P13 can also be included. 
Although this has the advantage of now including 77% (10/13) of the cases, this 
comes at the cost of ignoring the natural step in the consistency values, and of 
including a contradiction. P13, and all cases further down the truth table, do not 
display the outcome in their fuzzy set scores; when their outcome is coded as 1 in the 
truth table despite their low consistency scores, they become fuzzy set contradictions. 
The recommended action for this type of contradiction is to recode the outcome to 
zero (Rihoux and Ragin, 2009), which would effectively cancel this test, so it will be 
run with the aim of simply showing it to be weaker than the original analysis. 
The parsimonious solution has two terms compared to the original single-term 
solution, due to the need for a PI to include case P13, and has a dangerously low 
consistency score of 0.816918 – a score of 0.75 could not support any argument of 
sufficiency (Ragin, 2008b). The complex solution is one term longer than the 
original, with a substantially lower consistency score of 0.925982 and an unchanged 
coverage score. The consistency scores have been lowered by the inclusion of P13 in 
a test of conditions sufficient for an outcome that it does not display, and this is also 
reflected in the term-level score. 
The non-outcome truth table originally had four cases coded to 1. By increasing the 
threshold from 0.98 to 0.99, P13 is excluded. The three remaining cases naturally 
give a much reduced complex coverage score of only 0.698276, offering only very 
weak empirical support to the causal argument despite the consistency being 
unchanged. 
If instead the threshold is lowered to include P16 as the fifth case, the same problem 
arises of creating contradictions. This requires a PI to derive a two-term 
parsimonious solution with a low consistency score of 0.881188; the complex 
solution has a weaker consistency score than the original at 0.944762. 
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All of the results of this test are taken to confirm that the consistency thresholds were 
set at appropriate levels in the main analysis. 
7.2.4.4 Tests for necessary conditions 
Although the solutions generated by the sufficiency tests are not sensitive to the 
necessity tests that preceded them, they do support the conclusions that were drawn 
regarding necessity. The respective presence and absence of the condition 
IINFORMAL was found to be necessary for the presence and the absence of the 
outcome, and this is borne out by its appearance in all of the terms of the chosen 
solutions. 
In contrast, IFORMAL had a more marginal result for necessity. It appears as both 
present and absent within each solution, showing that the decision not to consider it 
to be necessary was correct. TUNCERTAINTY is also shown not to be necessary, 
but its inversion in the majority of the solution terms supports the suggestion that it 
behaves differently to the other conditions. 
7.3 Findings from the data analysis 
The final solutions reached as a result of the fsQCA analysis are restated below. 
7.3.1 Solution for the presence of the outcome 
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The cases represented by the first term of this solution are P3, P6, P10, P11, P12 and 
P14; this includes the negative case P6, which shares the causal configuration but not 
the outcome. The second term represents only case P16, and the third term represents 
cases P2 and P7. The remaining cases are covered by the solution for a non-outcome. 
The presentation may be simplified without changing the substance of the solution, 






This simplified presentation highlights the presence of the necessary condition 
IINFORMAL in every term of the solution, but also shows that this condition alone 
is not sufficient for the outcome. This means that all of the cases that are isolated are 
also constrained by weak informal institutions, in combination with high or low 
transaction costs and weak or strong formal institutions.   
The solution’s causal statement is plotted against the outcome in Figure 9 below. 
Quadrant 1 contains the cases that display the outcome and the causal configuration 
contained in the solution, whilst Quadrant 2 contains cases with neither the outcome 
nor the cause. Quadrant 3 highlights the exception to this pattern, P6, which will be 
examined further in Chapter 8, as will the plot as a whole. 








































Figure 9 Plot of fsQCA scores for the presence of the outcome  
(Source: author) 
The solution has scope for logical simplification, by eliminating elements that are 
logically redundant (Ragin, 2000). As the third and fourth terms contain the same 
combination of conditions but with opposite signs, they effectively cancel each other 
out. If IINFORMAL in combination with either the presence or the absence of 
‘TUNCERTAINTY*TBOUNDEDRAT*IFORMAL’ leads to the outcome, then the 
latter combination has no effect on the outcome, which can be caused by 
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Now the containment rule can be applied to achieve further logical simplification. 
The cases described by the second term are also described by the first term: the first 
term contains the second term, making the second term redundant. The simplest 
possible solution would therefore be: 
IINFORMAL 
 OISOLATED 
This elimination of logically redundant terms has produced the same solution as 
fsQCA’s parsimonious solution, which was rejected by the author because of the 
hard counterfactuals it incorporated. The same counterfactuals are implicitly drawn 
upon to transform IINFORMAL from a condition that was originally shown to be 
necessary but not sufficient for the outcome, into a condition that is both necessary 
and sufficient in its own right. This solution is therefore unacceptable, as well as 
placing excessive emphasis on parsimony above complexity (Ragin, 2008b), giving a 
less complete account of the cases with the outcome. Because this solution has 
eliminated some terms to increase its parsimony, it has at the same time lost some of 
the richness or complexity that will drive the subsequent discussion. The author 
therefore chooses not to proceed with this logical simplification, but instead to retain 
the simplified presentation of the solution for further discussion. 
7.3.2 Solution for the absence of the outcome 









Sacha Rawlence  243 
 
The cases represented by the first term of this solution are P1 and P5, the second 
term is P13, and the third term is P4. 






Once again, this shows that absence of condition IINFORMAL is necessary but not 
sufficient for the non-outcome. The cases that are not isolated do not feel constrained 
by weak informal institutions, but this always occurs in combination with high or 
low transaction costs and strong or weak formal institutions. No logical 
simplification of this solution is possible. 
This solution is plotted against the non-outcome in Figure 10 below. This follows the 
same pattern as the plot for the outcome, grouping together the cases without the 
outcome in Quadrant 1, the cases with the outcome in Quadrant 2, and the negative 
case in Quadrant 3. This plot will be discussed further in Chapter 8. 















































Figure 10 Plot of fsQCA scores for the absence of the outcome 
(Source: author) 
Two different solutions have been derived for the presence and the absence of the 
outcome, demonstrating causal asymmetry in that one is not simply the inverse of the 
other. The terms they contain are different, as some are conducive to the outcome 
whilst others impede it, but they produce consistent results: the scores calculated for 
each case plot somewhere in the same quadrant regardless of the solution used. 
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Juxtaposition of the solutions 













As a broad generalisation, cases are isolated when they experience both high 
transaction costs and weak informal institutions, the exception being P16 (in the third 
term of the solution, or third row of the truth table in Table 8) who experiences weak 
informal institutions and isolation in spite of low transaction costs. Cases are 
generally not isolated when their high transaction costs are accompanied by strong 
informal institutions. This is illustrated at case-level in the truth table in Table 8, 
where the fourth row (case P7) and the eighth row (P4) differ only on informal 
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CHAPTER 8 DISCUSSION 
Chapter 6 discussed the findings for each interview theme in the light of the 
literature, addressing the two gaps that had been identified (namely isolation as a 
response to transaction costs, and the empirical study of informal institutions in the 
Chinese context) and answering the first two research questions (opportunism, 
bounded rationality and uncertainty as the principal causes of transaction costs 
perceived by the participants, and a common response of isolation). It also offered a 
preliminary answer to the third research question: that weak formal institutions 
prevented the predicted responses of contracts, internalisation and cooperation, and 
the nature of informal institutions also constrained cooperation, so firms avoided 
transactions to reduce behavioural transaction costs. The chapter concluded with the 
proposition that high transaction costs and weak institutions were associated with the 
outcome of isolation.  
Chapter 7 described the reduction of the interview data and how they were analysed 
in fsQCA, finishing with the solution statements for the presence and absence of the 
outcome of isolation. This chapter now discusses these findings with reference to the 
literature, the participating firms and an ideal type configuration to answer the third 
research question: Can an understanding of local institutions help us to understand 
the firms’ response to transaction costs, if it differs to that expected by theory? In the 
light of the findings reported so far, we can reshape the question: Why is it that some 
of the participants respond to transaction costs by structuring their businesses in an 
economically sub-optimal way? They could perform better, and contribute more to 
local economic development, if they responded by cooperating, leading to wider and 
then impersonal trading, enabling them to specialise. Which features of the 
institutional context intervene between the perception of transaction costs and the 
response to it, and how do they operate to constrain firms’ choice of responses? 
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8.1 Discussion of the truth table data 
We first discuss what can be learnt from the preliminary analysis of the truth tables, 
before addressing the solution statements. The aim here is to review the behaviour of 
causal factors, and to seek insights from patterns across cases (Daniels and Cannice, 
2004). Extracts of the truth tables, which were presented in full in Chapter 7, are 
given in Table 14 and Table 16 below for the reader’s convenience; Table 15 
illustrates the ideal type configuration, where high transaction costs and weak 
institutions are associated with the outcome of isolation. 
Table 14 Truth table extract for rows associated with presence of the outcome 
Case topportunism tuncertainty tboundedrat iinformal iformal oisolated 
P10 1 0 0 1 1 1 
P12 1 0 1 1 0 1 
P16 0 0 0 1 0 1 
P7 1 1 1 1 1 1 





1 0 1 1 1 1 
 
Table 15 Ideal type configuration for the presence of the outcome 
Case topportunism tuncertainty tboundedrat iinformal iformal oisolated 
Ideal type 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
Table 16 Truth table extract for rows associated with absence of the outcome  
Case topportunism tuncertainty tboundedrat iinformal iformal ~oisolated 
P5 0 1 0 0 0 1 
P1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
P4 1 1 1 0 1 1 
P13 0 0 1 0 0 1 
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Reading down the columns of these tables, it is clear that condition IINFORMAL 
(weakness of informal institutions) always scores 1 when the outcome OISOLATED 
is 1, and 0 when the outcome is 0. This characteristic is not shared by any of the 
other conditions, all of which may score 1 or 0 for cases with either outcome. This 
means that all nine cases that share strong membership of the set of isolated firms 
(Table 14) also share strong membership of the set of firms perceiving weak informal 
institutions (scoring 1), and the four cases that are not isolated (Table 16) share the 
common feature of strong informal institutions (scoring 0). This relationship between 
IINFORMAL and the outcome illustrates the key finding of the tests for necessary 
conditions reported in Chapter 7. These tests yielded a high score (0.96) to support 
the argument that weak informal institutions were a necessary condition for isolation, 
and that strong informal institutions were necessary to avoid isolation. The high 
scores in the tests proposing this relationship are confirmed by the positive 
relationship between IINFORMAL and OISOLATED in the case-level data: all of 
the isolated cases had weak informal institutions, and all non-isolated cases had 
strong informal institutions.  
The other interesting finding of the test for necessity was the behaviour of condition 
TUNCERTAINTY, representing high transaction costs related to an uncertain 
environment, which was also the only condition to show random dispersal in the XY 
plot against isolation. The conditions IFORMAL (weak formal institutions), 
TBOUNDEDRAT (transaction costs of bounded rationality) and TOPPORTUNISM 
(transaction costs of opportunism) all scored between 0.83 and 0.91 for consistency 
with the argument of necessity, and seven out of the nine cases with the outcome in 
Table 14 score 1 for each of these conditions; the remaining two cases show that the 
consistency scores give weaker support to this argument than they do for 
IINFORMAL. In contrast, the absence of uncertainty scored more highly (0.70) in 
the test of necessity for isolation, than its presence (0.57), although both scores were 
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lower than those for the other conditions. In the truth tables, the behaviour of 
TUNCERTAINTY is less consistent, where its impact on the outcome is considered 
in combination with other factors. Its absence is associated with the outcome more 
often than its presence, where seven of the nine isolated cases score 0 for uncertainty, 
and its presence is associated with the non-outcome in three out of four cases. 
Although Chapter 6 found that participants’ response to the individual factor of 
uncertainty was not the avoidance of trading, it appears that this response may be less 
consistent when considered together with other factors. 
8.1.1 Comparison to an ideal type configuration 
Reading along the rows, the cases can readily be compared to the ideal type 
configuration. P7 conforms exactly to the ideal type, being a strong member of all 
the sets for high transaction costs, weak institutions and the outcome of isolation. 
The next best fit to the ideal type with strong membership of four out of the five 
causal conditions are the group of P3-P6-P11-P14 (which includes the negative case 
P6, marked in italics in Table 14) who also reported weakness in both types of 
institutions, and perceived two out of three types of transaction costs (opportunism 
and bounded rationality), and similarly P2 (with uncertainty and bounded rationality, 
but not opportunism). A moderate fit with the ideal type, agreeing on three out of the 
five conditions, is shown by P12 who perceived the same types of transaction costs 
as the group of P3-P6-P11-P14, but differed in reporting strong formal institutions, 
and P10 who perceived weakness in both types of institutions but only opportunism 
as a cause of transaction costs, not uncertainty or bounded rationality. P16 shows a 
very poor fit with the ideal type, agreeing only on the necessary condition of weak 
informal institutions, and perceiving low transaction costs and strong formal 
institutions. The sharpest contrast between isolated firms is between P16, which does 
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not match the ideal type, and P7, which matches exactly: the only causal factor they 
have in common is weak informal institutions. 
An ideal type has been proposed for the outcome of isolation but not for the absence 
of the outcome, because (as explained in Chapter 5) causal symmetry is not assumed. 
However, it may be noted that amongst the cases without the outcome, P4 in fact 
makes a very good fit with the ideal type as it has strong membership of all 
conditions except for strong informal institutions – making this case the exact 
opposite configuration to P16. P5 and P13 are near opposites of the ideal type, 
reporting strong institutions and having strong membership only of uncertainty and 
of bounded rationality respectively, whereas P1 has both opportunism and 
uncertainty. P13 had reported confidence in legal protection against opportunism and 
in impersonal trading, contributing to his avoidance of the outcome of isolation. 
The truth table row for the group of P3-P6-P11-P14 demonstrates clustering of cases 
on the causal configuration with transaction costs of opportunism and bounded 
rationality, weak informal and formal institutions, and isolation. The number of 
cases, and the high scores for consistency (above the threshold value) and raw 
coverage reported in Chapter 7, show this configuration to be empirically important. 
Its proximity to the ideal type thus lends it support, particularly as the cluster differs 
from the ideal type only on the transaction cost of uncertainty, which was found to 
behave differently from the other transaction costs in the test for necessity.  
The cluster illustrates a pattern of causal factors that often coincide, and in three out 
of four cases the pattern is associated with the outcome of isolation. The consistency 
score for all four cases was reported earlier as 0.97; if we recalculate this to exclude 
the negative case P6, the score for the group P3-P11-P14 rises to 1.00, giving the 
strongest possible support for the argument of sufficiency for the outcome of 
isolation. As the consistency score including P6 was above the threshold value for 




Sacha Rawlence  252 
 
sufficiency, it can be seen that the inclusion of P6 has not materially weakened the 
argument of sufficiency, so the configuration remains important. 
8.1.2 Exploring key differences 
Following the exploratory study, the author had considered isolation to be a possible 
response to high transaction costs. However, the analysis of the truth tables has 
shown that high transaction costs alone do not explain the outcome of isolation. P7 
and P4 both perceived all three types of transaction costs, but P7 was isolated and P4 
was not. The only difference in causal factors between P7 and P4, who both 
perceived high transaction costs and weak formal institutions but had different 
outcomes, is that P4 reports strong informal institutions in contrast to weakness 
reported by P7. 
Furthermore, if isolation were a response to high transaction costs, and if the 
causation were perfectly symmetrical, we might expect low transaction costs always 
to be associated with the absence of the outcome. However, P16 is isolated despite 
perceiving low transaction costs, demonstrating at least an exception to causal 
symmetry. It appears that his report of weak informal institutions may help to explain 
the unexpected outcome of isolation. 
The apparent interaction between transaction costs and institutions supports the 
author’s inclusion of both high transaction costs and weak institutions as casual 
factors in the ideal type. Whilst Chapter 4 suggested that institutions might be a 
factor influencing the response to transaction costs, and that formal and informal 
institutions have different effects on the level of transaction costs and on firm’s 
responses, there was no suggestion at that stage that one might affect the response 
more strongly than the other. However, it now appears that a contingent factor 
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between the presence or absence of the outcome may be the strength or weakness of 
informal institutions.  
There could also be further causal factors that contribute to the outcome but have not 
been included in the analysis. One suggestion made in the literature regards the 
constraint imposed by firms’ stability or stage in development on their responses to 
transaction costs. Martinez and Dacin (1999) suggest that firms that are doubtful of 
their survival, or are in decline, may prioritise immediate concerns over long-run 
efficiency and so make decisions that appear not to be in their long-run interests. 
This could help to explain the coincidence of high transaction costs and a response of 
isolation in P2 and P3 (where survival is in doubt) and P7, P11 and P12 (who are in 
current or imminent decline). However, there are also stable firms that respond to 
transaction costs with isolation (P10, P14 and P16), so this factor does not offer a 
consistent explanation and is not considered to contribute substantially to the 
findings. 
8.1.3 Responses to combined causal factors 
Here we use the truth tables to explore firms’ responses to combinations of causal 
factors that were discussed in Chapter 2. 
Williamson (1985) expects that bounded rationality in an uncertain environment will 
limit firms’ otherwise possible responses to information asymmetry, and result in the 
increased likelihood of internalisation. This combination is evident in the truth tables, 
but appears not to have a consistent effect on the response of isolation that is under 
current examination. P2 and P7 have the combination and are isolated, whereas P4 
has the combination and is not isolated. P10 and P16 do not perceive either cause, 
and yet they are both isolated. Both outcomes are also observed for participants 
perceiving the combined factors of opportunism and bounded rationality 
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(Williamson, 1985), where P3-P6-P11-P14 and P7 are isolated, but P4 is not; 
opportunism and uncertainty (Artz and Brush, 2000), as P7 is isolated, but P1 and P4 
are not; and opportunism, uncertainty and weak formal institutions (Zhou and Poppo, 
2008), where P7 is isolated, and P4 is not. 
More support is offered for the connection between transaction costs and informal 
institutions, than for simple combinations of transaction costs. In the case of informal 
constraints to reduce opportunism (North, 1990), seven of the nine participants 
reporting weak informal institutions also perceived high transaction costs of 
opportunism, suggesting that the weakness of informal institutions was not helping to 
reduce their perception of opportunism. In contrast, only half of the four participants 
with strong informal institutions perceived opportunism. Regarding the proposal that 
trust might moderate the effect of uncertainty (Madhok, 1995), this also appears to be 
supported: three (P1, P4 and P5) of the four participants reporting strong informal 
institutions (and thus integration rather than isolation) also perceived uncertainty. 
There is not an evident pattern of transaction cost drivers that prompted P1, P4 and 
P16 to specialise, but did not prompt the other participants to do so. All three had 
very different perceptions of transaction costs: P16 perceived none at all, supporting 
the expectation that low transaction costs enable specialisation (Arora et al., 1996), 
and no other participants had such low transaction costs. However, P4 had high costs 
in all three categories, and P1 had two out of three, yet both participants have 
specialised regardless. P7 has the same high costs as P4, but has not specialised. It 
may be that P16’s low transaction costs have enabled him to specialise despite his 
isolation (whose composition reflects a constraint of personal exchange rather than 
limited numbers of suppliers), whilst P1 and P4 have been able to specialise because 
of their integration into the market – and in spite of their high transaction costs.  
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The complexity of these alternative causal paths that can be taken to reach the same 
outcome is better explored through a continued discussion of the fsQCA analysis 
than simply with reference to the truth tables.  
8.2 Discussion of the fsQCA solution statements 
Chapter 7 explained how the solution statements for this study were derived and 
offered arguments to support the decisions and assumptions that were made during 
this process. The purpose of this section is to illustrate the good fit of these decisions 
made with the case observations and the literature, in addition to examining the 
correspondence of the solutions to the ideal type, and answering the third research 
question. The solutions prompt us to ask questions about contrasting cases, offering 
insights into causal processes that may be at work; these are then explored further 
with the aim of deepening our understanding of the participants’ responses. The 
solutions for both the presence and the absence of the outcome are discussed in turn, 
in search of further insights and to further explore the extent to which causal 
symmetry may be present. 
8.2.1 Solution for presence of the outcome 
Chapter 7 presented the derivation in fsQCA of the solution statement for the 
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This solution demonstrates multiple conjunctural causality (Berg-Schlosser et al., 
2009): it comprises three terms joined by ‘OR’ statements, showing multiple 
causality, and each of these terms is comprised of many conditions acting in 
combination joined by ‘AND’ statements, showing conjunctural causality. 
Each of the three terms must be accompanied by IINFORMAL, as indicated by the 
‘AND’ statement in the first line. This identifies IINFORMAL as a necessary 
condition as all solution terms contain it, and also shows that on its own it is not a 
sufficient condition, as it is always combined with other conditions in a solution 
term. This means that weak informal institutions are present for every case whose 
response is isolation, but informal institutions alone cannot account for isolation. 
This is consistent with the findings of Peng and Luo (2000), in whose study informal 
ties between firms in China were found to be necessary to firm performance but not 
sufficient in the absence of firms’ other value-adding activities. It also supports the 
author’s decision to combine transaction costs with institutional theory, as both are 
present in every term of the solution. All three terms of the solution represent causal 
paths that are associated with a single outcome of isolation, demonstrating 
equifinality. 
The interview data had suggested that opportunism was a key contributor to the 
outcome of isolation, and the truth tables showed uncertainty to behave in an 
inconsistent manner as it was associated with both the presence and the absence of 
isolation. Both of these patterns are reflected in the solution for isolation, where 
opportunism is always present (due also to its inclusion in the simplifying 
assumption) and uncertainty may be present or absent. Bounded rationality and 
formal institutions can also be either present or absent, as the interview data 
indicated that both of these conditions were a hindrance to trading for some but not 
all cases. 
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8.2.1.1 Illustrating the steps in the derivation with reference to cases and 
theory 
The first term of this solution represents a cluster of six cases (P3, P6, P10, P11, P12 
and P14). The cases P3, P6, P11 and P14 shared a common configuration in the truth 
table, and were matched with P12 as they had opportunism, bounded rationality, 
weak informal institutions and the absence of uncertainty in common. In this 
configuration, it made no difference to the outcome whether formal institutions were 
weak or strong, which suggests that factors other than the strength of formal 
institutions were important in shaping these firms’ response. Whilst Zhou and Poppo 
(2008) considered weak legal institutions to cause firms to prefer relational to 
contractual governance, here the weakness of formal institutions appears to be less 
important than other factors. 
P10 was matched in a similar manner, having the conditions of opportunism, weak 
formal institutions, weak informal institutions and the absence of uncertainty in 
common with P3, P6, P11 and P14. Here the presence or absence of bounded 
rationality had no effect on the outcome, perhaps being outweighed by the lack of 
protection from opportunism by either formal (North, 1994a) or informal (Poppo and 
Zenger, 2002, Peng, 2004) means.  
P2 and P7 were merged into the third term, sharing uncertainty, bounded rationality, 
and weak formal and informal institutions. Williamson (1985) expects uncertainty 
and bounded rationality together to greatly increase the risk of transactions. This risk, 
combined again with a lack of formal or informal protection, may have been so high 
that the further presence or absence of the additional risk of opportunism made no 
difference to the response.  
Further reduction of the solution resulted from the simplifying assumption that the 
presence of opportunism should contribute to the outcome, by virtue of increasing 
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transaction costs (Williamson, 1975) to which firms might respond by isolation (as 
discussed in Chapter 3). This had the effect of consolidating the configuration for P3, 
P6, P11, P14 and P12 with that for P3, P6, P11, P14 and P10 to complete the first 
term of the solution, by matching counterfactual configurations with P12 and P10. 
These again eliminated bounded rationality and formal institutions, allowing all six 
cases to be grouped together under their common conditions of opportunism, weak 
informal institutions and the absence of uncertainty. The anticipated need for 
informal protection from opportunism (Poppo and Zenger, 2002, Peng, 2004) is thus 
reflected in the final solution, where opportunism accompanied by weak protection 
by informal institutions is associated with isolation. 
The simplifying assumption also applied to P16, whose configuration in the truth 
table included the absence of opportunism. As the assumption had been made that 
the presence of opportunism would be associated with the outcome, this eliminated 
opportunism from the solution term that covers only P16, and which comprises the 
absence of uncertainty and bounded rationality, weak informal institutions and strong 
formal institutions. This case does not fit the author’s expectation of isolation as a 
response to high transaction costs, and so will be discussed further. 
8.2.1.2 Correspondence to ideal type 
The solution term that corresponds most closely to the ideal type configuration, 
sharing four of its five conditions, is the third term. It may be considered to be the 
most important of the terms as it has the highest scores for consistency and for 
unique coverage (Schneider et al., 2010), meaning that it alone is sufficient cause for 
the most cases – with others being explained by more than one term where they 
overlap. This importance, combined with the good fit to the ideal type, supports the 
argument that high transaction costs and weak institutions may be the cause of 
isolation. However, the first term scores more highly for raw coverage, as it covers a 
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much higher proportion of the cases, although part of this coverage overlaps with 
other terms and so is not unique. As the first term has empirical importance, the 
condition on which it diverges from ideal type (namely the absence of uncertainty) is 
also important – but the advantage of reduced uncertainty is outweighed by the 
presence of opportunism and weak informal institutions, and isolation results all the 
same. 
The second term (covering P16) indicates that the ideal type configuration is not the 
only route to the outcome of isolation. It disagrees on three of the four conditions, 
sharing only the necessary condition. So even where isolated cases share the 
necessary condition and the outcome, sufficiency cannot be achieved simply by 
adding the high transaction costs and weak institutions of the ideal type. Even if 
firms are in the strong position of perceiving low transaction costs and strong formal 
institutions, as P16 does, they may still be hindered from integration in to the market 
– and the only remaining causal factor to explain this is informal institutions. This 
suggests that informal institutions may play an even more important role than we had 
previously thought. This raises a question of whether weak informal institutions on 
their own comprise a sufficient handicap to integration, such that they can cause a 
firm to be isolated even in the absence of high transaction costs. Of the other eight 
isolated cases, half have lower fuzzy set scores than P16 for weak informal 
institutions and half have higher scores, so P16’s median score seems unlikely to be a 
sufficient cause in accounting for his unexpected isolation. We conclude, for the time 
being, that P16 constitutes an exceptional case: it combines the necessary condition 
of weak informal institutions with the advantages of low transaction costs and strong 
formal institutions, and has an outcome of isolation. 
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8.2.1.3 XY plot of solutions for the outcome 
The plot of the cases’ fuzzy set scores for the solution statement against their scores 
for the outcome was shown in section 7.3.1 of Chapter 7. These scores were 
calculated from the detailed fuzzy set data that were imported into fsQCA, upon 
which the simplified presentation of the truth table was also based. The quadrants 
marked on the plot indicate the mid-point on the scale from 0 to 1 that divides strong 
from weak fuzzy set membership. Quadrant 1 groups together the eight cases that 
display the outcome and the causal configuration contained in the solution, whilst the 
negative case P6 plots in quadrant 3 because it is present in the causal statement but 
not in the outcome. Quadrant 2 contains the four cases with neither the outcome nor 
the cause, which will be discussed in section 8.2.2. The clustering of most cases into 
quadrants 1 and 2 indicates that the relationship that the author has proposed between 
high transaction costs, weak institutions and a response of isolation, is largely 
supported by the empirical data – excepting the negative case and P16’s exception. 
Whilst the grouping of most cases into quadrants 1 and 2 supports the proposed 
relationship, their distribution within the quadrants also illustrates the deliberate 
oversimplification of the ideal type that would plot in the upper right-hand corner. 
The quadrant 1 cases show variation on both axes, illustrating their relative positions 
in the multi-dimensional vector-space: P3 has the highest score for the solution 
statement and the outcome of isolation, whereas by contrast P10 has a lower causal 
score and a much lower outcome score.  This is a graphical illustration of the two 
cases’ rows on the truth table, where P3 had strong membership in four of the five 
causal conditions, whereas P10 had strong membership in only three.  
P2 and P12 have exactly the same score for the outcome, generated from very 
different causes (they have opposite views on opportunism, uncertainty and formal 
institutions) that have resulted in their being covered by different terms of the 
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solution statement. Equifinality can thus even apply to uniformity in the degree of 
the outcome, not just the causal paths leading to it. In contrast, P3 and P7 have the 
same causal score and coverage by different solution terms, but for P7 this is 
associated with a lower score for the outcome. 
8.2.1.4 P6 as a negative case 
Although we have explained above that P6’s inclusion in the first solution term has 
not materially reduced this term’s importance, understanding what causes P6 to 
behave as an exception to the general pattern is an important question meriting 
further investigation (Öz, 2006). Why, when this firm has all five causal factors in 
common with three other cases in the truth table, four factors in common with the 
ideal type, and is covered by the same solution term as five other cases, does it not 
share their outcome of isolation? The answer may lie in the situational context in 
which P6 is embedded, a feature of which has not been accounted for in the causal 
conditions analysed.  
Chapter 7 confirmed that P6’s outcome score was not marginal, and compared its 
composition to that of P14, identifying P6’s greater inclination for horizontal 
cooperation as the key to her lower outcome score (indicating integration rather than 
isolation). A further difference in the composition (but not the values) of the scores 
was their compensatory scores in trading relationships. Whilst neither case was 
isolated from customers or suppliers, with all scores being less than 0.5, P6 was more 
strongly integrated in customer relationships, whilst P14 was more integrated with 
suppliers.  
Knowledge of P6’s situation helps to explain these differences. Chapter 6 explained 
the significance of relationships with international tour operators, and observed that 
P14’s hosting of tour groups was declining whilst P6 was doing well, particularly in 
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maintaining a good working relationship with TO2. P6 was the only participant to 
mention the importance of good customer service during the data collection 
interviews, which the author considers to be a factor in her popularity with 
international operators who (or whose clients) value this. The relative locations of the 
participating firms are an important consideration in understanding their inclination 
to cooperate. P14 gave no reason for his reluctance to cooperate, but his very close 
proximity to two other guesthouses and easy road access to three more has resulted 
in an environment of fierce competition in which outdoing other firms may come 
more naturally than seeking areas of mutual benefit. In contrast, P6 has a prime 
location on the main tourist path, far enough from neighbouring guesthouses not to 
be in direct competition with them. This explains her willingness to cooperate 
loosely with her neighbour at P5, and closely with P4 who is more distant still. P6 
capitalises even further on her customer and cooperative relationships, by integrating 
her relationships with P4 and TO2 rather than keeping them separate. TO2 is a 
regular client of both P4 and P6, but P4’s location is reached first on TO2’s standard 
itinerary. P6 has chosen to receive TO2’s booking information via P4, meaning that 
TO2’s administrative tasks are effectively halved (potentially increasing goodwill 
towards P6), and P6 benefits from both P4’s and her own good relations with TO2. 
This sheds light on P6’s response: although she perceives opportunism and bounded 
rationality, and her report of weak formal and informal institutions explains her 
reluctance to engage in impersonal exchange, she is still open to trading with known 
suppliers and manages her relationships with customers and peers exceptionally well. 
Whilst this increases our understanding of what caused the contradiction, it has not 
resolved it and so the solution cannot be said to be sufficient for all cases. Ragin 
(1987) suggests that further causes can be added in order to tune the solution more 
finely until it offers a complete explanation for the outcome. The author considers 
the solution to have identified the main pattern explaining participants’ behaviour, 
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and considers the identification and consequent deeper examination of this 
exceptional case to have added to the value of this study – much as Ragin (2000) 
himself intended in his emphasis on seeking diversity rather than homogeneity. For 
this reason, the contradiction has been retained at present, and more detailed study of 
it may drive part of the author’s future research agenda. 
8.2.1.5 Summary  
The solution has offered broad support for the argument that the ideal type 
configuration of high transaction costs and weak institutions leads to the outcome of 
isolation, although an exception is made for the condition of uncertainty that has 
been found to have inconsistent effects. In contrast to Williamson’s (1985) 
expectation, participants in this study did not respond to uncertainty by avoiding 
transactions, although it could be associated with isolation when combined with 
other conditions. The solution further confirms that weak informal institutions are a 
necessary but not sufficient cause for the outcome of isolation. 
8.2.2 Solution for the absence of the outcome 
Whereas a single truth table can display the configurations that are associated with 
both the presence and the absence of the outcome, scores for consistency and 
coverage need to be calculated separately in support of arguments for the outcome 
and for the non-outcome, and separate solution statements derived for the outcome 
and for the non-outcome. The current study is focussed specifically on an outcome of 
isolation as opposed to more traditionally expected outcomes, and so does not 
particularly seek reasons why isolation should not come about. However, exploring 
the non-outcome may offer new insights into the causal patterns. In particular, our 
observation of a potential intervention by informal institutions between transaction 
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costs and responses would be more strongly supported if a similar effect were 
observed for the non-outcome. 
The solution for a non-outcome presented in Chapter 7 was the complex solution 
generated by fsQCA, meaning that there are no simplifying assumptions that require 







This solution again shows multiple conjunctural causation, being composed of three 
terms of four or five conditions each. The cases covered by the first term of this 
solution are P1 and P5 (a matched pair eliminating TOPPORTUNISM), the second 
term is P13, and the third term is P4. Very little simplification has been achieved in 
this solution, with a single cluster generalising between two cases, and the second 
and third terms each describing a case in full. All terms share the necessary condition 
of strong informal institutions, and perceive at least one cause of transaction costs. 
An early suggestion would be that all of these firms perceive at least a low level of 
transaction costs, yet none is isolated; the only condition they all have in common is 
strong informal institutions, which may intervene in avoiding isolation as a response 
to the transaction costs. 
All of the non-isolated cases had low scores for trust, as they suffered less constraint 
than other firms in who to trust, and they used their networks to positive effect. This 
enabled P4 to trade widely and cooperate to overcome high transaction costs as 
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recommended by Rao (2003) and others, resulting in her integration rather than 
isolation despite these perceived costs. In the first term, very high uncertainty has not 
prevented specialisation by P1, perhaps reflecting the benefits of Hu’s (2007) guanxi 
community in contrast to other authors’ fears of constraints. P13 does not specialise 
or cooperate, and yet is integrated into a network of customers and suppliers, whose 
development was presumably supported by the ease with which this participant 
developed personal and impersonal trust (Humphrey and Schmitz, 1998).  
8.2.2.1 Ideal type 
The author has not proposed an ideal type configuration for the absence of the 
outcome, as the theoretical background supports proposing conditions that might lead 
to isolation, and only inverting this (and thus assuming causal symmetry) would offer 
an ideal type for non-outcome with any theoretical support. That being said, we 
earlier identified the second term of the solution for the outcome as the term that 
disagreed with the ideal type for the outcome on three of its four conditions.  
Similarly, the first and second terms of the solution for the non-outcome agree on 
only one condition each – so three of the four cases without the outcome disagree 
with the ideal type for the outcome. Taken together with the high consistency and 
coverage scores for the first term, it therefore appears that there may be a degree of 
symmetry in the empirical data after all. The exception to this is the third term of the 
solution for the non-outcome, which agrees with the ideal type for all conditions 
except informal institutions, and yet does not have an outcome of isolation. As with 
P16, informal institutions are the only factor agreeing to ideal type, further 
suggesting their great importance. 
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8.2.2.2 Comparison between solutions for the presence and absence of the 
outcome 
In the solution for the absence of the outcome, all of the causal conditions (except the 
necessary condition of strong informal institutions) can be either present or absent. 
This does not, however, demonstrate a lack of causal symmetry so much as the 
author’s decision to apply a simplifying assumption only to the solution for the 
outcome, which forced opportunism always to be present. There is, in fact, a degree 
of symmetry within the outcomes, as well as between them. Within the solution for 
the outcome, the second and third terms are symmetrical in all of their sufficient 
conditions; this is also apparent in the second and third terms for the non-outcome, 
although only for three of the four sufficient conditions. Near-symmetry between 
solutions can be seen between the third term for the outcome and the first term for 
the non-outcome, and between the second term for the outcome and the third term for 
the non-outcome – although both of these are exceptions to the general pattern. 
Again this requires us to look more closely at P4: with high transaction costs we 
expect her to be isolated, but her strong informal institutions apparently intervene. 
The cases to which she is most similar (P2 and P7) have the opposite outcome, and 
of the cases to which she is most different (P5, P13 and P16), P16 is exceptional in 
itself, and the remaining two share her outcome but with very different 
configurations. This will be explored further below. 
The symmetry between the third term for the outcome and the first term for the non-
outcome is only disrupted by the failure of TUNCERTAINTY to change its sign. 
This could be taken as further support for our observation of its inconsistent 
behaviour, or else might indicate that high uncertainty can be counteracted by strong 
formal institutions (observed only for P1 and P5) to avoid isolation. 
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The low level of transaction costs in the first and second terms for the non-outcome 
does not explain by itself the covered cases’ ability to avoid isolation. If it did, the 
first and second terms of the solution for the outcome might also have avoided 
isolation. 
Opportunism has been shown to be a particularly prevalent cause of high transaction 
costs in the research context, and the author has earlier combined the literature and 
the interview data to support an expectation (expressed as a simplifying assumption) 
that opportunism would only ever be associated with the outcome of isolation. 
However, the third term of the solution for the non-outcome includes opportunism, 
so it does not always lead to isolation. This term has all three types of transaction 
costs and weak formal institutions, in marked similarity to the third term of the 
solution for the outcome – suggesting once again that the strength or weakness of the 
informal institutions accompanying transaction costs can change the response to high 
transaction costs. 
8.2.2.3 Exploring P4’s response 
We adopt the approach suggested by Berg-Schlosser and de Meur (2009) to pairing 
up cases for closer examination, to help identify decisive conditions and explore how 
their interplay affects the presence or absence of the outcome, both in similar cases 
(most similar causes with different outcomes, or MSDO) and in contrasting cases 
(most different causes with similar outcomes, or MDSO). To identify the pairs, we 
refer to the truth table to review Boolean distance. For MSDO this enables us to 
select P7 in preference to P2, as it has more causal factors in common with P4. 
Similarly, P13 exhibits the most causal differences to P4 for the MDSO comparison. 
In the MSDO comparison, P7 and P4 had strong membership of all the causal 
conditions in the truth table, except for P4’s non-membership for weak informal 
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institutions. They had the same fuzzy set scores for uncertainty (both having grave 
concerns about the dam, and identifying uncertain demand due to the 2008 
Olympics), and very close scores (with a difference of only 0.05) for bounded 
rationality (with P7 perceiving marginally more risk in asymmetry and language). 
They both perceived weakness in formal institutions, with P7 reporting more distrust 
of officials, vulnerability to their unfairness and exposure to impersonal trade in the 
absence of legal protection – with their scores differing by 0.13. A larger difference 
of 0.20 on their perception of opportunism was due to P7’s more frequent experience 
of opportunism by suppliers and his fear of the risk this posed to his firm. The only 
condition that triggered different memberships in the truth table, with a range of 
0.43, was informal institutions. P7 was much less inclined to trust others, limiting 
this to family and long-standing acquaintances, not extending it to new contacts or 
organisations as P4 did, or using small-volume trades to develop trust; he was also 
more constrained to trading and employment within his social network, and lacked 
any political connections. The difference of 0.36 in the outcome scores, which 
resulted in P7’s isolation and P4’s integration, is traced to P7’s much smaller number 
of suppliers, all of whom he knew personally and trusted (in contrast to P4’s 
impersonal trading), and also his declining involvement with tour operators and 
cessation of cross-referring with other guesthouses. P4’s ability to develop new trust 
relationships is thus considered to be key to her different outcome, and confirms the 
importance of informal institutions in overcoming high transaction costs. 
We contrast this with the MDSO comparison. P4 and P13 again had very similar 
scores for bounded rationality and demonstrated similar strengths in informal 
institutions, with P13 having a similar approach to the development of trust and 
occasionally trading outside the network. P13 had more confidence (by 0.19) in 
formal institutions – citing the beneficial effects of local government, reduced tax 
bills, and reliance on legal protection – and less fear of opportunism (by 0.25, 
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occurring less regularly and not preventing impersonal trade), yet they still both 
avoided the outcome of isolation. The large difference (0.77) in uncertainty was due 
to P13’s lack of concern for the uncertain environment, which did not prevent either 
firm from trading. So although P4 and P13 display causal differences, their similarity 
in trust is key to their shared outcome of avoiding isolation. 
8.2.2.4 XY plot of solutions for the non-outcome 
The plot for the non-outcome was shown in section 7.3.2 of Chapter 7. It can be seen 
that P5 and P13 had the same fairly low score for isolation, although P5 reported 
stronger informal institutions than P13. This demonstrates transaction costs and 
institutions working in combination to achieve the outcome, because if strong 
institutions alone explained the outcome, P13 would be more isolated than P5. P13’s 
equal degree of integration is apparently made possible by his lower transaction 
costs, which help to avoid isolation despite the relatively weaker informal 
connections. 
This plot is consistent with the plot for the outcome, in that the same grouping of 
cases into quadrants occurs whichever solution is used to calculate the scores plotted. 
Thus, the interesting observations yielded by the solution for the non-outcome have 
enriched our understanding of the relationship between causal conditions and 
responses, without changing the proposals we have made concerning this 
relationship. We therefore refer only to the solution for the outcome in our further 
discussion, which proceeds with a consideration of interaction between the 
conditions. 
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8.2.3 Discovery of an interaction effect  
The expectation formed during the discussion of the interview findings, and 
presented as an ideal type, was that high transaction costs and weak institutions 
would be associated with the outcome of isolation. However, the fsQCA analysis has 
shown that this is not always the case, and has indicated a further, underlying causal 
mechanism. A condition is said to have a contingent effect if it can be associated 
with the presence and the absence of the outcome, depending on which other 
conditions it is combined with. We see this interaction in the conditions of high 
transaction costs, which are generally associated with an outcome of isolation, but 
may instead lead to integration if they are also combined with strong informal 
institutions. 
This was observed in the truth tables where P7 and P4 both perceived high 
transaction costs and weak formal institutions, but P7 reported weak informal 
institutions and was isolated, whilst P4 reported strong informal institutions and 
avoided isolation. This also contrasts with P16’s low transaction costs combining 
with weak informal institutions to result in isolation. The contingent causal factor 
triggering their different responses to the level of transaction costs is the strength or 
weakness of informal institutions. It is further noted that P16, whose low transaction 
costs originally led us to expect him not to be isolated, were also accompanied by 
strong formal institutions. The implication of this is that the contingent effect of 
weak informal institutions can not only result in isolation despite low transaction 
costs, but can also result in isolation despite strong formal institutions. 
The mechanism by which this interaction effect works was uncovered in the exercise 
of contrasting P4 with P7 and P13. Where P4 and P7 had similar perceptions of 
transaction costs, P4’s readiness to establish new trust relationships enabled her to 
avoid P7’s isolation. P4 perceived higher transaction costs than P13, but shared 
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P13’s outcome of integration as a result of both participants’ willingness to trust. It is 
here that our abductive reasoning has inferred the operation of an underlying causal 
process that was not immediately apparent in the empirical data collected: that 
informal institutions, and specifically the ability to develop new trust relationships, is 
critical to the avoidance of isolation. 
The new insight offered by this inference is that in the presence of high transaction 
costs, the strength or weakness of informal institutions is the critical factor 
determining whether or not firms are able to avoid isolation. Whereas the empirical 
observation of firms’ behaviour had led us to think that institutions had a moderating 
effect on the relationship between transaction costs and isolation, our analysis has 
enabled us to identify the specific effect of an individual institutional factor. We now 
present our full answer to the third research question. 
8.3 Research question 3 
The third research question asked whether an understanding of local institutions 
could help to explain firms’ responses to transaction costs. Chapter 6 concluded with 
a preliminary answer, that weakness of formal institutions prevented the literature’s 
expected responses of contracts, internalisation and cooperation, and the nature of 
informal institutions also hindered cooperation, so firms reduced behavioural 
transaction costs by avoiding transactions and became isolated as a result. 
It made the proposition that high transaction costs and weak institutions were 
associated with isolation, which was examined further in the discussion of the fsQCA 
solutions in this chapter. 
Institutions had first been considered as a factor in shaping firms’ responses to 
transaction costs, when the exploratory study (reported in Chapter 3) suggested that 
they were constraining participants’ ability to cooperate with each other and with 
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tour operators, and increasing their reluctance to trade. The influences included an 
atmosphere of fear preventing open discussion of opposition to the dam, a shortage 
of funding and costs of pollution contributing to competitive pressures, regulations 
limiting foreign ownership and employment practices, purchasing decisions shaped 
by pre-existing trust relationships, and the importance of kinship and social or guanxi 
networks. These factors were subsequently expressed as formal and informal 
institutional constraints on the participants’ responses to transaction costs. 
The interview findings supported this approach of drawing on transaction cost and 
institutional theories, by showing that transaction costs were high and that 
institutions both affected the level of transaction costs and restricted firms’ range of 
options in responding to them. The broad outline of the fsQCA results confirmed that 
high transaction costs were generally associated with a response of isolation, and 
detailed examination of the results indicated more complex patterns of causality – 
combining transaction cost and institutional conditions – than had been apparent 
from the thematic analysis of the interview data.  
The dominant feature of the multiple and conjunctural paths to the outcome of 
isolation was the identification of informal institutions as a necessary condition. This 
highlighted that, where our attention in this study was focussed on trading isolation 
as an outcome, the informal features of the environmental context were more 
formative of firms’ actions than the formal features, which have dominated other 
writers’ discussions of contracting and internalisation as responses. It further 
demonstrated that transaction costs on their own were not a sufficient condition 
leading to isolation: every causal path was composed of the necessary condition of 
informal institutions, supported by a mix of transaction cost and formal institutional 
conditions, which combined to make sufficient terms. 
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A further layer of complexity was added by the contingent nature of causality, in 
which the interaction between transaction costs and the strength or weakness of 
informal institutions affected the outcome. The solution terms identified cases where 
high transaction costs could be associated with outcomes of either isolation or 
integration, depending on whether they were combined respectively with weak or 
strong informal institutions. There were also terms illustrating cases whose lower 
transaction costs could result in the expected integration when accompanied by 
strong informal institutions, or unexpectedly still lead to isolation if informal 
institutions were weak. 
The implications of this are suggested by Peng and Luo’s (2000) proposed 
connection between firms’ competitive performance and their dependence on 
informal connections: whilst all firms can benefit from inter-firm ties, less 
competitive firms may rely on them more heavily than more competitive firms. If 
firms begin from an uncompetitive position and so rely on their informal connections 
to drive performance, but these connections are weak, this will hinder their 
performance (reflected in our outcome of isolation), and fail to contribute to their 
competitive position. Firms with strong informal institutions, in contrast, can draw 
on these to improve their competitive position and degree of integration, becoming 
less dependent on these institutions over time. This illustrates the absolute necessity 
of informal institutions in this research context: they are a first step on the road to 
integration, without which firms will not become more competitive or move from 
isolation to integration. This carries ominous implications for the participant firms 
reporting weak institutions, in particular the less competitive among them, who may 
be more constrained by this weakness than the firms who are already in a more 
competitive position, and so be left behind. This emphasis on the necessity of 
informal institutions, however, did not mean that they alone were sufficient for the 
outcome. As the analysis has shown, the degree of integration associated with strong 
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informal institutions was still moderated by the accompanying level of transaction 
costs. 
Our short answer to the third research question is that local institutions do affect 
firms’ responses to transaction costs, and that informal institutions are a necessary 
but not sufficient condition in deciding between the responses of isolation and 
integration. This is illustrated in Figure 11 below, where the causal paths diverge as 
strong informal institutions allow a response to transaction costs of relational trading, 
and weak institutions prevent this and so lead to isolation. Elaborating upon this adds 
to the second observed gap in the literature, concerning the empirical study of 
informal institutions in China with regard to their constraint on firms’ responses to 
transaction costs. Chapter 6 found trust to be a scarce resource in the research site, 
which was of benefit to firms who were party to trust relationships but was not 
readily extended to other firms. The observation of the current chapter, that trust was 
the mechanism by which the contingent effect of informal institutions operated, 
makes it all the more important that trust should circulate more widely to address the 
present constraints. Some participants’ readiness to enter into new trust relationships 
enabled them to overcome the high transaction costs that more reticent participants 
could not, resulting in their integration despite these transaction costs. Willingness to 
trust could also level the playing field, enabling participants perceiving high or low 
transaction costs to avoid isolation. 
By way of further explanation for Figure 11, it is the third of a sequence of four 
flowcharts. Whereas Flowchart 1 illustrated the theory of causes of and responses to 
transaction costs, and Flowchart 2 added intervening institutional factors and a 
response of isolation (drawing on the exploratory study and the institutional 
literature), this third chart makes further changes to reflect the findings of our 
analysis. Less-important causal factors (specificity, frequency and uncertainty) have 
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been bracketed out, as have the less important institutions (formal and sanctions). 
This focuses our attention on the causal path running from behavioural causes of 
transaction costs, to the deciding factor of informal institutions, and on to an outcome 
of either isolation or integration. 
 








 Intervening factors between 
causes and expected responses 
 Responses  Outcome 
Causes of high transaction costs  
(Research question 1) 
 Institutions  
(Research question 3) 
 Governance structures  
(Research question ) 
 Reduced transaction costs 
promote business dev’t 
       
       
       
       
  (Weakness of formal institutions:)  IF INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS    
  (Funding)  ARE STRONG:  Firm is able to overcome high  
  (Legal)  Relational transactions,   transaction costs and avoid 
  (Regulatory)  cooperation  isolation 
       
       
Behaviour al causes:  Substitution or constraint by      
Bounded rationality  informal institutions     
Opportunism  (2
nd
 gap in literature):     
  Trust     
  Kinship  IF INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS    
(Transaction characteristics:)  Network or guanxi connections  ARE WEAK:  Firm is unable to overcome  
(Specificity)  (Social sanctions)  Isolation   high transaction costs and 
(Frequency)    (1
st
 gap in literature)  becomes isolated. 
      Exchange, specialisation and 
      development are hindered. 
(Uncertain environment)       
       
       
Figure 11 Flowchart 3 – Model of the contingent effect of the strength or weakness of informal institutions on the outcome  
(Source: author) 
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8.4 Conclusion 
Granovetter (1985) anticipated an uneven distribution of trust relationships, 
explaining that this is why opportunism and distrust persist even when transactions 
are embedded in social relations of trust. This embeddedness describes a compromise 
position of personal exchange, when neither generalised morality (in which trust is 
predicated on the assumed absence of opportunism) nor formal institutional 
protection can be relied upon. However, in this study’s research site, the situation is 
less well-developed even than this compromise, as the order-sustaining structure of 
networks of relationships that Granovetter envisages is in fact more a series of dyadic 
trust relationships, in which missing relationships or gaps in the network result in 
isolation. Granovetter’s (ibid.) conceptualisation of a spectrum from generalised 
morality (which does not exist in the field site, as the development of trust is specific 
and very constrained), through personal exchange embedded in social networks 
(which is the closest approximation to the field site) to reliance on institutional 
protection (very limited in the field site), suggests that the situation could be 
improved by increases in the generalisability of trust, or in the reliability of formal 
institutions, or both.  
We can see potential benefits of improvements to both formal and informal 
institutions. The findings of this study did not support the literature’s expectation that 
informal institutions could simply substitute for weak formal institutions: although 
local informal institutions were found to be vital in facilitating trade, they are 
currently not strong enough to make up for the substantial weakness of formal 
institutions. For example, relationships were a complement to rather than a substitute 
for admittedly weak rule-based dispute resolution. Since this meant that the firms 
were heavily reliant on their informal resources, an increase in their capacity to form 
trust relationships could alleviate some of the observed consequences of weak 
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informal institutions and reduce their trading isolation. However, this would not 
address the accompanying problems of weak regulatory enforcement. Informal 
routes around weak formal institutions act as a work-around or a coping mechanism, 
but cannot improve them; informal mechanisms enable transactions to happen at all 
in the absence of formal regulation, but cannot contribute to bringing regulations into 
being. We therefore suggest approaches to improving formal and informal 
institutions in Chapter 9, and suggest that informal improvements may need to 
precede improvements to formal institutions. 
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CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSION 
The aim of this thesis, as stated in Chapter 1, was to explore the applicability of 
transaction cost theory to an emerging market context, complementing it with 
institutional theory to seek a better fit. This aim was to be achieved by answering 
three research questions, which asked which causes of transaction costs were 
perceived by firms, which responses were evident, and whether institutional theory 
could help to explain firms’ responses, if they differed from the predictions of 
transaction cost theory. The observed gaps in the literature concerned isolation as a 
response to transaction costs, and the empirical study of informal institutions in 
China. The author considered this study to be worthwhile because of the increasing 
recognition in the literature that management theories developed in the West often do 
not apply well in emerging markets, and because of the constraint that the observed 
isolation imposed on economic development in these markets.  
This chapter will examine the theoretical contributions made by this study, which lie 
primarily in its recognition of isolation as a response to high transaction costs, and in 
its integration of transaction cost and institutional theories to identify the pivotal role 
of informal institutions in determining whether or not firms would become isolated 
an environment characterised by high transaction costs. The chapter will then make 
recommendations for local practice and broader policy as a means of applying the 
new knowledge gained. It closes with an evaluation of this study, and ideas for future 
research. 
9.1 Theoretical contribution 
This section considers the contribution made by this study, in terms of assessing the 
applicability of transaction cost theory to the research context, and in the increased 
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understanding of firms’ responses that is offered by the integration of transaction 
cost and institutional theories. 
9.1.1 Applicability of transaction cost theory: causes 
The research context was chosen to challenge the applicability of transaction cost 
theory in the light of criticisms that have been made against it. We first consider 
whether the theory’s anticipated causes of transaction costs apply to this context. 
Due to the country’s Confucian tradition, opportunism might not be expected to be a 
high risk in China (Dore, 1983). In fact, this was the most widely-reported cause of 
transaction costs in this study’s research site, with the strongest consequences for 
firms. In this instance, the theoretical expectation of opportunism as a cause of 
transaction costs corresponds very well to the research context, and Dore’s analysis 
is not borne out it this context. In contrast, whereas Dore criticises Williamson for 
taking opportunism and bounded rationality for granted, in this particular context we 
cannot take Confucian values or long-term relationships for granted. Earlier chapters 
have suggested that the Cultural Revolution (Knight, 2001) or intense competition 
during the economic reforms of the 1980s (Li, 2008) may have disrupted these 
traditional patterns of relationships and values. 
The strong presence of opportunism puts us in a position of disagreement with Hill 
(1990), who anticipated that the market would act to remove opportunists through 
loss of reputation, formalised bankruptcy or takeover. In fact the empirical study 
observed the situation described by Ghoshal and Moran (1996), where the market 
creates the need for protection from opportunists, but does not actually provide that 
protection. 
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The presence of opportunism, bounded rationality and uncertainty in China 
corresponds with the expectations of Luo (2007) and Keister (2001). These causes of 
transaction costs are expected to limit small firms’ ability to conduct information 
search and monitoring, and to increase the risks of trading with a small number of 
suppliers (Nooteboom, 1993). The participating firms experienced these constraints, 
but perhaps not exclusively due to firm size, since there was variation in degree. 
Their difficulties with search, monitoring and suppliers were also related to a 
shortage of informal connections through which information is exchanged and 
transactions take place. The expectation that small firms should be protected by their 
networks from opportunism (Granovetter, 1985) or be able to depend on networks 
for information (McGee and Sawyerr, 2003) applies in the research site, but only for 
those firms that already have extensive networks. The applicability of this 
expectation is limited by the difficulty of establishing or extending such networks. 
Neither the literature relating to the Chinese context nor to small firms expects 
notable transaction costs of specificity or frequency. These are inherent in the 
transaction, rather than being a characteristic of the context in which the transaction 
takes place, and are largely beyond the scope of very small firms. They might have 
applied more closely to the tourism sector in the past, when foreign ownership of 
local assets was more common (Dunning and McQueen, 1981). 
The perception of opportunism, bounded rationality and uncertainty is consistent 
with generic theory, and with expectations related to the research context. 
Opportunism was found to have a particularly strong influence on firms’ decisions, 
whereas uncertainty was inconsistent in its effect.  
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9.1.2 Applicability of transaction cost theory: responses 
We next consider the degree to which the theory applies to this context, in the 
responses to high transaction costs that it anticipates and the reasoning it offers for 
them, in comparison to the response of isolation observed in the field. 
Williamson (1975) expects firms to reduce the number of market-mediated 
transactions when transaction costs are perceived to be high. Up to this point our 
field data agree with the literature, as the firms do reduce the number of transactions 
they perform. However, Williamson expects this reduction to move transaction from 
the market into the hierarchy of the firm or a cooperative structure. Transaction costs 
are at their lowest in simple market exchanges, and when these are still too high, a 
change of transaction governance is required. Whereas Williamson (1985) considers 
a move from market to relational exchange to be a deliberate response to transaction 
costs, in the research site relational trading was found to be the usual starting point 
for exchange: this is our early indication that the nature of trust differs greatly 
between Western conceptions and the research site. Although we see some of the 
governance structures described by Williamson, they are present for different reasons 
than those he described as being the cause of these structures. 
Another divergence is the internalisation decision by firms to bring in-house the 
production of some goods or services rather than procuring them on the market 
(Williamson, 1975). As we have discussed in Chapter 6, non-specialised firms were 
producing many inputs in-house, but this was as a continuation of their earlier 
farming practices rather than as a deliberate broadening of their range of activities. 
Again, a snapshot of behaviour appears to conform to Williamson’s expected 
response of reducing transaction costs at the margin, with the broad range of 
productive activities foreseen by Buckley and Casson (1998), but a closer 
examination reveals that it has not developed in the manner and for the reasons that 
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he expected, and instead reflects a decision not to specialise. However, the high level 
of uncertainty in the research site supports Jones’ (1997) expectation that the 
decision whether to make or buy would be a judgment rather than a precise 
calculation. 
Cooperation between a few participating firms and international tour operators did 
appear to work as a means of reducing risk and improving market access that was not 
resource-intensive. This supported the recommendations of Oviatt and MacDougall 
(2005) and Thorelli (1986), matching closely the needs and capabilities of the 
participating firms, but left the question why it was not observed more frequently, 
especially given that cooperation is the expected response to high transaction costs 
both by small firms (Nooteboom, 1993) and in a Chinese context. Cooperation is also 
proposed as an alternative to formal governance structures when there is weak (Zhou 
and Poppo, 2008) or unpredictable (Luo, 2007) law enforcement, which was reported 
by the participants. The historic preference for relational ties (Zhou and Poppo, 
2008) was less strongly in evidence, as participants lacking in social contacts 
withdrew from trading rather than trying harder to cultivate such ties. Explanations 
for these surprising findings will be offered in the next section. 
The market institutions in the research context were less developed than the level 
assumed by transaction cost theory: they did not offer effective legal protection from 
opportunists, which Hill (1990) had expected to be a function of the market, or 
enable the funding and legal recognition or protection of internalisation. Zhou and 
Poppo (2008) anticipate that this lack of development will hinder the transition from 
trust-based to contractual governance in China. The effect of assuming a given level 
of competence of the regulatory institutions is that the response mechanisms that are 
predicated on this simply cannot apply. So even though the causes of transaction 
costs are present in this context, we cannot expect the same response as the literature 




Sacha Rawlence  284 
 
predicts, where this concerns increased complexity of contract, internalisation 
through acquisition, or formalised cooperative alliances.  
Instead, we observed isolation as a common response to high transaction costs. Over 
the course of this study isolation has been developed from a sensitising concept, to 
describe the tendency towards self-reliant production observed in the exploratory 
study, to a grounded description of a trading behaviour that relies on personal 
exchange with a minimal number of customers and suppliers, with little horizontal 
cooperation. Although the literature hints at the possibility of isolation in response to 
high transaction costs, this is presented as an exception rather than an anticipated 
rule. Williamson (1985) concedes that particular transactions might be avoided 
where extreme uncertainty prevents the drafting of complete contracts; however, our 
empirical work finds uncertainty to be the norm, and avoidance of transactions a 
routine means of reducing transaction costs. Zhou and Poppo (2008) only expect 
transactions to be avoided if opportunism is added to the combination of uncertainty 
and weak institutions, which they otherwise expect to lead to cooperation. Lyons 
(1995) and Buckley and Casson (1998) cite specific examples of how suspicion of 
suppliers or of the market mechanism might lead firms to prefer in-house production, 
but neither explains the widespread tendency towards self-sufficiency observed in 
this study. North (1990) describes the absence of both formal and informal 
enforcement as an extreme case that might lead to the avoidance of exchange. 
The theoretical implication is that this study contributes to filling the first gap in the 
literature: the response of isolation is evident in the simple governance structures, the 
wide range of productive activities carried out under a single roof and particularly in 
the limited relationships of some participating firms. This response is also far more 
common than the brief mentions of it in the literature would suggest, and so merits 
the degree of attention that this study has paid to it. 
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Because the analysis did not find a consistent and sufficient relationship between 
causes of high transaction costs and the outcome of isolation, it incorporated an 
investigation into the effect of reported strength or weakness of institutions. This will 
be discussed next, and suggests that the modification to transaction cost theory that 
would increase its applicability to this context would lie in incorporating the 
influence of institutional conditions in its assessment of how firms are likely to 
respond to high transaction costs. Where institutional weakness prevents the 
expected responses of internalisation and cooperation, the available responses are 
integration into the market or the newer idea of isolation from it. 
9.1.3 Integration of transaction cost and institutional theories 
Having examined the broad applicability of the theory’s expected causes of 
transaction costs to the research context, and reviewed the nature and extent of the 
alternative response of isolation, we now consider institutional factors as a possible 
contributory cause of this response. Whilst this approach agrees with the many 
writers who call attention to the importance of institutions to our understanding of 
decision-making in emerging markets and in China, a distinction between formal and 
informal institutions (in the language of North, 1994b) has been vital to our 
exploration of institutions’ effect on responses to transaction costs. This extends 
beyond the extant literature that not only does not consider isolation in depth, but 
also focuses mostly on the impact of formal institutions on Chinese firms’ responses. 
9.1.3.1 Formal institutions and responses to transaction costs 
The research site did not display the effective formal institutions of law enforcement 
that North (1994b) and Rao (2003) expect to reduce transaction costs, but more 
closely resembled Palepu and Khanna’s (1998) characterisation of emerging markets 
whose weak formal institutions lead to higher transaction costs. However, the key 
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determinant of the participating firms’ decisions was neither the regulatory 
uncertainty that they experienced and that Ang and Michailova (2008) expected to 
dominate in emerging markets, nor the formal constraints on small firms expected by 
Morrison et al. (2003). In fact, formal institutions were more notable in this research 
context for their failure to help reduce transaction costs, than for substantially 
increasing them. 
Whilst Levitsky (1989) had correctly anticipated that government policy would seem 
remote to small firms, local government was also largely irrelevant to them despite 
the expectations to the contrary of Smallbone and Welter (2006). In a similar vein, 
Elkan (1995) and Luo (1997) were right that the firms would not receive government 
support, but nor were there any reports of the malign government influences 
suggested by Peng (2004) and Zhou and Poppo (2008). Mechanisms for the legal 
resolution of disputes were undeveloped as expected (Ahlstrom et al., 2003), but 
there was less evidence of the informal resolution that both they and Zhou and Poppo 
envisaged (2008) than of a preference for self-reliance. The levels of reliability of 
legal description (de Soto, 2006) and enforcement (Zhou and Poppo, 2008) were so 
low as to make them an irrelevance rather than a hindrance to decision-making. 
Weak property rights constrained borrowing and so investment (Cleaver, 2007), with 
a consequent reliance on informal borrowing as expected among small Chinese firms 
by Peng (2004) and Herd et al. (2010), and an additional emphasis on the 
reinvestment of profits. It seemed not so much that perverse incentives of 
dysfunctional institutions were driving up transaction costs, as that their absence 
failed to deliver beneficial effects. However, the cost of this absence was that 
Granovetter’s (1985) hopes that formal institutions would serve as a functional 
substitute for trust could not be fulfilled. 
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A deeper understanding of the weakness of formal institutions in this research 
context has helped to explain why firms do not respond by more detailed contracts, 
internalisation and formal cooperation. This does not mean, however, that transaction 
cost theory with its implicit reliance on strong formal institutions does not apply in 
contexts with weak formal institutions. On the contrary, it invites a broadening of the 
theoretical integration to incorporate North’s (1990) proposed effect of informal 
institutions supplementing weak formal institutions, thus avoiding the under-
socialised view criticised by Granovetter (1985). The author shares Tremblay’s 
(1998) view that transaction cost theory does not yet fully explain firms’ decisions, 
but whereas he considers technological change to be the missing causal factor, in this 
context we propose that the factor that has not yet been accounted for is the strength 
or weakness of informal institutions. 
9.1.3.2 Informal institutions and responses to transaction costs  
Researchers have recently increased the emphasis they place on the importance of 
informal institutions to the study of firms in emerging markets (Trevino et al., 2008) 
and in China in particular (Peng et al., 2008). Zhou and Poppo (2008) and Peng and 
Luo (2000) expected informal ties to help to offset the impact of weak formal 
institutions, North (1990) and Madhok (1995) thought that they could moderate the 
risks of opportunism and uncertainty respectively, and Hu (2007) proposed that 
norms and trust would facilitate the reduction of transaction costs in China. In the 
field study, however, rather than the strength of informal institutions reducing 
transaction costs, their weakness contributed both to raising these costs and to 
constraining firms’ responses to them. 
The informal structures within which trust develops were inefficient, increasing the 
time and cost of development, and hindering its reach. The very first step described 
by Humphrey and Schmitz (1998) assumes an acceptance of risk in the hope that 
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partners will not act opportunistically, but the participants did expect to be taken 
advantage of, and so rather than exposing themselves to the risk of opportunism they 
developed protective mechanisms. This meant that most instances of trust were 
interpersonal, developed through acquaintance rather than the description that de 
Soto (2006) expected to suffice, with the consequences that their reach was limited 
by the participant’s range of personal contacts and a substantial investment of time 
was entailed in their development. There was very little impersonal trust, so the 
potential benefits of reduced transaction costs where opportunism is not expected 
(Rao, 2003) were not realised. In this research site, the ties that were valued for 
engendering trust were strong: as Granovetter (1973) anticipated, this resulted in 
isolation, whereas more numerous weak ties would help to expand the range of their 
networks. Trust relationships preceded business relationships, as expected in China 
(Zhou and Poppo, 2008). Both of these restrictions contributed to the difficulty 
experienced by participants in expanding their networks of trust relationships, which 
Keister (2001) describes as the path-dependency of trading relationships in China. 
The opportunities for trust and networks to substitute for weak formal institutions, 
and to reduce transaction costs, were consequently less common than expected in 
China (Buckley, 2004, Hu, 2007). Storper’s (1991) warnings of trust serving as a 
private means of market coordination to the exclusion of new entrants, were borne 
out by the empirical findings of this study: trust could protect the transactions of 
those who were already party to it, but constrained the trading activity of others. 
Peng’s (2004) imagery of concentric circles of relationships proved to be apposite in 
this context, with kinship often restricting employment and social ties being the 
strongest determinant of trading partners. Fukuyama’s (1995) concern was that this 
restriction on employment would hinder internalisation in China, but the lack of a 
driving need and of enabling resources for internalisation (Granovetter, 1985) in the 
research site have perhaps been greater blocks. The effect of social ties in facilitating 
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trade worked through their role as a locus of close trust (Hu, 2007) rather than in 
extending the reach of cooperation and deterrence of opportunism as Peng (2004) 
had hoped. It was this limited scope of participants’ networks that so reduced their 
effectiveness, compared to the high expectations raised by many writers in the 
literature specific to China. The usefulness of political ties anticipated by Li et al. 
(2008b) was out of the reach of most participants, just as the government itself was 
too remote to constitute an immediate concern to them. Luo’s (2008) prediction that 
the Chinese would hold increasingly negative views of such ties was supported by 
the critical opinions expressed by participants. 
Given that the participants expected their trading partners to behave 
opportunistically, the author had anticipated that Humphrey and Schmitz’s (1998) 
conception of sanctions designed to deter such behaviour would be appropriate to the 
site. However, sanctions were not used as an informal enforcement mechanism even 
though Peng (2004) and Zhou and Poppo (2008) expected this to be effective in 
China, and Holstrom (2002) had explained their usefulness to locally-based groups. 
This failure to employ sanctions may be due to ethnic or other differences hindering 
participants’ propensity to recognise a shared common interest (Ostrom, 1990), 
intensifying competition and then further obscuring the recognition of a shared 
interest; alternatively, it may be due to norms of village life preventing the free 
communication of infractions that is vital to the operation of sanctions (Douma and 
Schreuder, 2008). 
This increased understanding of informal institutions in the research context has 
helped to explain why even informal cooperation is little used in response to high 
transaction costs. In an environment of weak regulatory enforcement, transacting 
parties’ minimal recourse to outside protection of even an informal nature has 
confined many firms to personal exchange. This constraint is reinforced by the 
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weakness of institutional support for the development of trust and informal 
governance structures, with the result that isolation is commonly seen as the only 
rational response to the transaction costs caused by opportunism, bounded rationality 
and uncertainty.  
9.1.3.3 Contingent effect of institutions on firms’ responses 
Institutional theory is expected to help to explain firms’ decisions whether or not to 
cooperate in response to high transaction costs, for example by North (1990) in 
general, and by Li et al. (2008b) in China. Roberts and Greenwood (1997) 
considered both formal and informal institutions as constraints on firms’ responses to 
transaction costs. The findings of this study are consistent with these views, but they 
also reveal a greater significance of the role of informal institutions that were 
identified as a necessary condition in the fsQCA analysis. Although our interview 
data showed weak formal institutions hindering contract, internalisation and formal 
cooperation in response to high transaction costs, the fsQCA analysis also found 
matched cases where the strength or weakness of formal institutions made no 
difference to the outcome of isolation. This brings our findings closer to the 
expectations of Oliver (1991) and Martinez and Dacin (1999), who emphasised 
social constraints on firms’ decisions and their quest for transaction cost efficiency.  
The necessary condition applied to both the presence and the absence of the 
outcome: weak informal institutions were associated with isolation from the market, 
and strong informal institutions with integration into the market. Only one case 
managed Rao’s (2003) recommendation of cooperating in order to overcome high 
transaction costs, and so avoiding isolation. The analysis of paired cases in Chapter 8 
compared this integrated case to another case with similar causal characteristics but a 
different outcome, and to a further case with different characteristics but the same 
outcome, to explore whether contingent causality was at work. The cases with 
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similar characteristics differed on only the reported strength of informal institutions, 
which appears to account for their different outcomes, and this was interpreted as the 
critical factor enabling the former case’s greater ability to develop new trust 
relationships to support impersonal trade. The cases with similar outcomes had very 
different causal characteristics, except for strong formal institutions and a similar 
ease in developing trust. This shows that the observed contingent effect of informal 
institutions is critical to avoiding isolation in cases with high transaction costs, and 
that isolation can be associated with weak informal institutions even when 
transaction costs are lower. It also accentuates Peng and Luo’s (2000) observation 
that less competitive firms may be more dependent on informal ties, by illustrating 
the disadvantage posed by weak informal institutions even when a firm’s transaction 
cost and formal institutional position is relatively favourable, and it offers a means of 
addressing this disadvantage. The pivotal role that informal institutions could play in 
the reduction of firms’ disadvantage and isolation feeds into the main contribution of 
this study. 
9.1.3.4 Possible reasons for the scarcity of trust and weakness of informal 
institutions  
The key contribution of this study to assessing the applicability of transaction cost 
theory to this research context is its detailed exploration of local institutions that 
uncovered the severe constraint placed on trading and cooperation by weak informal 
institutions and especially the scarcity and slow development of trust. That does not 
simply constitute a mismatch between Western theory and Chinese cultural reality, 
as the ideas of many Chinese specialists have also been found to have limited 
applicability in this particular context. It thus appeared that a further, underlying 
causal mechanism might be at work, which had not been fully explained by the 
reviewed literature on Chinese business practice. 
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An important lesson for non-native learners of Chinese is understanding that 
expressions proceed from the general to the specific. For example, in personal 
introductions the family name (the general identifier) is given before the personal 
name (the specific identifier), and dates are expressed as “year, month, day”. The 
author proposes that the observed patterns in the development of trust in the research 
site also proceed from the general to the specific. However, whereas Western 
business practice provides for a pattern of generalised trust in which parties’ trust in 
counterparties to a transaction is supported by their reliance on the commercial 
regulatory framework, and distrust of specific individuals may be learned through 
bad experiences, the research participants in contrast appeared to begin from a 
general position of distrust of all others, from which specific individuals could earn 
trust through long-term relationships. The transaction costs of opportunism, 
uncertainty and bounded rationality in the Western rule-based pattern are borne by 
the society establishing the rules that enable all members to generally trust all others, 
whereas the model described for the research site burdens individual traders with all 
the costs of relationship development. Douma and Schreuder (2008) describe this 
apportionment of the costs of rule-based transactions as high fixed costs borne by the 
society but low marginal costs borne by the individual, compared to relationship-
based transactions with lower fixed costs but higher marginal costs.  
In the future, a transition towards rule-based exchange and more generalised trust 
could lower the transaction costs of avoiding opportunism, and so enable freer 
impersonal trade (Arora et al., 1996) and reduce the need for cooperation and 
internalisation as responses to high transaction costs. This in turn could facilitate 
specialisation of productive activity with its associated benefits for local economic 
development (de Soto, 2006). Suggestions as to how such a transition could be 
initiated from specific trust to generalised trust, and relationship-based to rule-based 
exchange, will be discussed in the following sections that make recommendations for 




Sacha Rawlence  293 
 
policy and practice. Consideration will then be given to recent contributions to the 
development economics literature, which caution against attempts to introduce 
international best practice in formal institutional reform without regard to local 
context.  
9.2 Recommendations for policy and practice 
9.2.1 Rationale for recommending changes to policy and practice 
The status of all the case firms as going concerns shows that their approach of 
isolation can be commercially viable, but this may be considered to be sub-optimal 
for reasons that are supported by the literature. Firstly, isolation hinders the transition 
from personal to lower-cost impersonal exchange (North, 1994b), with its requisite 
transition from personal trust in the counterparty to an impersonal trust in formal 
institutions (Douma and Schreuder, 2008). This in turn prevents the further 
contribution to business and local economic development that could arise from 
specialisation (Arora et al., 1996) and deeper market integration (Storper, 1991). This 
would matter in any economy that sought growth, but is particularly pertinent to 
China, which relies on private enterprise to contribute substantially to its economic 
growth (Peng (2004) cites the Fifteenth Party Congress of the Chinese Communist 
Party in 1997 as the first official recognition of this) and will therefore need to foster 
its development. 
There is thus a real need to avoid isolation as a response to high transaction costs, 
and the institutional weakness that hinders the development of trust relationships has 
been identified as the criterion upon which this response depends. The first aspect of 
our recommendations will therefore focus on the development of trust at the firm 
level, to extend the scope of personal exchange. The second aspect of our 
recommendations seeks to reduce the transaction costs to which the firms respond, 
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by strengthening the enforcement of formal institutions. If this were to prove 
effective in the development of generalised trust, and for the enforcement of rule-
based, impersonal exchange, this could reduce the need for reliance on personal 
exchange, and be of benefit to a broader population of firms. However, because our 
findings have shown informal institutions to be of critical importance to overcoming 
high transaction costs and avoiding isolation, we further propose a third option. This 
builds upon an emergent strand of literature that begins to address an implicit 
assumption that development policy need only be concerned with formal institutions, 
and that this can be divorced from the context.  
Our proposal of recommendations concerning the weakness of both informal and 
formal institutions corresponds to the equifinality of the fsQCA solutions: there may 
be more than one possible means to achieving the desired outcome. Our discussion 
proceeds with recommendations for local practice, followed by policy 
recommendations concerning formal and then informal institutions. 
9.2.2 Recommendations for business practice 
We focus here on firms’ business practices that contribute to their responses to high 
transaction costs, rather than on the external environment over which small firms 
exercise little control (Smallbone and Wyer, 2006). So without yet tackling the 
causes of transaction costs, this section proposes a possible means of reducing the 
degree of isolation that results from them by focusing on the problem areas 
highlighted by the fsQCA solutions (Schneider et al., 2010, Pajunen, 2008). 
Our recommendation is that the participating firms should attempt to broaden the 
networks within which they develop trust. This is intended as a way of extending the 
range of trust relationships within which they conduct personal exchange, to increase 
their integration into the market. It is a coping strategy they could employ themselves 
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to counteract the isolation caused by high transaction costs, as increased trust 
between firms could reduce the constraint on trading of the fear of opportunism 
(Sengenberger and Pyke, 1992), and thus enable them to contribute more to local 
development (Humphrey and Schmitz, 1998). Such a change to practice could 
contribute to integration and specialisation whilst the firms remain small (Locke, 
1996), rather than pushing them towards internalisation and extension of their 
boundaries. Smaller scale can be an advantage in sectors that are labour- rather than 
capital-intensive (Fukuyama, 1995), and in customer-facing service industries 
(Hausmann and Rodrik, 2006) including tourism (Novelli et al., 2006), in addition to 
being more appropriate to the rural environment of the research site. For firms that 
have not specialised out of farming, this could be turned to their advantage: only two 
participants’ menus currently mention that the food they serve is organically grown 
on the premises, but this could attract more customers if they were to publicise it 
more widely.  
9.2.3 Mainstream recommendations for policy 
This section offers a policy recommendation that is consistent with the literature that 
is currently mainstream, which recommends the adoption of formal institutions in 
keeping with international best practice. It shows how such advice could be applied 
in this context, if it were considered to be the best option. It will be followed, 
however, by a third alternative. 
This is a recommendation for government at the national level, in its role as regulator 
rather than as economic agent or strategic planner (Bennett, 2006), as the latter two 
roles are not substantially constraining the participating firms and so are not our 
policy priority. Intervention should not be on behalf of specific firms (Bennett, 2006) 
or sectors (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2006), but at the aggregate level to encourage 
economy-wide development. This would, however, require a departure from the 




Sacha Rawlence  296 
 
usual Chinese approach of targeting sectors and individual firms (Hong Kong Trade 
Development Council, 2005). Our aim is not to instruct governments on how to build 
stronger institutions, which has its own body of literature (see for example North, 
2003), but rather to indicate which areas could beneficially be changed. 
The recommendation is that policy steps should be taken to strengthen the regulatory 
regime and its implementation, in order to improve the local business climate. The 
aim of this would be to extend formal legal protection to reduce the risks of exchange 
that currently cause high transaction costs. With more consistent regulations and 
more reliable enforcement, the current need for reliance on personal exchange could 
be reduced as firms discovered the freedom and protection of rule-based exchange 
(North, 2003, Peng, 2003, Danis et al., 2010) – if this were to prove viable in the 
presence of the weak informal institutions. As institutional protection is the 
foundation upon which impersonal trust is built and generalised across the society 
governed by these rules, this increased protection could contribute to an increase in 
the division of labour and the consequent specialisation (Seabright, 2004). 
This recommendation is supported by a consensus view in the literature that it is the 
role of governments to provide the economic and legal institutional framework for 
business. For example, North’s (1994b) particular focus is the provision of the 
requisite formal institutions for specifying and enforcing exchange, which is 
supported by Rao’s (2003) concern for the institutional structures that affect the level 
of transaction costs; Olson Jr. (1996) specifies the responsibility for providing a 
sound legal system to enforce contracts and protect property rights. In the context of 
emerging markets, emphasis is placed on government responsibility for the 
institutional conditions that can enable or constrain entrepreneurship (Smallbone and 
Welter, 2006), the transaction costs of inefficient markets (Palepu and Khanna, 
1998), and the regulatory protection of vulnerable consumers (Karnani, 2010). Since 
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our recommendation can only be enacted by the government, it also follows the 
caveat that policy interventions should not duplicate or crowd out market provision 
 (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2006, Rao, 2003, Bennett, 2006 - citing Keynes, 1926). In 
keeping with this, Chapter 6 suggested that the local government should improve the 
provision of credit information to banks to facilitate their lending, instead of offering 
credit guarantees of its own which risk crowding out the nascent market-based 
lending. 
If this recommendation were to be adopted, it could be carried out as a stand-alone 
exercise in economic reform, or as a focused extension of an existing programme 
such as China’s current New Socialist Countryside rural development policy. 
“Making Markets Work for the Poor” (M4P) is an example of a market-based 
approach to economic development currently employed by the UK’s Department for 
International Development (DFID) and the Swiss Agency for Development and 
Cooperation (SDC), which could be employed as a policy extension. Similar 
approaches to addressing market inefficiencies are used by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP, “Growing Inclusive Markets”), Inter-American 
Development Bank (IADB, “Opportunities for the Majority”) and the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC, “Next Four Billion”), and all correspond to the growing 
business interest in the Base of the Economic Pyramid initiated by C. K. Prahalad in 
2004 (DFID and SDC, 2008b). M4P recognises the importance of efficient markets 
for economic development. A wide range of analyses is employed to identify market 
imperfections, including regional economic studies, regulatory reviews and value 
chain analyses. An economic application of the M4P approach (DFID and SDC, 
2008a) interprets the inefficiencies as transaction costs, to be reduced by 
development of formal institutions in areas including accountability, enforcement 
and coordination. This is intended to result in systemic change to the benefit of all 
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market participants, with higher relative benefits accruing to participants who suffer 
proportionately higher transaction costs. The author considers the present study to 
complement M4P’s broad areas of regulatory effectiveness and improved 
enforcement mechanisms, which currently lack detail in terms of both analysis and 
resolution (Meyer-Stamer, 2006).   
This approach is considered to be appropriate to an aim of formal institutional reform 
in this research context, because M4P evolved out of the Sustainable Livelihoods 
Approach (SLA). SLA was the basis of DFID programmes from 1998 until 2002, 
when the DFID’s focus moved from the symptoms of weak development to attempts 
at larger-scale resolution of its causes by increasing market participation (Clark and 
Carney, 2009). SLA is currently used as the basis for research and policymaking at 
China’s Centre for Integrated Agricultural Development in Beijing (Zuo, 2009), 
confirming its suitability to the context of rural China, and suggesting that M4P or 
other market-based approaches could be applied to this context in the future. 
9.2.4 An alternative approach to policy recommendations 
Our concern is that a mainstream policy recommendation such as that outlined above 
might be of limited effectiveness, because this study’s research context adds an 
additional constraint of weak informal institutions. This seems not to be taken into 
consideration normally – in either the type of programme described above, or in the 
literature that follows. The current policy-oriented literature appears to contain an 
implicit assumption that institution building for economic development concerns 
only formal institutions to the exclusion of informal institutions (contrary to the 
advice of North), and it has until recently considered this in generic terms rather than 
in relation to the local context. 
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9.2.4.1 Background  
The policy recommendations for enabling economic development have moved on 
from a focus on relative prices in the 1980s, to the realisation in the 1990s that 
reform of market-supporting institutions was also required in order to shape 
appropriate incentives (Rodrik, 2000). At the turn of the century, the recognised 
challenge was to identify which institutions were important for economic growth 
(Henisz, 2000). At that time, Henisz concentrated on political constraints such as a 
government’s credible commitment to protecting property rights, whilst Rodrik 
(2000) focused on the formal institutions of property rights, market regulation, 
macroeconomic stabilisation, social insurance, political representation and the rule of 
law, all drawn together in a participatory democracy. Over time this was distilled 
down to property rights and the rule of law (Rodrik et al., 2004, Acemoglu and 
Johnson, 2005), still echoing North’s “rules of the game” (1990: 3). However, a note 
of caution also emerged, with the observation that these recommendations had 
become oversimplified – leading to their interpretation as a uniform need for 
governance reform – and that there was a need to identify the “binding constraint” on 
growth that was particular to any given context at any given time (Rodrik, 2004: 5). 
Rodrik further developed this concern for context-specificity with ever-stronger 
warnings against attempts to copy a “blueprint” of Western institutional best practice 
into developing countries, regardless of their individual binding constraints 
(Hausmann and Rodrik, 2006, Rodrik, 2008) – a practice that he associates with 
multilateral organisations including the International Monetary Fund, World Bank 
and World Trade Organisation. 
At the same time, the study of government institutions remained focused on curbing 
the power of political elites through stronger property rights protection (Acemoglu, 
2006, North et al., 2007, Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008). The only observed 
inclusion of informal institutions in the consideration of policy is in Rodrik’s (2008) 
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counter-argument that there may be more than one way of achieving growth 
(reflecting equifinality), whereby existing, context-specific “second best” institutions 
might be more appropriate than acontextual best practice recommendations, which 
could have counterproductive effects. He supports this idea with the example of 
informal, trust-based, relational contracting that is used as an effective substitute for 
weak formal contract enforcement in Vietnam, and warns that imposing best practice 
would undermine this substitution. He criticises the best practice approach for 
imposing its model “without paying attention to potential interactions with 
institutional features elsewhere in the system” (p2). We consider his view to relate 
closely to the observation we made in the closing summary of Chapter 6, that 
corrections ought not to be proposed to individual aspects of the trading environment 
without taking the wider institutional environment into account, and we would 
suggest that further development of the emerging interest in informal institutions and 
context would make a useful extension to the policy literature. 
9.2.4.2 Application to this study 
In the research context of this study, we found that it was the informal, rather than 
the formal, institutions that explained whether or not firms were able to avoid 
isolation in the presence of high transaction costs. This interaction effect suggests 
that the presence of weak informal institutions might reduce the effectiveness of 
policies that aimed only to address weak formal institutions. We consider this to 
offer empirical support to Rodrik’s emergent concern both for context-specificity, 
and for the inclusion of informal institutions, in the formulation of policy 
recommendations.  
In this research site, firms are dependent on a limited number of strong ties 
(Granovetter, 1973) and become isolated. The M4P or multilateral organisations’ 
approaches outlined above would seek to replace these informal, relational ties with 
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strengthened formal institutions. The alternative that we propose as a closer fit to this 
context would be to facilitate the development of weak ties between more firms, to 
enable them to establish more numerous relationships within which exchange could 
take place. Despite North’s warning that informal institutions change very slowly, a 
policy mechanism of public-private institutions has been conceptualised by 
Hausmann and Rodrik (2006), and given empirical support by McDermott et al. 
(2009). The broad aim of the former authors was the pooling of public and private 
capabilities, and shaping incentives to increase productivity. The application of the 
latter authors was a comparison between two of Argentina’s wine-producing regions, 
which were originally characterised by weak formal institutions and socio-economic 
fragmentation (approximating to the isolation in our research site). The authors drew 
upon the work of Locke (1996) and Ostrom (1999) to explain the local government’s 
provision of “bridging structures [in a context where they] are not historically or 
organically present” (McDermott et al., 2009: 1274), in order to overcome the 
barriers to acquiring new information that had previously been posed by the 
participating firms’ embeddedness in insular, local networks of strong ties – and 
which could equally well describe the context of the Tiger Leaping Gorge. These 
structures enabled “public and private actors create new institutions with governance 
principles that anchor new horizontal ties among previously isolated producer 
communities” (p1276), where the resulting new ties between communities were 
effective in overcoming these barriers to knowledge exchange. 
In the present research context, the public element of the partnership would be 
necessary not only to facilitate, but also to legitimise, the intended bridge-building 
activity. Legitimisation is needed because of the very limited freedom of association 
reported by participants in the exploratory study. The role of facilitator is needed 
because of the absence of other bodies, such as local trade associations or chambers 
of commerce (Locke, 2001), that might otherwise administer such a programme on 
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behalf of the government. The aim would be to reduce firms’ isolation by increasing 
their range of weak ties and thus expanding their trading networks, whilst also 
reducing the intensity with which the ties need to be cultivated. In the light of the 
critical role that informal institutions play in this research site, we have come to 
consider the reduction of firms’ trading isolation to be a more appropriate aim than 
the Northian goal of impersonal exchange. In terms of costs and benefits, the cost of 
implementing the policies required for a transition to impersonal exchange in the 
context of this sparsely-populated rural area, risk exceeding the benefits if the weak 
informal institutions reduce their effectiveness. A smaller-scale benefit, but with 
more proportionate costs, would be an expanded range of less close trading partners, 
allowing firms to make some progress towards specialisation, market integration and 
contribution to local economic development. 
These recommendations are illustrated in Figure 12 below, which is the fourth and 
final flowchart in the series, and superimposes our recommendations onto the third 
flowchart. To aid clarity of presentation, we have removed the factors whose 
importance already appeared reduced in the third flowchart, and shaded out the 
existing causal path. Our new recommendations are marked in numbered, bold italics 
and with dashed arrows. Following an outcome of isolation, there is a need (1) to 
increase trust. The first and third recommendations, concerning informal institutions 
(2), are marked with dotted arrows; the second recommendation for formal 
institutions (3) is marked with evenly dashed arrows. The anticipated effect of all 
three is increased generalised trust (4), with consequences marked with unevenly 
dashed arrows from (5) reduced transaction costs and increased trade to (6) the 
possibility of greater specialisation and contribution to economic growth.  
 








 Intervening factors between 
Causes and expected responses 
 Responses  Outcome 
Causes of high transaction costs 
(Research question 1) 
 Institutions  
(Research question 3) 
 Governance structures  
(Research question 2) 
 Reduced transaction costs promote 
business development 
       
  Weakness of formal institutions: 
 
 IF INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS 
ARE STRONG: 
 Firm is able to overcome high transaction 
costs and avoid isolation 
  (3) Second recommendation: 
strengthen enforcement to 
reduce transaction cost of 
opportunism 
 Relational transactions,  
cooperation 
  








 gap in literature): 




 gap in literature) 
 Firm is unable to overcome high 
transaction costs and becomes isolated. 
Exchange, specialisation and 
development are hindered 
  Trust     
  Kinship 
Network or guanxi connections 
    
  .  (2) First and third 
recommendations: trust to 
reduce isolation 
 (1) Solve by increasing trust 
       
    (4) INCREASES generalised 
trust (Storper) 
 (5) Reduces transaction costs, 
increases trade 
 (6) Results in specialisation 
 (Arora), economic growth (Storper) 
    (whether market, contract, or 
cooperative) 
  
Figure 12 Flowchart 4 – Recommendations for policy and practice  
(Source: author) 
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9.3 Evaluation of the study 
9.3.1 Evaluation of theoretical contribution 
We believe that our findings avoid the parallel pitfalls of the over- and under-
socialised explanations that Granovetter (1985) warned of. The participating firms 
demonstrate competitive economic behaviour and are influenced by formal 
institutions so social explanations have not been privileged over economic 
explanations. Although the firms are even more strongly influenced by informal 
institutional factors, these were found to be necessary but not sufficient for the 
outcome, and so did not overshadow the formal factors.  
This study has confirmed that transaction cost theory could not be simply transferred 
across to China, as warned by Leung et al. (2009). But whereas earlier writers have 
tended to focus on the effect on firms’ responses of formal institutions, our 
exploration has found both formal and informal institutions to be important and has 
further uncovered the greater importance of informal institutions  
We feel that our sharpened focus on behavioural transaction costs and the influence 
of informal institutions has offered an answer to the challenge, issued by Meyer and 
Peng (2005), to seek a deeper understanding of the limitations of transaction cost 
theory. These can be overcome, with reference to this research context, if we add a 
response of isolation and include the institutional context as a factor influencing 
firms’ choice of response. 
This thesis contributes to theory by highlighting the pivotal role of informal social 
structures on the cost, extent, or even absence of exchange, and thus adapting 
transaction cost theory to better fit this institutional context. The possibilities for 
generalisation to other contexts are outlined below. 
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9.3.2 Generalisation to other emerging market contexts 
The recommendations for policy and practice were derived from a generalisation to 
the theoretical proposition of a relationship between transaction costs, institutions 
and isolation, in contrast to generalising from a sample to a population (Yin, 2003). 
This is a moderatum generalisation (Williams, 2000) that interprets aspects of the 
observed behaviour as instances of a broader set, enabling tentative comparisons. 
Such a generalisation is in keeping with the critical realist foundation of the study, 
with its inherent emphasis on studying phenomena in context, and so the external 
validity of the study (in terms of its transferability to other contexts) has not been 
compromised (Bryman, 2008). The conclusions drawn from this proposed 
relationship might therefore be cautiously applied to firms in other emerging markets 
that share some of the observed institutional weaknesses, whose resolution could 
facilitate exchange and further economic development. 
The reasons for caution in generalisation stem both from the methodology employed 
by this study, and from the nature of its subject. Generalisation from interpretive 
research must be more cautious than that based on probability samples, which may 
make inferences to a population (Williams, 2000). Such statistical inference is not 
the aim of QCA so much as assisting causal interpretation (Ragin, 2005b), and these 
interpretations should be generalised to cases considered to be similar to those in the 
QCA analysis (Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009). We therefore adopt the view (Zhou and 
Poppo, 2008) that attempts to generalise from China to other emerging markets 
should take the form of further research to explore which characteristics are shared, 
rather than assuming that any or all will be shared. 
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9.3.3 Evaluation of methodological contribution 
The examples given in Chapter 5 showed the QCA approach to be less commonly 
used as yet in business research, than in its more established fields of social and 
political science. It is an even more recent addition to international business research, 
with only two articles (Pajunen, 2008, Schneider et al., 2010) in the Journal of 
International Business Studies. The method is used extensively in the comparison of 
quantitative data sets, but despite the value that Ragin (2000) places on the 
interpretive value of fuzzy sets derived from interview data, there are few published 
examples of this. The closest that the author has found is the re-analysis by Haege 
(2007) of data from structured interviews, observations and documentary evidence 
that were collected for a predecessor’s exploratory research. The author therefore 
considers the analysis of interview data to be a novel contribution both to QCA in 
general, and to its application in international business research in particular. It has 
been effective in answering the research questions, maintaining the strong connection 
to the research context, and for uncovering the importance of the underlying process 
of trust formation. 
The author further feels that although the analysis has progressively reduced the 
detailed interview data down to a series of numeric scores for computer-assisted 
analysis, this process has not diminished the richness of the analysis. This is firstly 
because a thematic analysis was conducted on the interview data, relating detailed 
findings to the literary sources that had prompted the interview questions, and 
secondly because the analysis of the fsQCA solution has entailed frequent 
reinterrogation of this detailed data, in what Ragin (2000: 4) describes as a “dialogue 
between ideas and evidence”. 
Finally, the isolation that was observed during the ethnographic reconnaissance of 
the exploratory study was a concept still fairly new to the literature. It seems, 
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however, unlikely that this is a new phenomenon, and more likely that it is a more 
common occurrence that International Business data collection methods have largely 
overlooked. We therefore consider that the method of observation used to collect the 
data for this study has also made a contribution. 
9.3.4 Data validation 
The interview data were validated by triangulation at various levels (Ghauri, 2004): 
amongst cases, between cases and context interviews, between both parties to a 
business relationship, between similar questions asked of the same participant, 
between the methods of interviewing and observation, and from data to theory. This 
was intended partly to increase confidence in the findings, but mostly to highlight 
areas for further investigation where different parties reported varying perceptions, 
and to uncover asymmetric power-relationships. It was not intended to identify and 
dismiss non-conforming data, which would have contradicted the abductive approach 
(Blaikie, 2000).  
The study meets standards adapted specifically for qualitative research (Lincoln and 
Guba, 1985), for example: credibility is demonstrated by the author’s long-term 
association with the field site, analytical generalisability has been shown in the close 
link between the literature and the research context, and consistency is apparent in 
the documentation of stages in interpretation. Internal validity was enhanced by the 
author’s repeat visits to the field site, which contributed to a deeper understanding of 
the setting and responses (Lapsley, 2004, Mason, 1996). The reliability of 
interpretation was maximised as far as possible by the choice of language for each 
interview, and the use of multiple questions to confirm the understanding both of the 
participants and of the researcher. The analysis is reliable in the sense of replicability 
(Bryman, 2008), as the coding and fsQCA procedures have been thoroughly 
documented; an attempt to replicate the data collection would, however, not 
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necessarily succeed in collecting the same subjective interpretations from the 
participants (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). The risk of inconsistency in the coding of 
these data was reduced by the establishment of benchmarks, and by frequent cross-
checking between cases during coding. 
Maintenance of the researcher’s objectivity during data collection (Lofland and 
Lofland, 1995) was assisted by her role of outside researcher, as this maintained a 
guest-host relationship in addition to the researcher-participant relationship. The 
researcher also moved between guesthouses at least every two days, which avoided 
excessive immersion in a single firm. The reliability of analysis (Silverman, 2005) is 
supported by comprehensive documentation of analytical procedures, and the use of 
a systematic, computer-assisted method. It is also increased by the empirical 
grounding of the research questions in the exploratory study (Peräkylä, 2004) and in 
the literature. 
9.3.5 Limitations 
The contributions made should be qualified by the limitations of this study. The 
participating firms were the accessible population of the selected study site, which 
has meant that the final research question was shaped around the concerns common 
to this site, and restricts generalisation to other comparable sites. On the other hand, 
this had the advantage of grounding the research in the issues experienced by the 
participants, and avoiding the limitations associated with sampling. It further 
facilitated the inclusion of comparable cases, which would have been more difficult 
to ensure if the cases had been drawn from multiple sites or contexts. 
The number of cases in the study was appropriate to the types of analysis employed, 
and enabled the collection and analysis of very detailed data. If detail had been 
sacrificed in favour of more numerous participants, this could have enabled the 
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drawing of statistical inferences. Most firms could provide only one interviewee, 
which prevented comparison within cases. Comparison was instead made amongst 
cases, and between cases and context interviews, as described above.  
One aspect of reporting on the study that the author feels has reduced its immediacy 
to the reader, however, has been the need to protect the anonymity of the 
participants. QCA demands a detailed knowledge of the cases, which the author has 
attempted to impart to the reader but which has no doubt been hindered by the 
author’s deliberate attempt to disguise the participants’ identities. Furthermore, 
certain characteristics of individual participants would usefully contribute to the 
analysis of their strengths and motivations, but could not be included in the 
discussion because they would have offered an obvious connection to the identities 
of the participants in question. The author therefore offers assurance that where 
participants had such distinguishing features, they have been found not to outweigh 
the openly discussed similarities and differences between cases, so no unique but 
undisclosed features have determined the outcome of the analysis. 
The exploratory nature of this study has yielded a broad understanding of many 
factors, and identified those that are of most importance to the outcome. A deeper 
understanding of why these latter factors arise and how they operate would need to 
be the subject of a future study focused more closely upon them. 
9.4 Future research 
As indicated above, the limitation of the wide scope of the current study opens up the 
possibility of a more tightly-focused study in the future. Having laid the foundations 
for integrating transaction cost and institutional theories, the findings of the current 
study could form the basis of a subsequent study specific to the factors that have 
emerged as the most important: opportunism, enforcement and the development of 
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trust. This could take the form of a more in-depth comparison between two opposing 
cases in the manner of McDermott et al. (2009), to identify further lessons that cases 
without trust could learn from those with trust – both here and in other emerging 
market contexts. Alternatively, the data collected for this study could be used in the 
coding of new fuzzy sets, for just those elements that contribute to opportunism from 
amongst the transaction costs, and trust from the informal institutions. 
The negative case, P6, would merit deeper study. There may be further factors 
contributing to her successful avoidance of isolation despite the disadvantages of 
high transaction costs and weak institutions, which were not included in the original 
study. If her flair for managing relationships with customers, tour operators and 
competitors can be associated with another marked difference from the other firms – 
perhaps in her motivation as an entrepreneur, which might be through choice rather 
than necessity (Reynolds, 2001) – this insight could be of value in suggesting how 
other firms could also avoid isolation. 
Follow-up studies with more numerous cases could be designed to serve a number of 
purposes: to enable an fsQCA analysis without the need for counterfactuals; to seek 
broader support for the idea of an interaction effect, if more cases were found that 
integrated despite high transaction costs or were isolated with variable transaction 
costs; to try out the emergent idea of generalised distrust and specific trust; or to 
explore whether this appears to be associated with particular ethnic groups. A second 
study of the same participants could add an informative longitudinal aspect to the 
study: as all of the participants were first-generation founders, a return to the 
research site by the author in ten years’ time could compare the perceptions, 
responses and degree of specialisation of the next generation of proprietors. In order 
to explore any relationship between rural/ urban location and the development of 
informal institutions, a comparative study could be designed with the addition of an 
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urban site in the same region. This could be the town of Zhongdian, which has a 
similar ethnic mix to the Tiger Leaping Gorge and a growing urban tourism industry, 
or the more mature tourist destination of Lijiang, a UNESCO World Heritage Site to 
the South of the gorge. 
In much broader terms, comparative studies with similar sectors in other emerging 
markets could assess the generalisability of the conclusions. Comparable cases might 
range from the established trekking routes in Nepal, to the nascent provision for 
tourists in the rural north of Vietnam – the country where Rodrik (2008) found 
relational contracting to be effective. Further generalisation could draw on a 
comparison drawn with small firms in a different industrial sector.  
Building on the findings of the current study, a detailed follow-up study could further 
aim to investigate what causes the weak informal institutions, perhaps in connection 
with the Commons literature. For example, Ostrom’s (1992) characterisation of 
communities that are able to develop endogenous solutions to common-pool 
resources share similarities with the participants of the current study. The group is 
small and stable, and – within the limited extent of existing trust relationships – they 
share norms of trust and have low information costs; they also value the continuation 
of their activities. The key difference may lie in the interaction between the 
community and the government: Ostrom sees an optimum involvement where 
authorities lower the transaction costs of reaching community agreements and the 
ability of individuals to enforce them, rather than by imposing rules from outside. 
This takes us again to a future role for public-private organisations as suggested by 
Hausmann and Rodrik (2006). A related broadening of the disciplinary approach 
could extend this study into the field of developmental entrepreneurship, or into 
economic development policy – taking further the ideas of bringing informal 
institutions and local context into the formation of policy recommendations. 
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In conclusion, the author considers that the study has achieved its aim of adapting 
transaction cost theory to more closely apply to this research context. It has shed new 
light on the processes by which trust relationships are formed, and the constraints 
that this places on aspirations for wider, less personal and more specialised trade. 
This may lead to further conceptual development in this area in addition to the 
dissemination of suggestions for policy and practice, both of which could be of great 
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APPENDIX 1: Link from theory to interview topics and fuzzy sets 





Related citation Indicative interview questions Fuzzy 
set 
code 
Description of fuzzy set – Set of 
cases with: 











Oviatt and MacDougall, 
2005 
Nooteboom, 1993 
Do you have, or can you imagine, ownership, 
partnership or formal cooperation with other 
firms? Can you imagine taking over a supplier, 
or being taken over by a tour operator? 
21A4 Company structure without 
internalisation or cooperation 
 2.3.1 Governance of 
individual transactions 




Zhou, Poppo and Yang, 
2008 
Do you conduct arm’s length market 
transactions? Relational trading, cooperation?  
21E1 Transaction governance is 







Buckley and Casson, 
1998 
Which tasks are performed in-house or outside? 
Would you say you have specialised? Has this 
changed over time? 
22F5 Non-specialised, is a generalist in-
house producer 
 3.5.1 Specialisation Lyons, 1995 
Buckley and Casson, 
1998 
Do you prefer to make rather than buy because 
of a fear that suppliers might starve you of 
inputs? Would you switch from make to buy if 
purchasing costs fell or production costs rose? 
22F10 Not specialised because of supply 
risk 
 3.5.1 Specialisation North, 1990 Is it safer not to specialise? Why? Is it like 
insuring against an uncertain future? 
22F11 Not specialised as insurance 











Related citation Indicative interview questions Fuzzy 
set 
code 
Description of fuzzy set – Set of 
cases with: 
 3.5.1 Specialisation Ellis and Biggs, 2001 How many sources of income do you have? Why 
just one/ many? 
22F13 Multiple income sources 
Isolated from 
relationships 




How many suppliers do you buy from, are they 
local/ remote, how often, what volume? 
Relational or arm’s length? 
23D1 Limited number of suppliers 




How many regular or ad-hoc tour operators? 
How many individual guests? 
23D0 Limited number of customers 
 3.5.2 Trust and 
informal constraints 
North, 1990 
Zhou and Poppo, 2008 
 
For how long have you traded with suppliers? 
Does this build trust? Would you buy from a 
stranger? 
23D2 No impersonal exchange in supply 
 3.5.2 Trust and 
informal constraints 
Artz and Brush, 2000 What is your relationship with the other 
guesthouses? Competition, cooperation, 
disinterest? Trust, suspicion? 
23F12 No inter-firm cooperation or cross-
marketing 
RQ1: Perceived causes of transaction costs      
Specificity 2.2.3 Types Williamson, 1985 and 
1991 
Poppo and Zenger, 
2002 
Langlois and Robertson, 
1995 
Lamminmaki, 2005 
Are any assets dedicated to a specific client/ tour 
operator? Anything requested by a specific 
client? E.g. buildings, tailored extensions/ 
improvements, staff members, training received. 
Are you ever fully occupied by a single client 
group? 
TSH1 Investments to support specific 
transactions 
 2.2.3 Risk of 
dependence 
Rao, 2003 Does this make you dependent on that client? Is 
that risky? How could you reduce the risk? 
TSH6 Dependence on the relationship 
with specific customers 
Frequency 2.2.4 Frequency Colbert and Spicer, 
1995 
Do you have high-volume or recurring 
transactions with the same tour operator? 
TFI1 Repeat or high-volume customer 
transactions 
 2.2.4 Frequency Colbert and Spicer, 
1995 
Do you have high-volume or recurring 
transactions with the same supplier? 












Related citation Indicative interview questions Fuzzy 
set 
code 
Description of fuzzy set – Set of 
cases with: 
 2.2.4 Governance Williamson, 1985 Do you manage them differently to one-off 
customer visits? 
TFI3 Perceived importance of long-term 
customer relationship 
 2.2.4 Governance Williamson, 1985 Do you manage them differently to one-off 
purchases? 
TFI4 Perceived importance of long-term 
supplier relationship 
Uncertainty 2.2.5 Perception Williamson, 1985 
Sutcliffe and Zaheer, 
1998 
Werner, Brouthers and 
Brouthers, 1996 
Wholey and Brittain, 
1989 
Dess and Beard, 1984 
Guiler and Guillen, 2010 
Do things happen that affect your firm, but that 
you can’t control or anticipate? E.g. natural 
disasters, competitors’ behaviour, government 
policy, economic change, supply and demand. 
TUJ1 Perception of uncertainty 
 2.2.5 Adaptation Krishnan, Martin and 
Noorderhaven, 2006 
Barthélemy and Quélin, 
2006 
How do you adapt, respond or plan? Does more 
detailed contracting help? 
TUJ3 Active attempts at adaptation/ 
response/  contingency planning 
 2.2.5 Impact Keister, 2001 Do you avoid trade because of uncertainty? 
Does this affect a particular partner? Or many 
partners? 
TUJ5 Avoids trade because of 
uncertainty 
Bounded rationality  2.2.1 Planning Williamson, 1975 Can you plan? What tasks, timescales? TBK1 Perceived difficulty of planning 
due to bounded rationality 
 2.2.1 Asymmetry 
 




Does the seller have information that you don’t? 
Does this put you at a disadvantage? 
TBK2 Awareness of information 
asymmetry, as a buyer 
 2.2.1 Language Buckley and Chapman, 
1998b 
In which languages do you negotiate? Can this 
mean you don’t fully understand the transaction? 












Related citation Indicative interview questions Fuzzy 
set 
code 
Description of fuzzy set – Set of 
cases with: 
 2.2.1 Monitoring North, 1990 
Zhou and Poppo, 2008 
Can you monitor counterparty, at worthwhile 
cost? Would this prevent a contract? 
- [Insufficient responses to code] 




What detail would be included in or omitted from 
a contract? Complex for contingencies, or 
vague/ incomplete? Renegotiate? 
TBK5 Lack of information constrains 
contracts 
Opportunism 2.2.2 Types Williamson, 1985 
Buckley and Chapman, 
1998a 
Wathne and Heide, 
2000 
Do people ever lie, cheat, steal, make promises 
they don’t intend to keep, withhold or distort 
information, take advantage of others? 
TOL1 Awareness of types of 
opportunism 
 2.2.2 Actors Schauwecker and 
Kühlmann, 2007 
Have you seen people taking advantage of or 
cheating customers? 
TOL2 Seen it towards customers, by 
other service providers 
 2.2.2 Actors Schauwecker and 
Kühlmann, 2007 
Have you ever been cheated by your 
customers? 
TOL3 Experienced it by customers 
 2.2.2 Actors Schauwecker and 
Kühlmann, 2007 
Have you ever been cheated by your 
competitors? 
TOL4 Experienced it by competitors 
 2.2.2 Actors Williamson, 1985 Have you ever been cheated by your suppliers? 
Is there more risk, if you have only a few regular 
suppliers? 
TOL5 Experienced it by suppliers, small-
n 
 2.2.2 Fear Williamson, 1985 Do you fear that your firm could be taken 
advantage of by opportunists? Who – 
customers, suppliers, officials? 
TOL6 Fear of cheats 
 2.2.2 Judgment Douma and Schreuder, 
2008 
Can you judge whether a stranger is honest? 
How? Is this effective? 
TOL7 Inability to make judgment/ 
recognise opportunists among 
people they don’t already know 
 2.2.2 Monitoring, 
2.3.3 Combined 
Zhou and Poppo, 2008 
Carson et al. (2006) 
Can you monitor your counterparty, how would 
you respond or retaliate? 












Related citation Indicative interview questions Fuzzy 
set 
code 
Description of fuzzy set – Set of 
cases with: 
causes 
Consequences 2.2.2 Protection, 
2.4.2.1 Context 
Zhou and Poppo, 2008 
Hill, 1990 
Are there social or legal sanctions against 
cheats? Are they effective? 
TOL12 Doesn’t feel protected from 
opportunists 
 2.2.2  Personal 
exchange 
North, 2003 Do you know personally all the suppliers you buy 
from? Do you ever buy from strangers? 
TOL9 Trades only with known suppliers 
 2.2.2 Constrained 
range 
North, 2003 Why not trade with strangers? Would you trade 
more widely, if you knew more suppliers 
personally? 
TOL10 Feels constrained from trading 
more widely 
 2.2.2 Risk North, 2003 Would it be more risky, to buy from suppliers you 
don’t know? 
TOL11 Perceive a risk of impersonal 
exchange 
RQ3: Whether institutions help to understand the response to transaction costs   
Informal institutions      
Trust: who is trusted 4.3.2.1 Trust Peng, 2004 
Child and Moellering, 
2003 
Fukuyama, 1995 
Who do you trust? ITM1 Personal trust limited to kinship 
network 
 4.3.2.1 Trust Peng, 2004 




Do you trust your close family? Wider family, 
kinship network? Do you trust your friends, 
social network? Outsiders? 
ITM3 Trust limited to kinship and social 
network, not beyond 
 4.3.2.1 Trust Lewicki and Bunker, 
1996 
Do you trust people who are similar to you? 
Different to you? 
ITM4 Trust limited to similar people 
 4.3.2.1 Trust Humphrey and Schmitz, 
1998 
 
Can you trust organisations as opposed to 
people? E.g. other firms, banks. 












Related citation Indicative interview questions Fuzzy 
set 
code 
Description of fuzzy set – Set of 
cases with: 
Types of trust 4.3.2.1 Trust Barney and Hansen, 
1994 
Do you have any vulnerabilities? Could they be 
exploited? How do you safeguard them? 
ITN1 Weakness (not strength) of trust 
 4.3.2.1 Trust Granovetter, 1973 Do you value long-term relationships? Recent 
relationships? If they could benefit the firm? 
ITN2 Only value long-term relationships, 
not recent/ weak ties 
 4.3.2.1 Trust Humphrey and Schmitz, 
1998 
Do you conduct simple trades, trade involving 
long-term commitment, international 
cooperation? 
ITN3 Minimal (not extended) trust 
Sequence in 
development 
4.3.2.1 Trust Lewicki and Bunker, 
1996 
Dibben and Harris, 2001 
Zhou and Poppo, 2008 
Could you trade with someone you don’t yet 
trust? Must trust come first? Can trade help to 
develop trust? 
ITN4 Trust must precede business 
transactions 
 4.3.2.1 Trust Dibben and Harris, 2001 Is there anyone you used to trade with, but don’t 
any more? Are you still in contact? 
ITN6 Ceased trade and lost contact with 
former trading partner 
 4.3.2.1 Trust Dibben, Harris and 
Wheeler, 2003 
Do you trust people because of your personal 
disposition? Or determined by situation?  
ITN7 Reasons for trust are dispositional 
(not situational) 
Outcome 4.3.2.1 Trust Steensma, Marino and 
Weaver, 2000  
Does your trust in other people reduce your fear 
of opportunism? Eliminate it? 
ITO1 Personal trust does not reduce 
fear of opportunism 




Does your trust of institutions and other firms 
make you willing to trade with unknown parties? 
ITO2 Impersonal trust does not enable 
impersonal exchange 
Kinship 4.3.2.2  Kinship Whyte, 1996 
Fukuyama, 1995 
Do you employ family members? Wider social 
network? Outsiders? 
IKP2 Employment limited to kin 
 4.3.2.2  Kinship Whyte, 1996 
Fukuyama, 1995 
Do you buy from family members? Wider social 
network? Outsiders? 
IKP3 Trade (suppliers) limited to kin 
 4.3.2.2  Kinship Peng, 2004  Are you protected from opportunists by family, 
friends, police? Self reliant, no protection? 












Related citation Indicative interview questions Fuzzy 
set 
code 
Description of fuzzy set – Set of 
cases with: 
 4.3.2.2  Kinship Peng, 2004 Can you get help in dispute resolution from 
family, friends, police? Self reliant, no 
protection? 
IKP7 Does not involve kin in dispute 
resolution 
Networks/ guanxi 4.3.2.3 Networks Li, Zhou and Shao, 
2008b 
Does your network have a social aim or 
business aim? Or both? 
IGP8 Social network has a non-strategic 
aim 
 4.3.2.3 Networks Zhou and Poppo, 2008 Are you accustomed to network- or guanxi-
based trade? Would you consider a transition to 
impersonal trade?  
IGP9 Resistant to switch to non-guanxi 
transactions 
Negative aspects 4.3.2.3 Networks Douma and Schreuder, 
2008 
Peng, 2003 
Does it take time/ expense to maintain your 
network? 
IGP11 High transaction costs of 
maintaining guanxi or network 
 4.3.2.3 Networks Poppo and Zenger, 
2002 
Child and Moellering, 
2003 
Could you extend your network, or seek 
opportunities outside it? 
IGP13 Pursuit of new opportunities is 
constrained by network 
 4.3.2.3 Networks Whyte, 1996 
Keister, 2001 
Is it hard to compete against older firms with 
extensive networks? 
IGP14 Competitive disadvantage of new 
entrants' limited networks 
 4.3.2.3 Networks Guthrie, 1998 
Luo, 2008 
Can you tell me about using guanxi to “pull 
strings”? 
IGP15 Perception of guanxi as harmful or 
corrupt 
Social sanctions 4.3.2.4 Sanctions Zhou and Poppo, 2008 
Peng, 2004 
Are there social sanctions? Are they an effective 
deterrent to opportunists? 
ISQ2 Sanctions are an ineffective 
deterrent to opportunists 
 4.3.2.4 Sanctions Douma and Schreuder, 
2008 
Are changes in people’s reputations 
communicated? Is this easy, routine? 
ISQ6 Changes in traders' reputations 
are not readily communicated 
 4.3.2.4 Sanctions Keister, 2001 Do you prefer to trade with people who have 
good reputations? Are there any drawbacks? 
ISQ7 Prefers to trade with persons of 
known reputation 
Formal institutions      











Related citation Indicative interview questions Fuzzy 
set 
code 




Bai, Lu and Tao, 2006 
How much?  
If not, what stops you? 
borrowing 
 4.3.1.2  Funding Peng, 2004 
Hu, 2007 
How did you fund your building extensions – 
family, friends, retained earnings? 
FFR5 Lack of access to informal 
borrowing 
 4.3.1.2  Funding Mair and Marti, 2007 
 
Do you have enough funds to participate, 
compete, upgrade/ extend facilities? 
FFR4 Hindered in market participation or 
investment by lack of funds 
 4.3.1.2  Funding Atradius, 2008 Do you ever buy on credit? From whom, on what 
terms? 
FFR7 Cannot make purchases on credit 
 4.3.1.2  Funding Author Do you have insurance (health, buildings)? Is the 
cover adequate? 
FFR8 Has inadequate insurance cover 
Local government 4.3.1.1 Local 
government 
Zhou and Poppo, 2008 
Peng, 2004 
Which levels of government affect your firm? Is it 
helpful? Does it do any harm? 
FGS1 Local government has a negative 
impact on business 




Do you get any government support? Financial, 
allocation of materials? 
FGS8 Does not receive financial support 
from the government 
 4.3.1.1 Local 
government 
Rao, 2003 Is the local government efficient? FGS2 Government bureaucracy is 
inefficient 
 4.3.1.1 Local 
government 
Child and Moellering, 
2003 
Do you have confidence in local government 
officials? 
FGS3 Lack of confidence in government 
officials 
 4.3.1.1 Local 
government 
Child and Moellering, 
2003 
Are the regulations easy to understand? Clear, 
consistent? 
FGS5 Regulations are opaque/ not 
readily understood 
 4.3.1.1 Local 
government 
Author’s fieldwork, 2006 Do the regulations change often? Is it easy to 
stay up-to-date with the regulations? 
FGS4 Regulations change frequently 
 4.3.1.1 Local 
government 
Peng, 2004 Are local government officials fair? If not, does 
this hinder your business? Can you avoid this? 
FGS6 Unfairness by government officials 
hinders the business 
Legal 4.3.1.3 Legal system Cleaver, 2007 Was it expensive (time/ money) to register the 
firm? Are there any benefits? 
FLT1 Company registration was 











Related citation Indicative interview questions Fuzzy 
set 
code 
Description of fuzzy set – Set of 
cases with: 
 4.3.1.3 Legal system Douma and Schreuder, 
2008 
Zhou and Poppo, 2008 
North, 2003 
Do you trade with strangers? Is this risky? Does 
the law protect you? 
FLT3 Cannot rely on legal protection in 
impersonal trade 
 4.3.1.3 Legal system Zhou and Poppo, 2008 Could you take legal action if you were cheated? 
Is it reliable? Is there an alternative? 
FLT4 No legal recourse if cheated, 
informal response is more likely 
 4.3.1.3 Legal system Zhou and Poppo, 2008 Could you take legal action in a dispute? Is it 
reliable? Is there an alternative? 
FLT5 No legal recourse in disputes, 
informal response is more likely 
 4.3.1.3 Legal system North, 2003 Does the law help to reduce the risks of 
uncertainty or opportunism? Is there an 
alternative? 
FLT7 Law does not reduce risk of 
uncertain environment or 
opportunism 
 4.3.1.3 Legal system North, 1994b 
Khanna, 2007 
 
Are you confident of your property rights? Is 
there a risk of expropriation? Do you think you 
would receive compensation? Would it be 
adequate? 
FLT8 Property rights are not secure, 
expropriation is likely 
 4.3.1.3 Legal system North, 1994a 
Poppo and Zenger, 
2002 
Zhou and Poppo, 2008 
Do you think contracts are enforceable? Would 
you contract with a stranger or only with 
someone you already trust? 
FLT10 Contracts are not enforceable 
 4.3.1.3 Legal system Rao, 2003 
Milgrom and Roberts, 
1992 
Is your site affected by pollution? Do you lose 
trade? Are you protected? 
FLT11 Not protected from externality of 
pollution 
 4.3.1.3 Legal system Rao, 2003 Do you have to obey any environmental 
protection regulations? Is this expensive? 
FLT12 Cost of obeying environmental 
protection regulations 
 4.3.1.3 Legal system Cleaver, 2007 
 
Do these formal institutions protect you from 
risk? Do you also your informal methods? In 
which do you have more confidence? 
FLT13 Not confident that they can hedge 
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